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ABSTRACT
The study examines the evolution since the 1950s of the banana 
trades from the former British and former French Cameroons into the 
1982 banana business of the United Republic of Cameroon. As a case 
study in agricultural development, special attention is given to the 
changing viability of smallholders and to the role of the United 
Brands Company in the development of the trade. In studying the 
causes of changes in the business since the Second World War, the 
thesis examines the interaction of markets, technologies, managerial 
structures and the politics of independence in the two Cameroons. In 
that examination, some of the conflicts between the commercial 
requirements of an international trade operating to international 
standards, and the local needs of Cameroon’s governments, society and 
environment are explored.
The findings of the study are based principally on unpublished 
sources. Interviews with all the leaders of the 1982 Cameroon trade 
were complemented by interviews with company people, former 
participants in the trade, and residents of Cameroon who could recall 
the post-war period. Important material has also come from privately- 
held files of those people involved in the banana business. These 
files were of meeting minutes, correspondence and contracts from the 
1950s to the early 1970s and helped to detail the general information 
provided in the interviews.
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- a note on names
The British and French Cameroons were established as Mandated 
Territories of the League of Nations in 1922 with Britain and France 
administering the two Cameroons until their independence and 
reunification in the early 1960s. In 1962, the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon was created after the reunification of the Southern Province 
of the former British Cameroons (the Southern Cameroons) with the 
former French Cameroons.* This Federation consisted of two states:
West Cameroon whose official language was English and which was 
administered according to British traditions, and East Cameroon whose 
official language was French and whose administration was based on 
French practice. Since 1972, when the Federal Republic was replaced 
by the United Republic, there have been no administrative names for 
these two different regions. As a result, the former West Cameroon is 
now often known as "Anglophone" or "English-speaking" Cameroon, while 
the former East Cameroon is called "Francophone" or "French-speaking" 
Cameroon. All of these name changes appear on Maps 1, 2_ and 3_.
When discussing the banana trade in particular, the business on 
the French-speaking side is here referred to as the "Mungo" trade.
This results from the fact that the export banana of French-speaking 
Cameroon has always come from the Department of Mungo, whose 
boundaries have remained unchanged since the period of the Mandate.
The banana trade from English-speaking Cameroon has not been as easily 
labelled. In the first place, the banana-producing region crosses 
several administrative boundaries within the former Southern Cameroons. 
Secondly, these boundaries and the names given to the regions within 
them have changed repeatedly since the trade began during the Mandate. 
As a result, there has been no constant regional name for the banana- 
producing zone of English-speaking Cameroon. Instead, the name used 
here has changed with historical periods, becoming the banana trade 
of, variously, the British or Southern Cameroons, West Cameroon and 
Anglophone Cameroon.
* The Northern Province of the British Cameroons (the Northern
Cameroons) chose to be administered by Nigeria, rather than join 
the Republic of Cameroon.
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Throughout the thesis, the English spelling of Cameroon has been 
employed rather than the French spelling: Cameroun. This follows 
usage in Cameroon where bi-lingual practice has resulted in two 
spellings.
The history of the United Brands Company has also resulted in 
some confusion in the use of company names. The United Brands Company 
was formed in 1970 after the AMK Corporation had taken over the United 
Fruit Company, now an unincorporated division of United Brands. 
However, since much of the discussion in this thesis concerns the 
period before United Brands was formed, the parent company is usually 
called United Fruit. Likewise, the British subsidiary of United 
Brands is now known as the Fyffes Group, Ltd, This name came into 
being in 1969 when Elders and Fyffes Co., Ltd. (established in 1901) 
was forced to reorganise its operations after losses sustained in 
Cameroon. Here again, although usage in 1982 refers to Fyffes, much 
of the present study is about the earlier company, Elders and Fyffes. 
The French subsidiary of United Brands is now, and has been since it 
was formed in 1921, la Compagnie des Bananes. Since first going to 
the Cameroons, both Elders and Fyffes and la Compagnie des Bananes 
have worked there in their own names.
Contrary to practice in much of the francophone literature where 
personal names are written with the family name, in capital letters, 
coming first, we have chosen here to follow the English language 
convention of writing the family name last in upper and lower case.
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INTRODUCTION
The present research grew out of an interest in examining the 
role of a multinational corporation in agricultural development. 
Recognising that both agricultural development and multinationals in 
the Third World are exceedingly complex subjects, it was decided to 
adopt a case study approach. By limiting research to one company in 
one country it was hoped that the as yet unmeasurable phenomena 
involved in a company/host country relationship could be more 
precisely described and analysed. In so doing, it is assumed that the 
perspectives of several disciplines are required. Moreover, 
development is the process and direction of change over time. 
Therefore, not only is the present subject concerned with defining the 
exact nature of a complex relationship, but also with exploring the 
dynamic, changing qualities of that association.
There are no self-evident methodologies for approaching such a 
task. In weighing what might be possible, however, first 
consideration was given to techniques used in other case studies.
Here it was surprising to find that there are few case studies of one 
multinational agricultural business in one developing country, and 
even fewer studies which confront directly the effect of such 
businesses on agricultural development. Rather than concentrate on a 
single company in one country, several economists have studied a 
national or regional economy and a single export crop: Thoburn writing 
on rubber in Malaysia is one such example, and Clower at al writing 
about rubber in Liberia provides another. Ellis’s thesis for the 
University of Sussex, written on the banana trade in Central America, 
is in the same category. Swainson has written about specific 
companies in Kenya, but was concerned with a specific economic 
question: the process of capital formation. None of these writers
needed to utilise material from other disciplines, such as human 
geography, anthropology and politics —  all of which have been 
required in the present case study.^
Historical studies tend to have a broader perspective than 
economic studies, but have also been of limited value in the present 
research. The best of the historical studies is by Fieldhouse, 
Unilever Overseas, but like some of the other histories, it looks at
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one company in several different countries and so fails to explore the 
complexities of any one situation. As a consequence, such histories 
tend to result in an examination of company investment decisions 
rather than a full-scale study of the relationship which has existed 
between any one company, its host country and the business being 
pursued. Other histories have been limited to particular periods, 
e.g. Coquery-Vidrovitch writing about concessionary companies in the 
Congo from 1898 to 1930. Such a study is concerned with a more remote 
past than has been considered here and has not dealt with the
O
evolution of business and host country behaviour into the present.
There are several histories of the United Fruit Company as well 
as several business histories (e.g. Wilkins' studies on American 
multinationals abroad) which refer to the company. There are also one 
or two histories which are either about the Fyffes Group, London —  
one of the United Fruit subsidiaries involved in Cameroon —  or which 
refer to Fyffes at length. All these histories, however, were written 
about company operations and focus on company priorities. They 
contain little discussion about the exact nature of Fyffes1 or United 
Fruit’s relationship with any developing country or any discussion of 
the company’s role in agricultural development. There are also 
several histories of Latin American countries within which United 
Fruit achieves at least a mention and often notoriety. But these 
histories, concerned as they are with the overall political or 
economic events of the region, do not detail the exact nature of the 
company's position in the country or show how that relationship 
functioned. Special mention should be made of the work done in the 
1930s’ by Kepner and Soothill who wrote a two-volume work on the 
banana industry of Central America: The Banana Empire and Social 
Aspects of the Banana Industry. While this is a standard work in the 
literature on the United Fruit Company in Latin America, it has 
offered little guidance to the present study. This is largely due to 
the fact that Kepner and Soothill take a survey approach and so do not 
focus on the whole nature of any one company/host country
3
relationship.
Only two studies have come close to exploring in detail the role 
of a single company in the development of agriculture. One was 
Courade’s Les Plantations Industrielles d'Unilever au Cameroun, 
published by ORSTOM in 1977, and the other is a PhD thesis by Scott
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entitled The Organisation Network: A strategy perspective for 
development, published by University Microfilms in 1979. Of these two 
studies, Courade's work is strong on description of the Unilever 
operations, but weak on the analysis of its significance for 
development, and relation to the host society. Scott's thesis, on the 
other hand, is based on the Booker McConnell Company and, using an 
organisational model, studies the role that the company developed for 
itself in various agricultural development projects in South America 
and Africa. For our purposes, this latter material has been the most 
useful in formulating an approach to the study of a multinational 
company's role in agricultural development.1^
One of the problems of the present topic is that any realistic 
definition of agricultural development must recognise that such 
development is not simply a matter of how much of any agricultural 
product is produced, but is also concerned with the transformation of 
the social structure upon which that production is based. Therefore, 
in discussing the role of a multinational corporation in the 
agricultural development of a country, one is forced to look not just 
at production figures, but also at the society of the region where the 
crop is grown.
In the course of discussing the reshaping of the Booker McConnell 
Company since World War Two, Scott developed a model of the 
organisation network involved in any export agricultural enterprise. 
One of the features of that model which has been applied here is the 
idea of a 'Central Chain' consisting of those organisations or 
individuals performing associated tasks which "add up to the achieving 
of some larger objective, such as .... quantities of a given
C
agricultural commodity available for retail sale." In the case of 
the banana trade of Cameroon, the central chain includes all tasks 
ranging from the field production of bananas to their final retail 
sale. Outside this central or functional chain there is a variety of 
supporting services, e.g financing, as well as interest groups which 
are attached to the central chain itself. When taken altogether,
Scott is able to use his organisational network model to schematize 
the responsibilities of various organisations for different aspects of 
the production and sale of any commodity, including the provision of 
supporting services. In this present study of Cameroon, the same 
approach has been followed, except that little attention has been
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given to many of the supporting services. Instead, analysis has been 
organised around the central chain itself, and in particular around 
those tasks located in Cameroon and most especially related to field 
production.
Where this study departs from Scott's work is in using the 
central chain as a way of schematizing the Cameroon banana trade at 
several different periods of time. This has been important for 
understanding changes in the trade since it began in the 1930s, and 
which have been of two kinds. One concerns the evolving definition of 
the chain itself which has taken place as the technologies of 
production, shipping and sales have advanced. The other, corollary 
change is in the participants of the chain, not all of whom have been 
able to adapt to the new technologies.
There are several reasons for taking this approach. In looking 
at who does what and when, many of the social aspects of agricultural 
development are revealed. A business which incorporates thousands of 
African peasant farmers is very different from one which is based 
solely on the production coming from mutually-independent European 
plantations, which is very different again from a trade based on the 
production of parastatal plantation estates operating on a highly 
industrialised scale. All these differences imply significant 
variations in the kinds of development which have occurred. Just as 
importantly, by looking at changes in the nature of the chain of 
activities itself, one gains some idea of the type of agricultural 
organisation and development which was possible within the commercial 
requirements of the trade at any one time.
In looking at the changes in the central chain over time, this
study has compared two periods: the 1950s, when the trade was booming; 
and the present, 1982 when it is in a state of imminent collapse. In 
tracing the changes that have occurred between those two periods, and 
in trying to sort out the causes of those changes, some of the
fundamental dilemmas surrounding the presence of a multinational
agricultural business in a developing country have been revealed.
Above all, the conflict between the commercial requirements of an 
export trade and the political, social and ecological imperatives of 
the producing country has provided the main theme of the thesis.
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In that conflict, the United Brands subsidiaries in Cameroon have 
always stood at the frontier between commercial pressures of the 
international business and the local pressures of Cameroon’s social 
and physical environment. The company’s position comes out quite 
clearly in studying the responsibilities of the various participants 
in the central chain of activities in the banana trade of Cameroon, 
which, coincidentally, serves further to justify the approach that has 
been taken.
The methodology evolved in this work was developed in part out of 
a recognition that demographic and agricultural statistics would be 
difficult to find and, once found, not necessarily reliable. The best 
example of this difficulty occurs in the task of trying to assemble 
figures for the amount of bananas exported from the former French 
Cameroons from the 1950s to the present, broken down according to 
whether the fruit came from plantation estates or smallholdings. In 
the end, only one source for this information was found: a line graph 
on the wall of the director’s office at the Institut de Recherches 
Agronomiques, Nyombe. The graph is old, discoloured, and badly-lit, 
and it is nearly impossible to estimate accurately the numbers which 
had been used as points to draw the various lines. Similarly, it was 
difficult to find any maps which showed where the plantation estates 
were located and where smallholder banana production was taking place. 
Ideally, one would like to have been able to construct several such 
maps for several different periods of the trade. This, however, was 
impossible from existing maps and equally impossible if one tried to 
use land tenure records. These latter were not kept in any consistent 
form in French-speaking Cameroon and, moreover, there has never been - 
- in either French- or English-speaking Cameroon —  land tenure 
records for holdings held under various kinds of customary law.
In the virtual absence of concrete, quantifiable Information, the 
value of approaching an analysis of the business from the point of 
view of changes in the central chain of activities and its 
participants became even more important. In establishing the nature 
of those changes, published sources were found to be wholly 
inadequate. Research began, therefore, with unstructured interviews 
with representatives of all the major participants in the trade today, 
as well as with individuals who were involved at earlier periods.
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Here it should be noted that most interviews were held with those in a 
position to manage various aspects of the trade and did not penetrate, 
except on rare occasions, below a managerial level. It should also be 
noted that careful attention was paid to the order in which interviews 
took place, so that by and large the more senior people were 
interviewed first and asked for introductions to others working with 
them. The best example of this is the fact that when approaching 
people in the United Brands Company, care was taken to seek first the 
approval of the central office in New York, then to speak with 
officers of the London subsidiary, Fyffes, and from Fyffes receive 
introductions to the Paris office of la Compagnie des Bananes who, in 
turn, were able to present the study to company people in Cameroon.
The director of the company in Cameroon was extremely helpful in 
arranging interviews with planters and other participants in Cameroon. 
This approach was taken on the grounds that unless the company!s trust 
and cooperation were involved, very little could be learned about a 
business for which there are few visible records. Moreover, within 
Cameroon, the company’s advice on the correct protocol for meeting 
various government officials was very valuable and helped to keep to a 
minimum many of the delays usually associated with working in Africa.
As a result of these interviews, access was gained to personal 
and company files which proved to be an additional and extremely 
valuable source of information generally kept within the trade. These 
archives contained working documents from the late 1950s into the 
early 1970s, including contracts, correspondence and meeting minutes, 
all of which helped to specify information that the interviews 
themselves could only indicate in broad outlines. The files also 
served to identify issues that had not surfaced in the early 
interviews but which were then discussed as research progressed.
The approach taken in researching the material for this thesis 
was not the same as the logic used in writing it up, which has instead 
been based on the need to balance three different sets of ideas. The 
first set is concerned with the contrast between the 1950s and the 
1980s. The second results from the fact that today’s banana trade from 
the United Republic of Cameroon is based on the remnants of two 
earlier trades: one from the southern province of the former British 
Cameroons, the other from the Department of Mungo in the former French 
Cameroons. Thus, although all discussion of the present is fairly
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unified, most of the discussion of the 1950s and of the politics of 
independence in the early 1960s inevitably divides along the dualistic 
political boundaries of the times.
Finally, it has been reasoned that there are three major factors 
of crucial importance in explaining the changes in the trade and its 
participants from the 1950s to 1982. These are: (i) a changing 
technology of field production as forced by a rising international 
market standard; (ii) changes in managerial structures which resulted 
from political events and from technological pressure; and (iii) 
changes in the political and social framework of Cameroon which have 
both influenced and been influenced by the dynamics of the banana 
trade.
In an attempt to present this material with a minimum of 
complications, the outline has followed a broadly chronological 
approach. This serves, first of all, to develop a sense of how and 
why the banana trade of the 1950s in the French and British Cameroons 
differed so markedly from the trade of 1982. Second, the chronology 
of events is the best context in which the interaction of the 
technologies, managerial structures and politics can be shown as a 
process rather than as a static paradigm. Thus, the first chapter is 
a discussion of the markets and technologies of the 1950s, while the 
penultimate chapter, Chapter 6, explores the nature of the Cameroon 
banana trade in 1982. Between these two chronological poles, the
m
material divides in order to accomodate discussion of the managerial 
structures and politics of the French- and English-speaking banana 
trades. Here, the managerial structures of the 1950s are discussed 
first on the British side and then on the French side. This is 
followed by the politics of reunification in Anglophone Cameroon which 
leads into a discussion of the politics of independence in Mungo.
This approach has allowed for the emergence of several kinds of 
discussion. There is the implied comparison of the banana trades from 
the English- and the French-speaking territories. There is also the 
development of the trade from the 1950s to the present. Most 
importantly, however, there is the examination of the dynamic relation 
of technologies, managerial structures and politics, which 
demonstrates the tension between local and international objectives. 
The technologies have developed from the producers' need to respond to
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the ecological capacity of their own agricultural regions and 
simultaneously to the quality requirements of the more distant market 
countries. This is the first and most fundamental of the tensions 
between the local and international imperatives and it affects 
everything else. The managerial structures, which must in part be 
designed to accommodate the technical requirements of the trade, are 
also in large part defined according to who is participating in the 
central chain of activities. Thus, management reflects the fact that 
participants include both Cameroonians and Europeans and becomes 
thereby not just a way of organising a particular set of technical 
tasks, but also a reflection of the more cultural components of the 
trade, representing again both local and international values. The 
politics of reunification and independence in Cameroon during the 
early 1960s and afterwards serve as an explanatory link between the 
1950s and the 1980s. However, an attempt has been made not just to 
chronicle the events of the period, but to detail the manner in which 
aspects of the banana trade influenced political decisions and how 
those decisions both local and international, in turn affected the 
export banana trade.
It is from this rather elaborate set of ideas that the final 
chapter, "Choices, 1982", looks at the present state of the industry 
in Cameroon and the problems it faces. In weighing what options are 
now open to participants in the trade, this chapter attempts to draw 
on what has been learned about the technologies, management and 
politics of the export banana trade of Cameroon. In so doing, the 
thesis returns to the original interest in the role of a multinational 
corporation in agricultural development. The problem, however, is 
here examined from two perspectives: first that of the Cameroon
government which must decide the kind of agricultural development it 
wants for the banana zone of the country; and second, that of the 
United Brands Company, which must decide whether or not to continue 
working in the country at all.
One finds, in the end, that both the government and the company 
are forced to consider a great number of local and international 
factors. Of these factors, it is extremely difficult to say which are 
the most important and the most likely to influence decisions in the 
future. In fact, the relative weight of these elements is something 
that seems to shift with circumstance and history. It is hoped,
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however, that in identifying the major components of such decisions 
and in demonstrating their interaction over time, some progress has 
been made in the analysis of the complex phenomena of agricultural 
development and multinationals in the Third World.
- 22 -
CHAPTER 1
MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF THE 1950s
In making any comparison of the Cameroon banana trade of the 
1950s with that of 1982, one is immediately struck by the enormous 
difference in the volume of trade involw ved. This is shown clearly in 
Figure 1, on the following page* Figure 1 is admittedly a comparison 
of extremes, but is still of value. What makes this fall in 
production even more dramatic is —  as will be shown -- the fact that 
although a considerably reduced area is devoted to the banana trade in 
1982 (see Maps 4 and _5), it is planted in a variety which should be 
producing anywhere from three to ten times more fruit than was 
produced per hectare in the 1950s.
Looked at most broadly, and leaving aside for the moment the 
special difficulties of the 1982 trade, there are two major historical 
reasons for the difference in volume between the 1950s and 1982. The 
first is that the southern region of the British Cameroons lost Its 
access to the British market when it chose in 1962 to join the former 
French Cameroons in the Federal Republic. Since no other market was 
ever found for large quantities of West Cameroon bananas, both 
production and export declined. The second reason is that as the 
trade matured after the Second World War, the smallholder was less and 
less able to compete. By 1982, he had virtually disappeared. Since 
sixty percent of the bananas of the 1950s peak was coming from 
smallholders, their absence has considerably lowered the overall 
volume of production. The importance of both of these factors has 
been Illustrated in Figure 2 on the following page.
The effect of reunification on the banana trade of West Cameroon 
—  and hence on 1982 production —  is discussed in Chapter 5 : "The 
Politics of Reunification". In this present chapter we take a look at 
the reasons for the success of the 1950s smallholder and try to show 
why that success became harder and harder to maintain. We also 
examine some of the history behind the role of plantations in the 
banana trade, and why, given the nature of the export banana trade,
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Figure 1. BANANA EXPORTS OF CAMEROON
Peak exports of the 1950s versus estimated exports of 1982
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Figure 2. IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTION FROM SMALLHOLDERS AND THE 
BRITISH CAMEROONS DURING THE 1950s.
1950s peak banana exports from the Cameroons 
( by tonnage )
Smallholders
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British Cameroons 
43%
British Cameroons:
Plantations
Smallholders
1982 banana exports from  Cameroon
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Source: See Note 1, Chaoter 1
Ma
p 
4 
ES
TI
M
A
TE
D
 
EX
TE
NT
 
OF
 
BA
NA
NA
 
C
UL
TI
VA
TI
O
N 
IN 
TH
E 
Ma
p 
5 
ES
TI
M
A
TE
D
 
EX
TE
NT
 
OF
 
BA
NA
NA
 
CU
LT
IV
AT
IO
N 
IN 
TH
E 
CA
M
ER
O
O
NS
 
- 
19
50
s 
CA
M
ER
O
O
NS
 
- 
19
82
oo
° 5
O TO
2 re 3 d
£ > u  C
ro 3 ® cCD o Z  x:
26
plantation ideas have tended to dominate production. Before beginning 
those two discussions, however, it is important to look at the nature 
of the markets where the Cameroons banana was being sold. Market 
conditions in the 1950s were considerably more propitious for the 
success of the smallholder than they have been at any time since then, 
a fact which is easy to overlook in analysing the earlier success of 
the smallholders of the two Cameroons.
1950s Markets
The two Cameroons, British and French, had two principal markets 
in the 1950s —  Britain and France. Both of these markets were 
protected, and had been since the 1930s. In Britain, this protection 
had begun at the 1932 Ottawa Conference which decided to counteract 
the effects of the depression by protecting trade within the British 
Empire. For the banana trade, the Imperial Preference of 1932 
guaranteed that bananas from within the Empire would carry a duty that 
was one half-crown lower per hundredweight than bananas from outside 
the Empire. The immediate effect of the Imperial Preference was to 
divert Jamaican bananas from the United States1 market to Britain.^ 
During the Second World War, Jamaican production dwindled and then had 
a difficult time recovering in the early post-war years. As a result, 
Elders and Fyffes, who handled most of the banana trade into Britain 
at this time, asked the government for permission to begin importing 
fruit from the British Cameroons.^ By the late 1950s, twenty 
percent of Elders and Fyffes banana sales in Britain were of 
Cameroonian fruit.^
It was also in the 1930s that France first restricted her banana 
trade to the French territories, principally to protect the Antilles 
islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe. This protection, however, also 
had the effect of stimulating production in the French Cameroons both 
before and after the war, since the Antilles alone were unable to meet 
the demands of the French market. The other important producers for 
the French market were Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar, but 
throughout the 1930s and then the 1950s the market was still open 
enough to absorb the rising production of all these countries.
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It is important to remember that this market absorbancy in the 
1950s and the rising banana production one sees in both Cameroons 
during the first decade after the Second World War were very much 
post-war phenomena. During the war, production was either halted or 
destroyed largely because shipping had been diverted to war duties and 
was not available for the trade. In 1939, for example, Elders and 
Fyffes had twenty-one ships in service. Only seven survived the war; 
all the others were mined, torpedoed or sunk.^ The fact that for 
much of the war, therefore, no fruit was arriving in Europe, meant 
that after the war producers were working for a market which was 
expanding from zero. As a result, the combined efforts of all 
producers were needed to meet the demands of a population which had 
not been able to buy the fruit for four or five years. Only as the 
1950s drew to a close and as the market became saturated did producers 
find themselves in the position of competing with each other in order 
to control larger shares of a market which was no longer capable of 
expansion.
Both of these factors —  the protected economies of the late- 
colonial period and the ever-increasing demand for bananas in the two 
European markets —  were responsible for encouraging production in the 
two Cameroons during the 1950s. It is just as important, however, 
that the quality of fruit which was expected during this period was
lower than the quality which is taken as the trade’s standard today.
A memorandum written in 1961 by the banana producers’ organisation in 
Mungo, where the French-speaking trade has always been centred, notes 
that the fruit being exported was being sorted into two classes which 
received two different prices.
Les fruits venant des plantations industrialisdes qui sont 
classes comme premier choix, sont vendus a un prix supdrieur de 7 
frs. m§tro par kilo et les regimes dits "ordinaires" ou "tout 
venant" en provenance de toutes les autres plantations et qui 
sont vendus comme je viens de le dire 7 frs. mdtro moins cher le
kilo. C’est done la qualitd qui est en jeu et qui nous impose
ces diffSrentes ventes.^
What is significant is that this question of quality only became vital 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
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Smallholders Versus Plantation Technologies
The generosity of the banana market in Europe during the 1950s 
encouraged the booming production in both Cameroons. The existence of 
the market alone, however, would not have been enough to ensure the 
great success of the trade had it not also been true that a number of 
local factors were equally propitious. Taken together, they argue 
that banana production of the 1950s was based less on the careful 
management of a renewable natural resource than it was on the quick 
exploitation of highly favourable circumstances —  a process which 
was, in the end, more like a rapid mining operation than like sound 
agricultural husbandry. This was particularly true of the production 
coming from smallholders, as illustrated in the following discussion 
which contrasts smallholder and plantation strategies for managing the 
more important factors of production.
Land
Figures 3 and 4_ demonstrate that for much of the 1950s, 
plantation production was exceeded by the volume of fruit coming from 
smallholders’ cooperatives. Moreover, much of this smallholder
production was based on land which had been cleared from primary
forest and where the soils were thus at their maximum fertility.
That it was new land, and not the conversion of old farms, comes
out in a description of the very fluid evolution of smallholder land
use that was taking place at this time. According to people who grew 
up in the British Cameroons during the banana boom, the typical 
pattern in the area around Kumba was first to clear the forest for 
bananas, and then plant the banana rhizomes among the fallen trees.
The fertility supplied by the decaying forest vegetation was then 
sufficient to support a productive banana crop for two or three years, 
or even longer depending on the quality of the soil. As returns from 
the banana crop diminished, the man who had cleared the farm would put 
in robusta coffee plants or cocoa, using the last year or two of the 
banana crop to provide shade for the young trees. By the time the 
bananas were no longer producing profitably, a new cash crop was well 
in hand. This system had the advantage of securing certain rights to 
the land for the person who had cleared it, as customary law in this 
period granted title, not to the cleared land, but' to the permanent
- 29 -
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Figure 3. WEST CAMEROON BANANA EXPORT TONNAGE, 1955-64 . tonnes
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cash crops planted on it. Unwilling to abandon land he had taken the 
trouble to clear, a man was then able to secure both its use and 
profitability by putting in a second cash crop. The more enterprising 
farmers might then go on to clear more ground for bananas and start 
the cycle over in a new location.^
Under this dynamic system, one can well picture the situation of 
a man who would, after about ten years of work, have several fields 
producing a mixture of crops at different stages of this cycle and 
probably in several different locations. Other people, perhaps the 
actual majority of growers in the banana boom, may only have raised 
bananas for a short period of time. Afterwards, finding the crop too 
demanding to sustain in spite of the profits which had been made (and 
which were, in any case, declining towards the end of the 1950s and 
early 1960s), they would either abandon the land they had cleared or 
convert it to crops they found more suitable.
Unfortunately, no maps have been found which give an accurate 
idea of the extent of the land put into bananas after the war. 
Nonetheless, a rough measure of the evolution of smallholder land use 
can be gauged by working back from the export tonnages which appear in 
Figures 3 and _4. The peak of smallholder production was achieved in 
1957 in Mungo, in the French Cameroons, and in 1960 in the British 
Cameroons. The total for these two years combined is about 98,000 
metric tonnes of smallholder fruit. Estimating from three to five 
tonnes per hectare, one can conclude that from 20,000 to over 30,000 
hectares of land were being used to produce bananas outside of the 
plantations estates. If one then looks at the export tonnages 
from smallholders three years before peak production (i.e. 1957 in the 
British Cameroons and 1954 in Mungo) one finds smallholders shipping 
out about 52,000 metric tonnes, produced on an estimated 10,000 -
17,000 hectares of land. Regardless of which conversion figure is 
taken, it is clear that in the course of increasing smallholder
Q
exports, a great deal of new land was coming into use.
In contrast to smallholdings, most of the plantation land in 
the British and the French Cameroons had already seen a fairly high 
level of banana production during the 1930s. Much of the area of 
Mungo was settled in this period by both French and Cameroonian 
immigrants, many of whom based their livelihoods on the export banana
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plantations. Meanwhile, in the British Cameroons from 1928 to 1933 
the banana crop came to replace rubber as the chief export crop being
Q
raised by the German plantation managers of the inter-war period.
However, the extent to which the plantation land might have been 
run down during the 1930s was considerably minimised by the 
interruption in exports caused by World War Two. In effect, this 
inability to export forced a fallowing of the plantation land which 
had been in bananas during the 1930s. This was particularly true in 
the French Cameroons, where the Mungo planters were the recipients of 
a subsidy from the British government that was eventually used to 
finance a well-planned schedule of uprooting, sowing leguminous cover 
crops, and later replanting bananas, which left the plantations ready 
for the booming post-war trade.^
In the British Cameroons, things went another step further by 
bringing nearly all the 1930s private plantations under one 
coordinated management. The process began soon after the war started 
when the Custodian of Enemy Property took over the plantations from 
the Germans who had owned and managed them during the inter-war years. 
Eventually, the title to this land was passed to the state (at that 
time colonial Nigeria which administered the British Cameroons), but 
was leased back to the Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC). The 
CDC was set up to develop the plantation land for the benefit of the
inhabitants of the territory and was given parastatal status with a
number of far-reaching obligations. In working during the early years 
to meet those obligations, the CDC chose to rely heavily on the quick, 
high income generated by the banana crop. In doing so, they made a 
considerable effort to renew the plantations which had previously been 
in private German hands and then largely neglected during the war.
The fact that the 1950s plantations were based on these earlier 
enterprises forced the managers to take a very different attitude 
towards their crop from that adopted by smallholders. Simply by using
the war period to regenerate the land, the plantation managers had
already begun shifting their style from that of exploiting an 
exceedingly rich but still limited soil, to that of managing the 
preservation of its assets. The smallholders, however, were still 
relying on the fertility of newly-cleared land and on the assumption 
that new land to clear would continue to be available as it had been
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in the past. As can be seen from Map 6 , it is an assumption that 
could not long endure, particularly for the better volcanic soils.
It Is also important that plantations were planting a single crop 
while the smallholders, in developing newly-clearly land, usually 
finished with several different crops in a single field. In some 
ways, the plantations were taking the greater risks by concentrating 
all their investment, land and labour on a single crop. Their 
vulnerability to disease and soil infertility was all the greater and 
was Inevitably exposed much earlier than that of the newly-cleared 
smallholdings. This, in fact, shows up quite plainly on the line 
graphs of export tonnage (Figures 3 and 4) where the plantation 
tonnage in both the British and French Cameroons peaks several years 
before that of the smallholders.
Sigatoka Disease
That a number of smallholders found it difficult to make the 
change from a "mined" to a managed banana crop shows up clearly in 
discussing Sigatoka disease. It is also a point where some of the 
conflicts between plantations and smallholdings appear most 
irreconcilable. This is true because, although there are a number of
diseases which a banana planter can treat —  or not treat —  without
affecting his neighbour’s plantation, Sigatoka disease is not one of 
them. Sigatoka is a fungus transmitted by airborne spores. For many 
years it was completely absent from Cameroon, first appearing only in
the late 1930s. It began to spread widely with the increase in
production in the 1950s and also began to assume more virulent 
f orms
The best control of the disease has always been regular crop 
spraying. While this can be done from back-carried sprayers, the most 
effective control is achieved by regularly scheduled aerial treatment. 
In Mungo, this led to the creation of CATA, Cooperative Agricole de 
Traitement Aerienne, which was set up by the Syndicat de Defense des 
Interits Bananiers, a growers’ organisation which at the time 
represented both plantations and smallholders as well as shipping and 
sales organisations involved in the banana trade of the French 
Cameroons. This arrangement for disease treatment broke down when the 
price of bananas fell in 1959 and the smallholders pulled out of CATA
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in order to keep as personal income a greater share of the banana's
1 0earnings. In the British Cameroons, the large plantations of the
Cameroons Development Corporation and the Likomba plantation of the
Elders and Fyffes Company were sprayed from the air under a joint
agreement. The smallholders’ cooperative, the Bakweri Cooperative
Union of Farmers, was responsible for the treatment of the
smallholders’ farms. This was usually done by back-carried sprayers,
in large part because the forest canopy around the individual farms
1 3was too much of an obstruction for effective aerial treatment.
Regardless of what arrangements were made, neither the small­
holders in Mungo nor those in the British Cameroons liked spraying. 
There was considerable resentment of the cost and a general lack of 
conviction that the treatment made any difference. If, in addition, 
farmers were only raising the banana as a short-term, transitional 
crop, then they may have been unwilling to make any investment to 
protect a crop they regarded as temporary.
The smallholders1 reluctance to spray against Sigatoka was not 
well viewed by plantation managers. Because they were handling only 
one crop, it was in their interest to be more disciplined in treating 
any disease which affected that crop. Clearly, from a plantation 
point of view, it was counter-productive for a manager to spray his 
fields routinely when these fields were surrounded by scattered 
holdings which were untreated and continued to be carriers of disease. 
As a result, the usual plantation reaction to smallholder resistance 
to participate in spraying was to criticise the farmers' ignorance, 
laziness and greed, even though a smallholder’s reluctance may have 
been well-founded in a very different set of priorities from those of 
the larger estates.
However, it is not clear that even with the full cooperation of 
smallholders the plantations could ever be fully protected. The 
banana -- in all of its many varieties —  can be found in almost any 
garden in Cameroon. It is also true that as banana fields were 
abandoned, they were not necessarily ploughed under, but left in a 
semi-wild state. Thus, it is likely that no treatment could ever have 
been so comprehensive that it would have eliminated all incidence of 
the disease. Treatment, therefore, was more wisely seen as a 
necessary measure to maintain the quality of the fruit being exported.
- 36 -
In this sense, pressure on the smallholders to spray grew up as much 
in the name of ensuring the market quality of Cameroon fruit sent 
abroad as it was to control the spread of the disease.
What is important about Sigatoka disease in Cameroon is that 
smallholder expansion during the 1950s was predicated on an assumption 
that the disease was either absent or not terribly damaging. As this 
became less and less true, the smallholder was forced to reconsider 
his involvement in the banana trade in the light of the growing 
necessity to pay for treatments that had not previously been seen as 
important.
Panama Disease, Conversion and Packing Stations
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the cost of producing 
competitive fruit for an international market was becoming 
increasingly difficult for smallholders to maintain. The initial 
absence of wide-spread disease and the high fertility of recently 
cleared land had acted as a form of subsidy from the natural resources 
of the banana-producing zone. As the subsidy ended, the smallholder 
found himself unable or unwilling to make up the difference from his 
own resources. This problem of financing smallholder conversion from a 
"mined" to a managed crop became even more difficult as Panama disease 
became more widespread. Despite several decades of research in Latin 
America, by the late 1950s and early 1960s there was still no 
effective treatment against Panama disease which infects the soil of 
the banana fields where it is found. As a result, producers were 
increasingly being forced to switch from the Gros Michel banana to a 
disease-resistant variety usually known as Cavendish in English- 
speaking Cameroon and Poyo on the French-speaking side.
Most of the people involved in the Cameroon banana trade today 
are veterans of the boom period of the 1950s. In talking with many of 
them about that period and the changes since then, they will almost 
always preface their remarks by pointing out that "that was the period 
of the Gros Michel". In many respects, the Gros Michel was ideally 
suited for the boom conditions and pluralistic participation of the 
1950s Cameroon banana trade. It is extremely easy to cultivate and, 
more importantly, it is an extremely tough fruit which is tolerant of 
rough handling and thus easy to ship. In this sense, it is a much
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simpler fruit for smallholder propagation than the varieties grown 
now, as it can withstand the rough transport conditions involved in 
collecting fruit from numerous scattered small farms. By comparison 
with the Cavendish varieties, however, it is extremely low-yielding. 
Even under plantation conditions it produces only nine to eleven 
tonnes per hectare compared with thirty to thirty-five tonnes for the 
Cavendish. Where there is still considerable access to land as was 
true during the 1950s in Cameroon —  this low yield per hectare is not 
as important as it becomes when the land area being cultivated for 
bananas cannot expand.
In fact, the decision to convert was taken only gradually with 
first the large plantations leading the way. The decision was 
complicated by the fact that the banana trade in both the British and 
the French Cameroons was badly hit by the politics of independence 
around 1960. These events are covered in later chapters, but what is 
of importance here is that as a result of those events producers were 
faced not just with the difficult and expensive decision of whether "to 
convert, but with the decision whether to continue producing export 
bananas at all. In the British Cameroons, the question of conversion 
was largely answered by the political decision to federate with the 
French-speaking Cameroons in the new Federal Republic. With the 
subsequent loss of the Commonwealth preference and with it the ability 
to compete in the British market, the commercial viability of both 
plantations and smallholders in English-speaking Cameroon had 
evaporated by 1966-67. Only the Cameroons Development Corporation 
continued —  on a very limited scale and at the request of the 
government in Yaounde —  to export bananas.^
The situation in Mungo was somewhat different. By 1960, the 
plantations had already begun converting their holdings to the new 
varieties and a steady increase in Poyo exports can be seen from that 
date onwards. The conversion of the smallholders' farms was less 
successful and several government projects foundered on mis-management 
and corruption before disappearing altogether. Finally, in the late 
1960s, the government's Organisation Camerounaise des Bananes took 
over much of the smallholders' land and converted it not just to the 
Poyo variety, but to a more industrial style of plantation management 
as well, a process which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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The failure of smallholders in Mungo to maintain their 
independent commercial viability is due to a number of factors —  
political, managerial and financial. Of the three, however, the 
economics alone were prohibitive. In addition to the increased need 
to fertilise the land, spray against Sigatoka disease, and convert to 
resistant varieties, the early sixties also saw growing pressure to 
improve the packing of bananas. At first, this meant only that the 
stems of fruit —  previously shipped naked —  should be wrapped 
individually in polythene. By 1965, this had escalated to a 
requirement that all fruit be cut from the stems, washed, disinfected, 
graded and packed in forty-pound cardboard cartons. The transition to 
boxing was slow throughout the trade, but as the industry worldwide 
began to abandon the Gros Michel with its ability to travel without 
heavy bruising, the necessity to protect the new Cavendish bananas 
increased and boxing became one of the standards of the business.
The replanting of banana fields wiHv the resistant varieties was 
expensive and time-consuming. But it had clear economic limits and, 
once the decision was taken and effected, the financial blow could be 
worked off, probably at a fairly fast rate given the high yields. The 
same was not true of the subsequent necessity to establish packing 
stations for the sorting and boxing of fruit. In addition to the 
initial expense of setting up the stations, there was the recurrent 
cost of providing the labour and materials involved in operating the 
station every week or ten days when a shipment was made. This new 
operating expense followed the gradual accumulation of expenses for 
fertiliser, and disease and pest control. It is not surprising, then, 
that the economic viability of the smallholder in this situation was 
becoming more and more tenuous.
In the case of the Cameroon banana trade, the smallholder’s 
viability in the 1950s was based on newly-cleared soil, a particularly 
generous post-war market in Europe, the initial absence of several 
major banana diseases, and a variety, the Gros Michel, which could 
tolerate rough transport and bad roads. By the late 1950s and early 
1960s, all of these conditions had begun to change, squeezing the 
smallholder between a more demanding market in Europe and the 
declining productivity and quality of his banana crop in Cameroon. In 
that squeeze, a number of efforts —  some of which will be discussed 
later —  were made to keep the smallholder as a participant in the
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export banana trade. Most of these efforts, however, were based on 
the assumption that the plantation style of monocrop production could 
be applied to smallholders. This, in fact, was never achieved. But 
it is of interest in the next section to take a look at why plantation 
management was being assumed, in order to understand its place in the 
thinking of those individuals in a position to decide the future 
organisation of the Gameroon banana trade in the years following 
independence.
Vertical Integration and the Industrial Plantation Model
If one looks at the entire history of the banana crop in Cameroon 
since the 1930s it is significant that for most years exports 
consisted principally of plantation production rather than the fruit 
from smallholders. Certainly the period of successful smallholder 
participation in the 1950s was marked more by exceptional and 
essentially temporary circumstances than by the discovery of new ways 
of involving smallholders in an old trade —  although the organisation 
of smallholders1 cooperatives was an important innovation, especially 
in the British Cameroons.
Part of the importance of the plantation is that it is 
undoubtedly an easier unit to integrate into the long chain of 
activities from field production to final sale. Here it needs to be 
stressed that, unlike a number of other cash crops, the export banana 
is particularly dependent on a vertically integrated production and 
marketing structure. This is largely due to the fact that bananas 
cannot be stored for any length of time and must therefore be moved 
quickly from field to market, usually over fairly long distances.
This task is probably most efficiently accomplished by a vertically 
integrated structure operating under a single management.
Such a structure was an important achievement of the young United 
Fruit Company in the Americas, which provides a good illustration of 
this kind of organisation. When the company was formed in 1899 it 
joined the Latin American land and rail holdings of Minor Cooper Keith 
and the shipping and marketing assets of the Boston Fruit Company. In 
their first annual report, dated 20 March 1900, the company had about
86,000 hectares of land in Columbia, Santa Domingo, Cuba, Jamaica,
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Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, about a third of which was under
production, principally of bananas. The company also owned eleven
steamships, rented or chartered another twelve to thirty more, and had
1 5113 miles (182 kilometers) of railroad. In addition, the company
owned the Fruit Dispatch Company, which had been set up in the 1890s
by the Boston Fruit Company to specialise in the ripening and
distribution of bananas once they arrived in the United States from 
1 fi
the tropics. By 1913, this shipping, production and sales system 
was linked together by the Tropical Radio and Telegraph Company, an 
incorporated subsidiary of the United Fruit Company^ which is still
part of United Brands today as the TRT Telecommunications
18Corporation. In the same year, the directors voted to attempt to
1 9supply eighty percent of their fruit from their own plantations,
and in 1916, a botanist, Wilson Popenoe, was hired to do tropical 
20research. Thus, by 1920, the United Fruit Company was already 
emerging as an elaborate, integrated system. Bananas could be grown, 
transported to harbour, shipped and distributed through company 
subsidiaries alone.
In the context of that system, it is significant that the United 
Fruit Company directors wanted to depend on their own plantations for 
the majority of their bananas. This is not surprising. By that time, 
a dependable supply of fruit in sufficient and predictable quantities 
was needed to provision the extensive company infrastructure that had 
been created. In fact, the company never did rely completely on its 
own plantations, buying fruit from independent producers as well. But
the independents were often independent plantations, rather than 
smallholders. In 1935, for example, the company offered loans, 
materials and engineers to help equip 13,000 acres of private land
(5300 hectares) with the machinery to spray against Sigatoka disease
21from permanent overhead spraying pipes. This is not to say that 
smallholders were never involved in the Latin American banana trade. 
Certainly Jamaica and the Windward Islands both have long traditions 
of smallholder production. However, one suspects that if the whole 
industry were studied over a long period of time, smallholder 
participation would probably be seen as episodic, or only permanent in
selected locations.
In this respect, it is important that the plantation —  whether 
in bananas or some other crop —  represents the industrialisation of
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agriculture. As such, the object of a plantation is to produce a
single product in large quantity on a regular basis at a consistent
quality. In achieving that objective, the plantation has developed
many of the features of a sophisticated assembly-line factory and
functions as the main productive unit of a coordinated industry. As
such, it is a highly disciplined operation which not only supports an
elaborate infrastructure for shipping and sales, but which often
depends on that structure for marketing, materials and technical 
9 9
knowledge.
It is important to recognise that this kind of plantation is an 
industrial unit. As such it has developed over the years into an 
organisation that achieves its maximum efficiency through access to 
the most advanced agronomic research working in tandem with a highly 
structured and disciplined work force performing routine tasks 
according to a well-defined schedule. It is this kind of plantation 
that has, worldwide, consistently been at the forefront in the 
development and application of production techniques in the banana 
trade. It is also this kind of plantation which has produced the 
highest, uniform quality of fruit and which has classically been taken 
as the model for any banana industry trying to achieve the best 
possible standards of production.
Because it is essentially an industrial creation, part of its 
strength lies in the disciplined ordering of work and the ability to 
produce and .ship fruit In harmony with the larger vertical system of 
transport, ripening and sales. But the industrial plantation is also 
valued for the consistent quality and quantity of fruit it produces, 
all of which are factors of critical importance in the discussions 
that follow.
The post-World War Two banana trade of Cameroon has never 
functioned along the lines of an early United Fruit style of vertical 
integration under a single management. Nor have the plantations of 
Cameroon —  with the possible exception of those in the British 
Cameroons in the 1950s —  ever been managed to the highest standards 
of the modern industrial estate. Instead, one sees a very pluralistic 
population of producers entering the market in the 1950s and then 
slowly being squeezed out again as the trade became more expensive and
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competitive. In that transition, increasing stress was laid on the 
importance of the industrial plantation as the only means of producing 
large quantities of fruit to an ever-rising standard of quality.
However, the industrial plantation represents not just a 
particular technology, but also a specialised style of management, 
both of the plantations and of the trade. Thus, in the next two 
chapters we concentrate on the management practices of the banana 
industry in the 1950s, first as seen in the British Cameroons, then as 
experienced in Mungo. In the discussion, the models of a vert^ally 
integrated trade and an industrial standard of production are taken as 
points of reference and comparison. They represent, in a sense, the 
optimal efficiency in the business although, as will be seen in the 
following chapters, there have been many other forms for approaching 
that efficiency in Cameroon.
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CHAPTER 2 
MANAGERIAL STRUCTURES OF THE 1950s:
THE BRITISH CAMEROONS
In the banana trade in the British Cameroons during the 1950s 
there were three main producers: i) smallholders' cooperatives, ii)
the plantations of the Cameroons Development Corporation, and iii) the 
plantations of the international company, Elders and Fyffes, which was 
also responsible for shipping and sales (see Map 7). These groups 
were autonomous in their ownership, but linked by contract in a 
fashion that created a well-balanced managerial structure which 
nonetheless represented a significant departure from the idea of a 
wholly company-owned, vertically integrated production and marketing 
system.
In this system, the smaller productive units, i.e. plantation 
estates and farmers' cooperatives, were amalgamated into larger 
managerial bodies. Thus, what had in the pre-war years been separate 
privately-owned German plantations, were by the 1950s a single 
corporation, the Cameroons Development Corporation. This operated 
with a unified management structure within which one office spoke for 
all the banana production taking place on the Corporation estates.-^ 
Similarly, the smallholders' banana cooperatives did not operate in 
competitive isolation from each other, but were organised into primary 
or village-level societies which were then grouped into secondary 
societies which, in turn, had representation in the apex society, the 
Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers (BCUF). It was the BCUF which 
represented all of the banana cooperatives in any dealing with the 
Cameroons Development Corporation, the Elders and Fyffes Company, or 
any other outside body. Sitting neatly between the industrial 
plantations of the Cameroons Development Corporation and the Bakweri 
Cooperative Union of Farmers, was Elders and Fyffes. The company was 
the sales agent and shipper for both the Corporation and the BCUF.
They had their own plantations —  Likomba and later Bavenga —  which 
rendered them more than sympathetic to the requirements and advantages 
of industrial agriculture, but they had also, by 1957, signed a 1 
contract with the BCUF which, among other clauses, committed the
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Map 7. BANANA CULTIVATION IN THE BRITISH CAMEROONS-  
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company to providing managerial and technical staff to the cooperative 
union.
This managerial triangle seems to have formalised the 
technological and administrative differences between European 
plantations and African smallholdings. This very formality seems also 
to have provided a structure within which complaints, inequalities and 
tensions could be resolved. Although it was not always successful, 
there was nonetheless a high degree of administrative stability* 
Another important aspect to having three such sharply defined 
organisations dominating the trade was that it created a balance of 
power and allowed a circulation of comparative information that went a 
long way to preserving confidence in the trade and in each other.
The Three Principals
Cameroons Development Corporation
Of the three organisations involved in the banana trade of the 
British Cameroons, the Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC*) was in 
the strongest position, a fact which is reflected in their survival 
and expansion today, long after both the BCUF and the Elders and 
Fyffes company have virtually disappeared from English-speaking 
Cameroon* The strength of the CDC was derived from a number of 
factors, not the least of which was their control over much of the 
land of the Victoria Division (now Fako Department). Their holdings 
are based on land that was originally taken over piece by piece by the 
German colonial government in the 1880s and ’90s after the defeat of 
the Bakweri people in a battle at Buea. As the German administration 
acquired this land it was conceded to various private German 
companies, a number of whom returned in the 1920s after the division 
of German Kamerun into British and French mandated territories in 
1922.
* For the purposes of this thesis, CDC indicates the Cameroons 
Development Corporation and not the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, which is based in London and which helped to create 
the Cameroons Development Corporation. CDC is the acronym used 
most often in Cameroon, although in London the Cameroon business is 
known as CamDev.
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The expropriation of these inter-war German plantations by the British 
Custodian of Enemy Property during the Second World War provided the 
basis for the land holdings of the CDC. As a result, when the 
Cameroons Development Corporation was established it included the 
institutional participation of the colonial government (then Nigeria) 
which held title to the land. Moreover, the mandate of the CDC was 
not just to operate a profitable plantation company, but also to use 
the earnings of the corporation to develop the territory of the 
Southern Cameroons for the benefit of the inhabitants. Thus, the CDC 
in the 1950s was not just the dominant economic force, which the 
plantations had always been since they were first established by the 
Germans, but it was also a state-backed bureaucracy with formal social 
obligations that only enlarged its influence on a multiplicity of 
affairs in the Southern Cameroons.
Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers
According to Dr. Emmanuel Endeley, who has been President of the 
Bakweri Cooperative Dnion of Farmers since its founding, the BCUF was 
a logical development from the CDC Workers' Union which was first 
established in the late 1940s.^ Dr. Endeley's role in organising the 
Workers' Union led to his inclusion on the Board of the Cameroons 
Development Corporation and is a good example of the balance he 
maintained between opposition to and collaboration with the British 
colonial authorities. Like the plantation workers' union, the 
farmers' union was first created to negotiate with the CDC, in this 
case not wages, but the sale of smallholders' b a n a n a s .^ The 
existence of the BCUF institutionalised informal arrangements which 
had existed between smallholders and the German plantations of the 
inter-war years and which had been transferred to the CDC. The 
development of the smallholders' union was not greeted with any 
enthusiasm by the CDC just at a time when they were struggling to put 
their plantations on a sound economic footing and to meet some of the 
requirements for social services which their legislative definition 
imposed. Nonetheless, the BCUF grew, and in 1953 expanded its 
territory into the Kumba Division, moving out of their base in the 
Victoria Division where farmers were limited by the availability of 
arable non-CDC land.^ (See Map 8.) By the late 1950s, Dr. Endeley
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had become the Premier of the Southern Cameroons,* in addition to his 
role with the CDC and as President of the BCUF. He was, therefore, 
in a position of both economic and political influence. Moreover, the 
BCUF was strongly backed by the Co-operative Department of the 
Government of the British Cameroons, which consistently defended the 
interests of the BCUF, along with those of other farmers' 
cooperatives.
It is perhaps of some value at this point to take a quick look at 
the post-war government in the British Cameroons for its role in 
establishing the cooperatives. While there was a certain neglectful 
air about the administration of the Cameroons mandated territory 
before the war, exactly the opposite was true during the post-war 
period. One is struck by the several measures which were enacted 
immediately after the war to protect indigenous interests. One of 
these was the Lands and Native Rights Ordinance which was first 
enacted in 1948 and extended the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 
Northern Nigeria, no. 1 of 1916, to the Cameroons. It required that 
in making laws affecting the transfer of land and natural resources,
...the Administering authority shall take into consideration native 
laws and custons, and shall respect the rights and safeguard the 
interests, both present and future, of the native population...-*
While the law did not go so far as to return the newly-organised CDC 
lands to the descendants of the Bakweri people who had first been 
expropriated In the late nineteenth century, the land law was 
indicative of a government concern to protect native interests, 
particularly when in competition with European development plans. It 
was no doubt this same concern which created the C D C s  social 
obligations.
The same philosophy was behind the government's Co-operative 
Department, members of which were perhaps most effective as 
representatives and advisors, acting, in the case of the banana trade,
* In 1957, the Southern Cameroons achieved its own House of Assembly 
within the Nigerian Federation, which had been responsible for the 
British Cameroons since the Mandate had been created in 1922.
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as an intermediary between the farmers' co-operatives and the larger 
plantation organisations with whom they had to negotiate. As the 
banana cooperatives grew, however, the Department found itself also 
handling the increasingly demanding logistical problems of the banana 
boom period. Not surprisingly, the Department, understaffed and 
thinly distributed, found it nearly impossible to cope with the 
elaborate arrangements for moving bananas from thousands of small 
farms to dockside, while continuing to serve the needs of other crops 
such as cocoa and coffee. As a result, it was in some desperation 
that the Department asked Elders and Fyffes to second managerial and 
technical people to the BCUF.^ The Department thereby gave up its 
involvement in the day-to-day operations of the banana trade, but 
continued in an influential role by providing supervisors and 
ombudsmen —  a role which tended to strengthen the position of the 
BCUF in their dealings with Elders and Fyffes and the CDC.
Elders and Fyffes
Elders and Fyffes' introduction to the territory came during the 
Second World War when the ex-German plantations were under the 
management of the Custodian of Enemy Property and the company was 
asked to provide shipping for the bananas that had been going directly 
to Germany. This arrangement was interrupted when all banana 
shipments to Britain were banned and the Fyffes' ships were 
commandeered for active wartime duties. As the war ended, Fyffes laid 
a further claim to involvement in the British Cameroons on the grounds 
that the Likomba Plantations, formerly registered as the Guatemala 
Plantation Company, a German business, in fact belonged to Elders and 
Fyffes who held most of the European equity in the Guatemala 
Plantation Company. In 1948, this claim was settled with a licence to 
operate the Likomba plantations for eighteen years, even though the 
formal title rested with the CDC and the Nigerian Government. While 
this Likomba arrangement gave Elders and Fyffes a physical stake in 
the country, they were still very much at the mercy of the CDC's 
goodwill and ideas of expansion, as is shown in the 1958 agreement 
whereby the company handed over to the Corporation a number of assets 
—  principally in railroad equipment and medical facilities —  that 
had previously been administered by the company.^
As a plantation company operating on the sufferance of the CDC,
- 50 -
Elders and Fyffes found themselves having to live up to the social 
obligations of the CDC and even to outdo the CDC's own performance.^
As a result, one finds a significant difference between the functions 
of the CDC Workers' Union and the Likomba Plantation Workers' Union, 
which was established in 1949. According to Warmington in A West 
African Trade Union, published in 1960:
The policy of the Likomba union has tended to be rather more 
active and imaginative than that of the C.D.C. Workers' Union. 
Union administration has been somewhat better, and there has also 
been a more positive and in many respects more progressive 
attitude on the part of the company than of the Corporation.
This has led to rather different conditions of employment and 
more complex negotiating and consultative machinery being 
developed in Likomba than in the Corporation's estates.^
The company's reputation as a more progressive employer was reflected 
again in an interview with one of their former employees, Anthanacious 
Eddia, who now works for the CDC. He credits the company with a 
number of superior working conditions, better wages, free schools for 
workers' children, earlier promotion for Africans, that outshone the 
CDC's own efforts.^ To the extent that the company did operate to 
a higher standard in these matters, it is tempting to think that they 
served as a goad to the CDC's own ambitions, and therefore had a wider 
effect on living conditions in the Victoria Division.
Advisors and Managers: Elders and Fyffes and the BCUF
Most people today when asked about the role of Elders and Fyffes 
in the British Cameroons remember best their work with the farmers' 
banana cooperatives. The CDC's dependence on the company was limited 
to the company's role as shippers and salesmen for all Southern 
Cameroons' bananas sent abroad. By contrast, the relationship between 
the BCUF and Elders and Fyffes was considerably more intertwined.
While in many respects the BCUF contract with the company duplicates 
provisions of the CDC contract with Fyffes, the cooperatives' request 
for managerial personnel transformed both the BCUF and the nature of 
the company's role in Cameroon. Under Clause 4 of the BCUF contract 
both company managerial and technical personnel were to be assigned to 
the BCUF, at the Union's request. In addition, Elders and Fyffes also
- 51 -
INSERT TO FOLLOW PAGE 51
... agreed to act as extension agents —  by making 
"available to the Union the accumulated research and 
practical experience of (the Company) and its associated and 
affiliated companies ..." —  and as the Union's purchasing 
agents in the United Kingdom. This latter provision offered to 
the Union all discounts the company would receive, and 
included a clause saying the Union would have "preference" 
in the use of company vessels for shipping goods to the 
Southern Cameroons.
The effect of all these clauses was to place the Elders and 
Fyffes seconded personnel in the position of supervising, if not 
actually managing the complete chain of BCUF activities from field to 
final sales. Their control was in no way absolute; any village 
society which, for example, did not choose to spray against Sigatoka 
disease could not be forced to do so. On the other hand, the final 
selection of fruit to be placed in the ship's hold was, like that of 
the CDC fruit, completely in the hands of Elders and Fyffes and 
unsprayed fruit was much more likely to be rejected.
This final dockside selection was problematic for the farmers 
since it was done out of the farmers’ view. But it came after two 
earlier selection processes at village level had already taken place. 
The first was governed by the president of the village society, who 
generally selected which fruit farmers could cut for the current 
shipment. From this collection of cut fruit a second selection was 
agreed between the farmer, the village society's president and a 
representative of the BCUF who arrived with the truck to take the best 
of the village's banana stems to the dock. By the late 1950s, with 
the introduction under the Co-operative Department of a two percent 
savings plan, each farmer also had a book in which to record his 
shipments and receipts. There was considerable difficulty with the 
selection process as it was extremely difficult for the farmers to 
imagine that fruit which looked reasonably healthy when cut might 
deteriorate during the journey to the United Kingdom. There were 
frequent attempts to move rejected fruit from one village to another 
in hopes that it might eventually be accepted and shipped. It may 
also have been difficult for farmers who were only a few years out of 
a subsistence level of agriculture and in the habit of consuming all 
production, regardless of quality, to understand why edible fruit 
might be rejected because it was not absolutely perfect.^
One of the features of the CDC and BCUF contracts with Fyffes 
which is of interest here is that the CDC agreed to market their fruit 
jointly with that of other producers so long as "the fruit of other 
, producers shall not be accepted by the Company if below the standard 
laid down in Clause 1 (B)."-’-^  This provision placed both the BCUF 
and their Elders and Fyffes managers under a considerable strain to 
ensure that the quality of the BCUF was equal to the quality of the
- 52 -
CDC's plantation production. In many ways it was an impossible task 
(it could even be read as an attempt by the CDC to drive the BCUF out 
of the trade, although there is little to support that idea), and by 
the mid-1960s the Union was rewriting the contract so that BCUF fruit 
would be labelled and inspected separately.^  During the late 
1950s, however, when new lands were being constantly opened up by 
farmers, it was at least possible that a large percentage of the 
banana production could escape the effects of declining soil fertility 
and accumulated diseases and so ensure a substantial quantity of fruit 
that in quality compared favourably to fruit of a plantation standard. 
As disease spread —  both Panama disease and Sigatoka disease —  and 
as it became more and more difficult to find virgin forest land close 
enough to good roads for the crop to be evacuated from farm to ship's 
hold within thirty-six hours, the task of both the farmers and the 
expatriate managers working with the farmers' union became much more 
difficult.
A good example of the problems involved in raising the standard 
of smallholder fruit comes from David Philp, the Elders and Fyffes 
manager seconded to the BCUF during this time. He remembers a 
considerable resistance to "medicine", as Pidgen English labelled 
fertilisers and pesticides, more, he claims, out of an unwillingness 
to pay the cost of them than out of fear of their effects. The BCUF 
arranged for a nucleus of eight employees to demonstrate spraying 
techniques using hand pumps and the Union had a contract with a local 
company to sell these pumps in the villages. When that proved to be 
ineffective, the BCUF began moving towards a centralised spraying 
service for which members would be charged. The trade ended, however, 
before that system was fully introduced.
This task of maintaining the quality of production so that it 
could pass the selection process and meet the CDC standard was —  with 
the logistics of a twenty-four to thirty-six hour evacuation of fruit 
—  probably one of the more demanding tasks that the Elders and Fyffes 
personnel took on and demonstrates the kind of detail into which their 
management obligations led them. Exactly what differences their 
management made, however, is difficult to judge. The data on the 
cooperatives is extremely incomplete and, like a comparable study of 
the cooperatives in Mungo, would require at least a year of fieldwork 
in historical anthropology before one could begin to measure the
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effect of the Elders and Fyffes management on the banana cooperatives 
or on the villages where the cooperatives were based. There are, 
nonetheless, a few visible clues of the company's importance.
The Report of the Co-operative Department for 1956-58 credits the 
Elders and Fyffes management with improving the financial position of 
the Cooperative Union in a brief, understated compliment:
The efficiency in management attributable to the Manager seconded 
from Messrs Elders and Fyffes was reflected in very favourable 
comments from the Union's professional auditors.^
The same paragraph notes net surpluses in two financial years of more
than £40,000 and more than £56,000, of which roughly £10,000 and
£22,000 respectively were distributed as year-end bonuses to farmers.
They also mention that funds had been set aside for expanding the
offices, building agricultural stores and setting up a radio
communications network in the banana-producing areas. The same
prosperity entered the villages. Almost anyone who was living in West
Cameroon at the time will mention the rise in living standards and
housing and beer drinking which became a form of conspicuous 
1 7consumption.
How much all this was due to the terms of trade at the time, and 
how much was the result of Elders and Fyffes' management of the BCUF's 
affairs is still nearly impossible to say. It is not unreasonable, 
however, to suspect that the inherent prosperity of the period was 
considerably enhanced due to the improved organisation of a very 
widely dispersed collection of growers. But it seems to have been a 
prosperity that came at the cost of a "wartime discipline", in David 
Philp's phrase, which was not always appreciated. Mr. Philp was often 
announced in villages as "Satan done come"^. Later, in 1982,
Dr. Endeley laughed and admitted that his English colleague was very 
strict, but liked by the average farmer as a loving elder father who 
kept banana grades high-*-®. Yet, one suspects that as market 
conditions became more difficult, the more "satanic" sides of the 
Elders and Fyffes management were less easily tolerated by those 
farmers still trying to sell fruit on the earlier, easier terms.
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Contractual Balances: CDC, Elders and Fyffes, BCUF
:From the point of view of the overall management of the banana 
trade in British Cameroons, Elders and Fyffes' work with the BCUF was 
undoubtedly beneficial. If nothing else, the professional 
contribution of the company to the efficiency of the BCUF helped to 
put the Union on a par with the other two major producers, the CDC and 
Elders and Fyffes1 Likomba and Bavenga plantations. As General 
Manager of the Union and as a Fyffes employee, David Philp had access 
to several key points In the organisation of the business and 
undoubtedly strengthened the Union's ability to bargain with what must 
have often been an alien European standard.
Nonetheless, the essential tripartite balance between the CDC,
Elders and Fyffes and BCUF does not seem to have been upset by the
closer links that existed between the company and the cooperatives.
In large part, this is due to the 1958 contract that the CDC made
with the company. As the 1957 Elders and Fyffes' contract with the
BCUF was by then signed and operating, the CDC had had an opportunity
to gauge exactly where they were likely to be threatened by the BCUF
and had written several protective clauses into their own contract
with the company. The stipulation that all producers meet the same
standard of production was one such clause, and meant that the CDC
would not find its high quality fruit subsidising the lower-quality
exports that might come from smallholders. Other clauses, however,
which existed in the CDC contract but not in that of the BCUF,
anticipated those occasions when the amount of fruit ready for
shipping might exceed either the shipping space available or the
ability of the market to absorb the volume of production. In both
cases, the CDC made certain that the final allotments of fruit that
could be sent out of the country by each of the three producing
organisations was proportionate to the final estimates sent into the
on
company as part of the routine monthly predictions of production.
The most important feature of the Elders and Fyffes contracts 
with the CDC and the BCUF was the manner in which some of the weakest 
links in the Cameroon side of the chain of activities from production 
to sales were kept firmly in the hands of the company. Figure 5 , 
"Managerial Structure of British Cameroons Banana Trade, 1959" gives a 
rough idea of who controlled what aspects of the business. Field
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production with its numerous tasks of planting', weeding, pruning,
propping, fertilising and spraying was largely in the hands of
individual farmers and the various plantation managers. The tasks of
cutting the fruit for selection and shipping were also handled
individually as was spraying among the BCUF farmers. Aerial spraying
gave rise to a joint arrangement between CDC and Elders and Fyffes.
They also exchanged research findings, although not quite as often as
might be supposed. According to John Robertson, who worked with the
CDC during the banana boom, Elders and Fyffes were often reluctant to
v 91divulge their knowledge or research findings. A Transport to the 
ships was the most cooperative part of the process. In the case of 
the BCUF, the central management of the Union (as supervised by Elders 
and Fyffes seconded staff) provided the link between farm and 
collection point, after which the fruit was taken out to shipside by 
CDC rail or boat.
Thus, from field to ship, the responsibilities were very evenly 
divided with different producers more or less controlling most of the 
tasks. Where planters' groups did not completely control the 
exporting side of the chain was at those points which affected the 
optimal use of the shipping space available. Thus, although each 
producer estimated his harvest, it was the company who controlled the 
final adjustment of those estimates against the number of ships needed 
for the Cameroons trade. Similarly, it was the company who issued the 
first cutting orders and apportioned (based on estimates) how much 
each producer was allowed to cut for the ships waiting in the harbour. 
Finally, to ensure that no fruit was sent which could not survive the 
journey in good condition, it was the company who made the last 
inspection and selection before fruit was placed in the hold. Thus, 
while the producers were allowed more or less complete control over 
their styles of production, it was the company who guarded primary
controls over the organisation of the twenty-four to thirty-six-hour
22period between cutting and loading.
In this way, the company's points of authority were chiefly in 
the shipping and sales. At this time, few bananas left the British 
Cameroons which were not shipped and sold by Elders and Fyffes, almost 
always in the United Kingdom. Such an arrangement, it might be 
argued, placed an economy like that of the Southern Cameroons in a too 
vulnerable position, at the mercy of a single company exploiting a
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single market. Certainly, as later events showed, the dependence of 
the Southern Cameroons on Britain’s Commonwealth preferences proved 
ruinous when the country federated with the former French Cameroons.
As for their dependence on a single company, however, it is important 
to remember that the company was not in a totally dominant position —  
both the CDC and the local government had considerable authority over 
the company which could be brought to bear. Moreover, at this period 
in the company’s life, it was supplying twenty percent of their United 
Kingdom market with produce from the Southern Cameroons. Thus, their 
dependence on the Southern Cameroons was as important to the company 
as the country's reliance on Elders and Fyffes. Other sales agents, 
and particularly those in other markets, might have helped to 
diversify the British Cameroons' economic dependence on the British 
market. And yet, one should approach such an idea with caution, as 
another sales agent and shipper might have upset the managerial 
balance that had grown up over the 1950s and had developed with 
increasing efficiency and refinement. It is also possible that a 
greater number of participants would have reduced the economies of 
scale, particularly in shipping, where a good refrigerated ship 
adapted for the trade required at least 800 long tons of fruit before
it began to pay its way.
One is tempted, in studying the formal relationships between the
CDC, Elders and Fyffes and the BCUF, to argue that it was a well-
balanced structure in which the requirements of the industrial 
plantation, the smallholder and the European banana market were 
brought together in reasonable functional harmony. If only, one wants 
to hypothesize, the Southern Cameroons had not voted themselves out of 
the Commonwealth and into federation with the former French Cameroons, 
one would have the perfect model of a pluralistic agricultural ideal.
Unfortunately, like most "if onlys", this is an hypothesis 
Impossible to test. Certainly one would like to believe that with the 
help of the professional management coming from Elders and Fyffes, the 
BCUF would have been able to find a way through the very serious 
problems of disease, soil fertility and rising market standard which 
helped to drive the smallholder out of business in Mungo. One would 
also like to think that Elders and Fyffes as a progressive plantation 
company able to draw on United Fruit expertise, and pushed by the 
necessity to outdo the CDC in social services so that the CDC would
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continue to grant them leave to stay, would have continued in the 
ambitious style in which they began. One would also like to hope that 
the company's future contracts with both the CDC and the BCUF would 
have maintained the balance of interests and responsibilities which 
the early contracts described.
In fact, however, throughout the post-war period, the banana 
trade from the British Cameroons was changing almost month by month. 
Its success was remarkable, but in many ways the banana crop of the 
1950s was a pioneering crop, planted only at the beginning of a long 
development process. Certainly it had never before been produced in 
such volume or by so many numbers and kinds of farmers, and for many 
people it was the first cash crop ever planted for European markets. 
There was, therefore, still a long way to go before the crop could 
survive as a permanent fixture of the economic landscape.
It Is also undoubtedly true that in the volatile environment of 
African independence during the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was 
little chance that the kind of working relationship that existed 
between the farmers, Elders and Fyffes and the CDC could have long 
survived. The paternalistic style, the expatriate standard of 
production, and the many radical transformations in local society that 
attended the success of the smallholders’ banana trade, would 
eventually have either radically altered or destroyed the balance 
achieved in the late 1950s.
In any event, the business was transformed and then ruined by the 
loss of the Commonwealth preference. Exactly how that happened, and 
why, is something that will be discussed in Chapter 4 ; "The Politics 
of Reunification". But the deus ex machina impact of the decision 
begs a thousand unanswerable questions about what would have occurred 
if the banana trade of West Cameroon had been allowed to develop from 
the very sound base it had established by the late 1950s.
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CHAPTER 3 
MANAGERIAL STRUCTURES OF THE 1950s:
MUNGO
Like the trade from the British Cameroons the banana trade from 
Mungo has always departed from the idea of a centrally controlled, 
vertically integrated management structure like that exemplified in 
the early development of the United Fruit Company in the Americas.
Even more than in the British Cameroons, the trade from the French 
Cameroons has been characterised by a diffused structure, a high 
degree of independence among the participants, and a handful of 
contracts which had the effect of organising the trade. •
In this chapter we describe the managerial structure of the 1950s 
trade in Mungo and point out some of the characteristics of that 
structure which have influenced developments since then. We begin 
with the Syndicat de Defense des Interets Bananiers which throughout 
the 1950s was the official representative of the many interests 
working in the banana business and was, therefore, in a position to 
provide the kind of integrated management required in exporting 
bananas. Where the Syndicat failed to provide that management, we 
then look at some of the other organisations in Mungo in order to 
establish what exactly was the division of managerial responsibilities 
during the booming post-war business.
Syndicat de Defense des Intirsts Bananiers
The banana trade of Mungo began during the 1930s when European 
immigrants were encouraged by the administration of the French 
Cameroons to take up land concessions and develop them for the 
agricultural export market. A number of crops were tried, but the 
most successful was the export banana. In the course of this pre-war 
development, a number of African immigrants also came into Mungo, some 
as concessionaires with land grants of their own, but many more as 
labourers. In time, these workers also began producing and exporting 
bananas, usually planting on land adjacent to the European lands and 
shipping their fruit out with that of the neighbouring plantations.
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The Syndicat de Defense des Interets Bananiers was first formed 
by European planters in the late 1930s as a union representing 
European banana growers. As early as the 1930s, according to one of 
the African planters, the Syndicat lobbied with the colonial 
government for the interests of the European banana planters in Mungo, 
in particular against those Africans who wanted a larger, formal share 
of the trade.^ It was a lobby that formally failed. By the late 
1940s, Cameroonian planters had obtained a sixty percent quota of the 
banana exports from the French Cameroons and, by the early 1950s, the 
Syndicatfs membership had expanded to include Cameroonian smallholder 
cooperatives as well as all of the European planters.^
The Syndicatfs 1950s membership is illustrated in Figure 6,
"April 1959 Membership in the Syndicat de Defense des Interets 
Bananiers, Mungo". Several aspects of this membership should be 
noted. First, the peasant cooperatives and the Catholic Missions 
together represented the bulk of the Cameroonian producers who were, 
in 1958, producing seventy percent of the exports from Mungo. The 
cooperatives and missions were not only responsible for the 
smallholders' production, but were also in charge of transporting the 
fruit from the smallholder farms to the railroad for shipping to the 
port at Bonaberi. Counterpoised to the cooperatives and missions were 
the European plantations. They were providing thirty percent of 
exports in 1958 and like the cooperatives were responsible for 
transporting their fruit to the railroad. The cooperatives, the 
missions and the European plantations made up most of the membership 
of the Syndicat, and thus continued the original 1930s definition of 
the Syndicat as a producers' organisation.
In addition to the membership of planters and smallholders' 
cooperatives, however, the 1950s Syndicat also included IFAC, the 
agricultural research station at Nyomb£, which at the time was under 
the direction of the French government's Institut Franqais des 
Recherches Fruitieres d 1Outre Mer; Chargeurs Reunis, the shipping 
company which provided regular service to Europe; and the three sales 
agents, the largest of which was la Compagnie des Bananes. With the 
addition of these organisations, the Syndicat represented nearly the 
whole central chain of activities from field to wharfside sales in 
Europe. The only features of the chain which did not hold Syndicat 
membership were two government organisations: the railway line from
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Nkongsamba to Bonaberi which took the fruit down to the harbour, and 
the Service de ContrSle du Conditionnement, which inspected the fruit 
at wharfside and rejected any banana stems which were not of 
exportable quality.
This membership resulted in an organisation with a broad 
democratic base, a kind of town meeting of the trade in which (four 
times a year) everyone could vote. As defined by its 1950s 
constitution, it was a political organisation that was relentlessly 
diffused with few formal vehicles —  outside an administrative council 
of twelve and the quarterly general assemblies —  for manipulating 
differences within the banana trade. There was, for example, no 
constitutional obligation that the administrative council should 
represent both Cameroonian and European planters. Nor was there any 
constitutional provision for the routine administrative participation 
of the shipping lines, the railroads or the sales agents, any one of 
whom could make or break the success of the trade.^ It was a 
formula for obscuring legitimate differences and in so doing confusing 
the operational relations between different segments of the whole 
industry, as well as obscuring the social contradictions which, as 
independence approached, were becoming more and more volatile.
Thus, instead of becoming managers of the more complicated trade 
that emerged when the smallholders' cooperatives joined the Syndicat 
and started exporting, the Syndicat wrote its new 1950s constitution 
in such a way that the organisation remained essentially a political 
lobby and an agricultural union. As such, it was more concerned with 
promotional and cooperative buying schemes than it was with the 
routine management and coordination of the trade. As the goals were 
defined in Article 5 of the new constitution they read:
1° - d'etudier I 1amelioration S apporter aux cultures, la
conservation, le transport et la vente des bananes;
2° - de prater son entremise gratuite pour la vente des
produits provenant exclusivement des exploitations des 
syndiqu€s, de faciliter cette vente par expositions, 
annonces, publications, groupements d'expiditions, et de 
procurer a ses seuls societaires des Instruments et 
produits n^cessaires a leurs exploitations. II pourra 
en outre acquerir des terrains, construire des 
batiments, ateliers ou magasins dans l ’int&ret de ses 
adherents et pourvoir en general a tous les besoins 
professionnels de ses membres.^
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A number of practical steps resulted from this set of goals, 
among them the setting up of CATA, the aerial treatment company which 
was formed to spray against Sigatoka disease. Still, the tone of the 
organisation was that of a lobby which functioned more on the basis 
of persuasion (including the persuasion of its own members) than of 
authority.
In this respect, it is of interest to take a short look at the 
rapport moral of the Syndicat for 1958. It was presented at the April 
9, 1959, general assembly meeting by Monsieur Penanhoat who had been 
president of the Syndicat since it was founded before the Second World 
War. During this same meeting, M. Penanhoat resigned and the first 
Cameroonian president of the organisation was elected in his place.
It was the last general assembly of the Syndicat to be untroubled by 
political events in the region and so serves, in some ways, to 
epitomise the era of the 1950s.
In his speech, M. Penanhoat spent a lot of time exhorting members 
to maintain standards of production. He urged planters to use the 
plastic wrapping for exported banana stems that was just coming into 
vogue; he pressed on them the importance of maintaining their lorries 
and access roads so that the fruit did not get bruised while being 
transported to the trains; he argued that everyone should build paved 
hangars to protect the fruit from the weather after it has been cut; 
and he discussed the problems of aerial spraying. He also mentioned 
efforts to move into the centralised purchase of agricultural products 
and outlined contacts that had been made with various official bodies: 
the Production Minister, the Chamber of Agriculture, the USPAC for the 
creation of an agricultural wage scale, and with the CIB (ComitS 
Interprofessionel Bananier in France) to discuss access to the French 
market and relations with the French Overseas Departments, Martinique 
and Guadaloupe.^
What comes across quite clearly is that the Syndicat*s greatest 
successes were political, e.g. with the agricultural wage or 
negotiations in France. By contrast, the campaign against Sigatoka 
disease was introduced by a complaint about the cost:
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Si la lutte contre la Cercoporiose a permis par son efficacitS la 
quasi disparition de cetee maladie sur nos plantations, c'est 
gr&ce a un effort financier enorme qua les planteurs supportent 
avec peine.®
Only as an afterthought did M. Penanhoat thank the government 
agricultural services that made the compaign a success, returning 
quickly to the argument that the tax to support this treatment should 
be diminished. This, he stated, should be possible since the price of 
treatment fell after opening the contract to competitive bidding.
The same pattern occurs elsewhere in M. Penanhoat's presentation: 
complaint and exhortation, appeal for a state remedy, search for a 
commercial solution. A good example comes again where he was 
discussing the need to wrap all exported banana stems in plastic. He 
first issued a less than veiled complaint against the African 
producers for not bothering to wrap:
... malgre l'evidence de l'interet de l'emballage tant sur le 
plan pecuniaire que sur le plan de la qualite, nous avons 
rencontr§ aupres des producteurs africains une certaine 
reticence.^
He then described efforts with the Production Minister to make 
wrapping obligatory for all exporters, and finally finished by 
announcing that the Syndicat had managed to lower the cost of plastic 
wrapping by two francs a kilo (about one English penny's worth) and 
had stocked a large supply for the Syndicat's members.
Clearly, despite the expansion of membershp in the early 1950s 
and with it the increased complexity of the trade, the Syndicat chose 
to react to problems more as a political body demanding remedy than as 
a managerial organisation capable of resolving different situations on 
its own. This role can, in part, be explained by the fact that the 
Syndicat was an organisation begun by Europeans and, even after the 
admission of Cameroonians, it was weighted in favour of Europeans. 
These planters in turn had been described by Edwin Ardener as "a cross 
between French peasant farmers and the French Foreign Legion",® 
implying an undesirable hybrid of both. Ardener's description is 
undoubtedly extreme, but what does seem to be true, and what 
characterises their survivors in the industry today, is a radical 
individualism which does not admit easily of outside suggestion or
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control. At its worst, it has been a destructive form of managerial 
egotism, while at its best it has been ideally suited to the 
independence and isolation of creating and operating a plantation 
estate.
It was this spirit, however, which would seem to have made the
Syndicat what it was. Jealous of their own autonomy, the early
founders of the Syndicat seem to have been reluctant to concede to a 
public body like the Syndicat the formal right to make contracts for
shipping or sales or transport in their name. They would rather make
such arrangements individually, or at least guard the right to make 
them individually. It is also possible that when the European 
Syndicat was opened to Cameroonians and a new constitution was 
drafted, the orginal members of the Syndicat were disinclined to 
invest very much of the organisation of the trade in a body in which 
Cameroonian farmers could hold membership. There may well have been a 
fear that the control of the Syndicat would one day pass into 
Cameroonian hands and that the European planters would lose out in any 
such shift.
It should be noted, however, that since the 1930s several 
important aspects of the management of the trade had b$en taken over 
by la Compagnie des Bananes. The company's authority was contractual 
rather than hierarchical, and as such could only be exercised with a 
very light hand, as will be seen in the following discussion. More 
importantly, it was an administration of affairs that had won the 
approval and trust of the planters and which had been effective in 
seeing that the banana trade of Cameroon was healthy and profitable. 
Thus it is not surprising that in the early 1950s, when the new 
Syndicat constitution was written, the management of affairs was not 
really altered. There is, after all, always pressure to believe that 
as long as a business is doing well —  and at the time the banana 
business was doing extremely well —  it is wiser to leave the 
structure of affairs basically unchanged.
La Compagnie des Bananes
The first time one is aware of the company taking a central 
managerial role in the banana trade of Mungo comes during the Second 
World War. What is remembered today is that the Compagnie des Bananes
- 66 -
subsidised the banana plantations during those years when it was 
impossible to ship any fruit to Europe. In fact, the subsidy came 
from the British government who offered it as a gesture of support for 
the backing given by the French Cameroons to Free France.^ m. 
Penanhoat, as President of the Syndicat, introduced Alistair McLaurin, 
the company director, to General LeClerc. The General then placed the 
administration of the subsidy with Mr. McLaurin.^ The subsidy was, 
therefore, a joint effort of the LeClerc wartime government in the 
French Cameroons, the Syndicat, and la Compagnie des Bananes, with the 
British government as a fairly silent partner. Mr. McLaurin was 
responsible for seeing that fruit was produced —  even though it was 
later destroyed —  and eventually used the subsidy to support a 
programme of fallowing and replanting that lasted three years.^
According to Salomon Mpondo, who later became president of the 
Syndicat in the 1960s, none of the benefits of this subsidy went to 
Cameroonian planters because they never knew it existed.^ Alistair 
McLaurin claims that they would have received funding through the 
European planters with whom they exported.^ That being the case, 
it is not unlikely that the distribution of the British subsidy was 
uneven. Nonetheless, the administration of the subsidy seems to have 
earned the company a reputation as the company which "saved" the 
banana trade during the war. With that reputation came a certain 
amount of goodwill which became particularly valuable during the 1950s 
when competition between planters for shipping space was unusually 
complicated.
As was true of Elders and Fyffes in the British Cameroons, it was 
in this matter of cutting and evacuating the fruit that la Compagnie 
des Bananes exercised the most authority and its strongest managerial 
role of the trade. Matters of production, e.g. crop treatments, 
planting patterns, varieties used, were left largely in the hands of 
the planters themselves. Both the Syndicat and IFAC, the agricultural 
research station, offered advice to the planters on preferred 
approaches, and the Syndicat, as has been noted, worked as a 
collective buying organisation for planters' supplies and services.
But neither IFAC or the Syndicat had any authority to dictate the 
practices actually used by planters who made these decisions on their 
own. La Compagnie des Bananes which had, through the United Fruit 
Company structure, access to up-to-date advice on agricultural
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practices, also served informally as a planters’ advisory service, but 
again without much authority or even comprehensive use of that service 
by the many different planters in Mungo in the 1950s. Undoubtedly, 
there were in the company’s contracts with planters and cooperatives 
stipulations on the quality of fruit that was required. But how that 
quality was to be achieved was a question to be decided by the 
individual farmers themselves.
Unfortunately, none of the company’s contracts with planters in
Mungo was found during field research in Cameroon. However, the
practice of signing contracts had begun during the 1930s under
Alistair McLaurin, who provided a map of those Mungo planters under
contract to the Compagnie des Bananes in 1937. A simplified copy of
that map appears in Map 9. At first, according to Mr. McLaurin, much
of the 1930s shipping of the bananas was done by Armateurs Martins,
whose parent company, Martin Freres, managed the SPNP plantation of
1500 hectares. By the 1950s, however, la Compagnie des Bananes had
signed a contract with Chargeurs R&unis to provide refrigerated ships
departing regularly from Bonaberi. In the process, Armateurs Martins
discontinued banana shipping (to reappear later after independence)
and left its fruit to be handled by la Compagnie des Bananes and its
contracted shipping company, Chargeurs Reunis. The regular shipping
service provided by this arrangement, which was the same for all
growers and cooperatives contracted to la Compagnie des Bananes, was
1A
undoubtly one of the reasons for the success of the 1950s trade.
In managerial terms, the fact that the Compagnie des Bananes had 
managed to included the SPNP plantation —  the largest single producer 
in Mungo —  in their arrangements meant that by the 1950s the company 
was in a strong position to assume some of the management 
responsibilities of the trade. Ninety percent of the Mungo production 
was sold on commission by the company's offices in France, and the 
company had the only shipping contract regularly serving the Mungo 
banana trade.^ This made the company in Mungo the pivot 
organisation in the complicated task of moving the banana crop from 
the field into the ships at Bonaberi.
Figure 7 , "Managerial Structure of Mungo Banana Trade, 1959", 
shows the position held by the company in 1959. Practically speaking, 
the actual cutting and evacuation of banana stems from the field to
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Map 9. PLANTATION BANANA PRODUCTION OF 
MUNGO, 1937
Source: Alistair McLaurin
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the railroad station was the responsibility of the plantations and the 
smallholders1 cooperatives. The company, however, had the 
responsibility for establishing accurate crop estimates and from that 
calculating the required shipping space and apportioning the available 
shipping to the various producers. It was the latter of these tasks 
that took up the most time* Eventually, the company began holding 
weekly Monday morning meetings in the company offices at Penja. The 
purpose of the meeting, to which all planters and cooperatives were 
Invited, was to work out in concert the expected levels of production 
and to apportion the shipping space accordingly.
There was undoubtedly a fair amount of bluff involved in these 
meetings as planters and cooperatives tried to secure for themselves 
as much space as they thought they might need, perhaps over-estimating 
their requirements. Certainly in the early 1950s, according to 
Alistair McLaurin, he had to spend much of his time visiting farms to 
get some idea of how accurate the estimates had been. This, he said, 
was particularly difficult on the smallholders' farms where food crops 
were routinely planted with the bananas.
Once the estimates were fixed, the company then had to share out 
the amount of available shipping space. According to Mr. McLaurin 
again, this was particularly difficult when dealing with the 
smallholders' cooperatives. By the 1948 agreement which had given 
post-war African producers a quota of sixty percent of the shipping 
space in bananas, the allotments available to European and Cameroonian 
farmers were more or less fixed. There was, therefore, little room to 
quarrel over how much space was allowed to Europeans as opposed to 
Cameroonian producers. Nor was it too difficult to decide how much 
space each of the European plantations required. The plantations were 
not numerous —  about forty different estates under thirty different 
managements —  and were planted in one crop, the banana.
In the case of the smallholders' cooperatives, however, there 
were between fifty and sixty different organisations representing 
anywhere from two to five thousand small farms. Moreover, membership 
in the cooperatives was extremely fluid: overlapping, not easily 
counted and liable to change. In addition, the cooperatives were in 
intense competition with each other for the shipping space available
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within the Cameroonian quota of sixty percent. It is perhaps not 
surprising, therefore, that according to Mr. McLaurin the greatest 
difficulty was not in apportioning space between European and 
Cameroonian planters, but among the various Cameroonian smallholders’ 
cooperatives.*
Perhaps, however, the most important observation to be made about 
Figure 7 is that the actual responsibilities of la Compagnie des
Bananes in the Mungo banana trade were extremely limited. Despite the 
company's pivotal and very political role in allotting shipping 
capacity to various producers, there were still large areas of the 
whole business that were outside company control. Of these, 
production is the most obvious area where the company was of only 
limited importance. They could suggest what was required, but could 
do little to decide what procedures were ultimately used. In the same 
ways, the company had no agricultural research role, a task which was 
left largely in the hands of IFAC's research station in Nyomb§. This 
is not to say that the Compagnie des Bananes plantations never 
introduced and modelled new procedures, which they did, but the 
company never had a research station of its own geared solely to the 
requirements of the Cameroon trade. Nor, in fact, did IFAC specialise 
in the banana trade since their research involved not just banana 
cultivation, but also other cash crops that might be introduced.
Transportation is the other major area where the company had no 
role to play, aside from arranging the contract with Chargeurs Riunis. 
Unlike Elders and Fyffes or the United Fruit Company, la Compagnie des 
Bananes never had its ’own shipping fleet, relying instead on 
agreements with existing shipping lines. Similarly, the rail line 
from Nkongsamba to Bonaberi which ran through Mungo was not a company
* There are no figures available for the number of farms involved 
in the 1950s cooperatives. However, cooperative exports for 1958 
were 51,714 tonnes. At an average yield of five tonnes per hectare 
and an average of five hectares per farm, there would have been 
2068 smallholdings involved in producing that quantity of fruit.
At three tonnes per hectare and three hectares per farm, the number 
of holdings goes up to 5746 farms. Dominici estimates 12,000 
hectares and 6000 farmers on smallholdings with bananas. °
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operation like for example the early railroads in Costa Rica, but was 
a government project completed soon after the French were installed in 
the French Cameroons.
Finally, one of the most important procedures outside of the 
company's control was the inspection of fruit. In the British 
Cameroons this task rested firmly with the company, Elders and Fyffes, 
and involved fairly elaborate procedures both at the collection points 
in the field and at wharfside before loading onto the ships. For the 
Mungo trade, however, there was only one inspection point, the wharf 
at Bonaberi, and the inspection and selection were done, not by la 
Compagnie des Bananes, but by the government's Service de Controle du 
Conditionnement. There was, again according to Alistair McLaurin, a 
company representative who could offer suggestions on the selections 
being made, but in effect one of the most critical steps of the trade 
was being handled by someone who had no commercial relationship to the 
business and who did not feel the effects of the choices he made.
While this procedure might well have been designed to avoid 
corruption, it had the effect of distancing the inspection procedures 
from the commercial criteria that ultimately operated on the fruit in 
Europe. This selection procedure —  the fact that it was at a single 
point, distant from Mungo, and was not done by anyone actually trying 
to sell the fruit —  had several consequences, some of which will be 
mentioned in what follows. One of the places where it did the most 
damage was in the operations of the smallholders' cooperatives.
Smallholders' Cooperatives
It is unquestionably true that the most difficult managerial 
feature of the Mungo banana trade in the 1950s was the smallholders' 
cooperatives. In part, this was due to their great success and the 
numbers of farmers who joined cooperatives. The sixty percent export 
quota for Cameroonians and the ease of the early Gros Michel 
cultivation combined to encourage a large number of planters to join 
the trade. Their entry was further facilitated by the government's 
local Provident Society. The government of the French Cameroons had 
established these societies —  which were administered through the 
local government administration and based in part on compulsory dues 
—  in 1937. They became important in local areas, however, in the 
mid-1950s when new investment funds became available, largely from
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French development funds like FIDES. These investment funds were put 
into a Common Fund to which any local society had access. In Jane 
Guyer's paper on "The Provident Societies in the Rural Economy of 
Yaounde, 1945-1960", she notes that the mid-1950s were a period of 
rapid expansion of the commercialisation of agricultural products, 
much of it encouraged by the Provident Societies of that time. Of all 
the Provident Societies, she writes, the one in Mungo was "by far the 
most active Society." It was, she reports, "controlled by commercial 
growers of bananas for export. They made It into an extremely lively 
business venture, which made producer loans, and financed transport 
and marketing for the national consumer market as well as for 
export"
Unfortunately, Guyer does not elaborate on exactly how the 
Provident Society related to the fifty or sixty banana cooperatives 
which were exporting at the time. Nor is there any document which 
describes the manner in which the cooperatives functioned internally, 
or how they related to each other, to their members or to the 
Syndicat. What follows, therefore, is based on the impression of the 
cooperatives which has emerged after reading Syndicat meeting minutes 
and the minutes of the post-independence cooperative organisation: 
FEBACAM/UGEOBAM, and after discussions with a number of Africans and 
Europeans who worked with the cooperatives.
Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the cooperatives, in 
managerial terms, was the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by each 
cooperative. There was no umbrella organisation to which all the 
cooperatives in Mungo belonged. Instead, each organisation seems to 
have formed its own rules, its own accounting system and its own 
fashion for managing the production and transport of bananas. Another 
interesting feature of these cooperatives is that they were organised 
around individuals, rather than around villages, which were the basis 
for the smallholders’ cooperatives in the British Cameroons. This 
meant that any individual who was able to convince other farmers to 
join his cooperative was free to do so. Members no doubt joined for a 
wide variety of reasons: the president of the cooperative might have
been a neighbour, or a relative, or a particularly successful 
individual who seemed capable of managing a good cooperative or, in 
some cases, the Catholic father of the local mission.
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What such a system certainly required was a great deal of 
confidence in the individual who was forming the cooperative, and who 
had full responsibility for the success of the organisation. The lack 
of any umbrella organisation, like the Bakweri Cooperative Union of 
Farmers in the British Cameroons, for example, meant that the 
individual cooperatives functioned without supervision or advice from 
any broader authority. Such an authority might have been used to 
resolve problems between cooperatives, such as the allotment of 
shipping space, or might have been used to research ways of treating 
Sigatoka disease in fields that carried both food crops and bananas. 
Without a broader organisation, each cooperative president had 
virtually sole responsibility for his society. In this respect, one 
can also speculate that because cooperatives were based on an 
individual's appeal rather than on a village structure, the 
cooperatives lacked whatever authority and strength might have come 
from the village political structure. Where this might’ have had 
considerable importance was in checking the accounts and procedures 
used by any president in order to make certain that members were not 
being abused.
The overall lack of accountability that this system allowed was
aggravated by several features within the banana trade itself. One of
these was a very poor circulation of routine information, in
particular the price received for each shipment of bananas. Here
again, there is a useful contrast to the situation in the British
Cameroons where cooperative members were able to compare the price
they had received against the price received by the Cameroons
Development Corporation as reported by workers in the CDC. Since the
cooperatives and the CDC were contracted to receive the same price for
their fruit, cooperative members had a way of checking whether or not
they had received a fair price for their fruit. Nothing comparable
existed in the French Cameroons although, according to Alistair
McLaurin, any planter could ask la Compagnie des Bananes for price
information,^-® a procedure which would not have been effective in
spreading such information very widely. The lack of price information
meant that cooperative members were essentially ignorant when it came
to judging what their earnings should have been. In this situation,
it is not surprising to hear, for example, that as the banana earnings
declined in the late 1950s, one cooperative president was keeping for
himself seventy-five percent of the income of the whole organisation
19
with, apparently, relative impunity.
- 75 -
Similarly, the fact that the fruit inspection and selection 
always took place at the wharf at Bonaberi meant that no cooperative 
member knew whether in fact it was his fruit that had been rejected or 
that of another planter or another cooperative. This had two 
consequences. In the first place, it left great room for the unfair 
manipulation of individual accounts, and in the second place it meant 
that the reasons for rejection of fruit were essentially invisible to 
the man who had produced it. There was little way, therefore, for a 
farmer to learn what had failed in his farming and how to improve it.
There is one other feature of the cooperatives, taken as a whole, 
which should be considered. This emerges in looking at the 
cooperative export figures for January 1959 which appear in Tables 1 
and 1_. In these figures, one sees that a group of twelve cooperatives 
each (twenty percent of all cooperatives) was exporting fifty-five 
percent of all the bananas from smallholders. These large 
cooperatives each exported an average of 203 tonnes of bananas in 
January 1959. The smaller cooperatives averaged only forty-two tonnes 
each, but together made up eighty percent of all the banana 
cooperatives in Mungo.
While there is considerable variation in exports from one month 
to another, and between the years of the banana boom, it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that these figures present a reasonably 
accurate idea of the nature of the cooperatives involved in banana 
exports. What is of interest is the fact that such a large number of 
the groups was exporting a relatively small volume. This argues that 
the profits of the banana boom had attracted a great number of 
individuals who just wanted to export a few stems to raise a small 
amount of very quick cash. They did not see themselves as the 
proprietors of a banana holding, but as farmers who raised a few 
bananas among several other crops. This was even more likely to be 
the case if the number of members in each cooperative was very large, 
but unfortunately there is no way of knowing that without the luck of 
finding membership archives for 1959.
What this also means in managerial terms is that the commitment 
of this large number of smallholders to the banana trade was probably 
not as great as those larger cooperatives who may have had a greater 
dependency on the business. Here again, it would help to know whether 
the larger cooperatives had a larger membership or only a greater
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Table 1
DISTRIBUTION OF COOPERATIVE TONNAGE IN MUNGO JANUARY 1959 
consolidated Information
Percentages of
Jan. 1959 Number of Average All Jan. 1959
tonnage coops. tonnage coops. coop, tonnage
over
100 tonnes 12 203 20% 55%
0-99
tonnes 48 42 80% 45%
Total number of cooperatives - 60.
Total cooperative tonnage January 1959 - 4451 tonnes.
Source: Syndicat de Defense des IntirSts Bananiers, "Bilan,
31 decembre 1959."
Table 2
DISTRIBUTION OF COOPERATIVE TONNAGE IN MUNGO JANUARY 1959
detailed information
Jan. 1959 
tonnage
over
300 tonnes
Number of 
coops.
Average
tonnage
386
Percentages of
All
coops
3%
Jan. 1959 
coop. tonnage
17%
100-299
tonnes 10 167 17% 37%
50-99
tonnes 16 78 27% 28%
25-49
tonnes 14 32 23% 11%
0-24
tonnes 18 14 30% 6%
Total number of cooperatives - 60.
Total cooperatives tonnage January 1959 - 4451 tonnes.
Source: Syndicat de Defense des Interets Bananiers, "Bilan,
31 decembre 1959".
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volume of production. Either way, however, the presidents of these 
cooperatives would be more likely to be involved in the management of 
the trade because of the pressure from their members who were either 
very numerous or heavy investors in banana production. In contrast, 
it is more likely to have been the small cooperatives who resented the 
increased discipline and investment the business was requiring 
throughout the late 1950s and early ’60s. Likewise, it was probably 
from among their number that the economic pressure to drop out of the 
trade was felt most acutely and was most effective.
What becomes clear in even a speculative attempt to understand 
the functioning of the banana cooperatives is that they were in a very 
weak managerial position. The diversity of their membership and the 
variation between cooperatives would have made it difficult for them 
to agree on policies relating to technological changes, managerial 
requirements or political objectives. It also means that there was, 
as there was in the Syndicat itself, something of an organisational 
vacuum.
In summary, the outstanding feature of the 1950s Mungo banana 
trade is the diffused nature of the organisation. Neither the 
Syndicat de Defense des InterSts Bananiers nor la Compagnie des 
Bananes had, in the end, either the responsibility or the authority to 
manage the full range of tasks that composed the central chain of 
activities from field to European sale. This is not to argue that 
either organisation was powerless. On the contrary, in the exercise 
of those individual responsibilities they did have, both the Syndicat 
and the company were able to inject considerable discipline and 
professionalism into the trade. But the managerial structure, 
diffused and democratic as it was, made adaptation to the changing 
requirements of the market place in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
less easily achieved, since full agreement to modernise had to be won 
piecemeal from the various participants in the trade. One suspects 
that, throughout the late 1950s, the accomplishment of this task 
resulted in an informal partnership between the Syndicat*s officers 
and la Compagnie des Bananes. There was considerable weakness, 
however, in the informality of this arrangment, which by its very 
existence suggests that the broader membership of the Syndicat would 
not accept any more formal authority than that offered by persuasion. 
There were, in addition, the many weaknesses of the smallholders'
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cooperatives. These made the kind of modernisation the maturing 
banana trade was requiring in the late 1950s more difficult to achieve 
and played an important role in the politics of independence in Mungo, 
discussed in Chapter 5.
In the long term, the importance of the managerial structure of 
Mungo's banana trade in the 1950s is that it was the structure from 
which grew the management in 1982, which is discussed in Chapter 6.
One of the points to notice in that discussion is that despite the 
many changes from the Mungo business of the 1950s, the authority to 
manage the trade in 1982 was still diffused and still operating with a 
mixture of formal and informal arrangements. As will be seen, this 
has been an important factor in the disorganisation of the trade and 
in the growing inability of the Cameroon banana to compete even in the 
protected markets of France. Part of the 1982 problems, however, 
also resulted from the decline of the trade from the former British 
Cameroons, and from the failure to establish a post-independence 
business that incorporated the strengths of both banana trades from 
the 1950s. Exactly how that happended is discussed in the next 
chapter, "The Politics of Reunification in Anglophone Cameroon",
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CHAPTER 4
THE POLITICS OF REUNIFICATION IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON
It is important to remember that the production coming from the 
British Cameroons accounted for forty-eight percent of the peak 
production of the 1950s from both territories (see Figures 1 and 2_ in 
Chapter 1). Thus, the fact that 1982 Cameroonian production is only 
one-third of the 1950s best years is in large part due to the fact 
that almost the entire trade from the British Cameroons was slowly 
eliminated after the Southern Cameroons voted to join the former 
French territory. This was caused by the fact that after reunifying 
with the French-speaking Republic of Cameroon, the Southern Cameroons 
found itself economically thrown into the French Union and out of the 
British Commonwealth. It is a change that —  although obvious now —  
had not been fully appreciated by the voters or their leaders in 1962. 
Thus, the resulting economic upheaval, and with it the; distruction of 
the banana trade in the state that became West Cameroon, was a severe 
shock and is still recalled today with much confusion and criticism of 
the British firms who left the territory.
That reunification would have the effect of uprooting the banana 
trade and nearly all the British aspects of the economy of the 
Southern Cameroons was not widely foreseen at the time of the vote. 
Instead, both the referendum question and the compaign around it were 
based on the politics of independence which deserve to be explored for 
the manner in which they determined the outcome of the vote. The vote 
itself, however, was merely a rough choice between continued 
incorporation with Nigeria or federation with the new French-speaking 
Republic of Cameroon. If the vote had been in favour of Nigeria, 
there would have been little immediate disruption in the running of 
affairs, since it was a vote for the status quo. However, the choice 
was made to federate almost immediately with the new Republic of 
Cameroon. This largely eliminated the opportunity to work out with 
patience and forethought exactly what the terms of the new federation 
should be. In the post-referendum negotiations that took place 
between the Republic and the Southern Cameroons, little detailed
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thought was given to economic questions. Instead, these were worked 
out piecemeal over the next three or four years. As such, there was 
no chance to form a policy that would minimise the disruption of the 
new arrangements or to prepare businesses and bureaucracies for the 
implementation of the new political order.
One is, therefore, obliged to study not just the referendum, but 
also the process of federation that followed it in order to understand 
how the banana industry was affected by this change in the territory’s 
political status. The final collapse of the business came soon after 
the withdrawal of Elders and Fyffes from the territory. That, 
however, did not occur until 1966, some four years after the 
referendum had taken place. Thus, there were three or four years 
during which the economic implications of reunification might have 
been negotiated in such a way that the West Cameroon banana trade 
could have survived. The fact that Elders and Fyffes did not stay was 
in fact only one business decision among several made by the British 
firms in West Cameroon. That it was one of the more traumatic of 
these decisions is due to the high level of integration of the banana 
trade into the lives of people in the Southern Cameroons and to the 
fact that unlike other firms such as Barclay's Bank, which transferred 
its business to BICCIC, or R.W. King, which was turned over to a 
French company, no Francophone organisation ever took the place that 
had been created by Elders and Fyffes.
The Referendum
i
To an outsider looking at this history twenty years after the 
vote, it is astonishing that people could have chosen a political 
future that ran so directly counter to at least their short-term 
economic interests. That vote was conditioned, however, by the nature 
of the question posed in the referendum. There are, thus, two aspects 
to the reunification vote: the framing of the question and the actual 
vote on the question posed. The manner in which both were settled 
goes a long way to explaining some of the non-economic pressures which 
were at work in this situation.
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Framing the Question
Much of the literature on the 1962 referendum in the British
Cameroons discusses the nature of the voting. But it is important to
realise that the referendum offered only two choices: to stay with
Nigeria who had administered the British Cameroons since it became a 
Mandated Territory, or to join the French Cameroons. In short, there 
was no option open to be an independent state. If reunification with 
the former French Cameroons had gone smoothly, this would not have 
mattered. But reunification has not been very smooth, and the kind of 
bitterness and resentment one sees in Anglophone Cameroon in 1982 
forces one to ask why the referendum did not offer the option of 
becoming an independent state. If such an option had been open, and 
if it had been chosen, and if the people of the British Cameroons had 
elected to stay within the Commonwealth —  all of which could have 
happened —  the economic life of the British Cameroons might well have 
been allowed to continue without too much upheaval. But this did not 
occur and one must, therefore, ask how and why the referendum, which
was administered by the United Nations Trusteeship Committee, was
worded the way it was.
Although the day-to-day administration of the two mandated 
Cameroons often had more in common with colonial practice than with 
their status as protected territories of the League of Nations and 
the UN, the fact of being administered by France and Britain as United 
Nations Trusteeship Territories came to have considerable importance 
at the time of independence. Both the League and the UN had 
historically functioned as a court of appeal where grievances against 
the Trustees' administration could be brought, assuming they could 
make their way past the vigilance of the Trustees themselves. This 
function of the international body was repeatedly relied upon during 
the independence debates of the late 1950s. It was particularly 
important to the political strategy of the Union des Populations du
Cameroun (UPC), one of the earliest and most radical of the
independence parties in the French Cameroons, and the first party to 
call for the reunification of the two Cameroons.
The UPC was formed in April 1948 and became the Cameroon section
of the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA).^ The 
Rassemblement also included Leopold Senghor's party in Senegal
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and Felix Houphouet-Boigny's party in the Ivory Coast. The men who 
had formed these parties and the RDA had largely been educated in 
France and were much influenced by radical left-wing philosophies of 
the day. They were nationalist, anti-colonialist and closely aligned 
with and supported by the French Communist Party whose critique of 
colonialism was more than compatible with their own.
As the parties of the RDA began to gain respectability in their 
own countriesand with the explusion in 1947 of the French Communist 
Party from the coalition government in France, the French 
administrations in Africa began to try to suppress the RDA.^ It 
should be remembered, that at no point in establishing their rule in 
Africa had the French conceived of the relationship between France and 
the African territories as anything but a close economic and political 
union that was absolute and indivisible. While the Brazzaville 
Conference of 1946 weakened aspects of this conception it was first 
effectively challenged as a whole by the RDA in the late 1940s. At 
that time the RDA argued that the French African territories should be 
both politically and economically independent of France, a position 
that was shared and supported by the UPC in Cameroon.
In 1950, however, after two years of intense repression of the 
RDA in the Ivory Coast, Francois Mitterand negotiated a rapprochement 
with Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Two aspects of this agreement would have 
been particularly disagreeable to the Cameroonians of the UPC: first,
a relaxation of the call for economic independence,J and second, the 
ending of all association with the Communist Party of France.^ In 
accepting the Mitterand agreement, the Ivory Coast and similar parties 
in the Rassemblement were able to legitimise their positions in their 
own countries and thus became the heirs to the French rule in Africa. 
In return, the French were able to maintain strong economic links with 
Africa and, through the skilful placement of technical advisers, a 
fair amount of bureaucratic influence as well. To those who chose to 
stay outside of this arrangement, subsequent history was not nearly so 
kind. In the case of the UPC, the party was first persecuted, then 
outlawed in 1955, then engaged in a protracted civil war —  first with 
the French authorities and finally with the government of Ahmadou 
Ahidjo, as assisted by members of the French army. By the mid-1960s, 
most of the UPC leaders were exiled, imprisoned or dead, although a 
few chose to work with Ahidjo's government after an offer of amnesty.
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The influence of the UPC on the referendum in the British 
Cameroons lies in the export of their anti-colonial policies to the 
Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations. As the UPC found itself 
increasingly excluded from the legitimate political processes of the 
French Cameroons, it relied more and more on its influence in the 
Trusteeship Committee to gain respectability and power. As the party 
in the French Cameroons which had first called for independence and 
which, even after the split with the RDA, still maintained links with 
the French Communist Party, the UPC and its policies were endorsed by 
the anti-imperialist and usually Soviet-bloc countries of the UN.
Thus, within the Trusteeship Committee reunification, as a UPC policy, 
came to be regarded as the only true anti-imperialist policy. This 
fact helped to polarise the committee into two factions on this 
question: one which supported reunification as a thoroughly anti­
colonial measure and the other which favoured continued integration
with Nigeria, the position taken by the Western bloc representatives
sinvolved in the question.
This polarisation in fact reflected only a segment of the range 
of opinion within British Cameroons itself. The government elected by 
the Southern Cameroons Assembly in 1959 contained a majority which 
rejected both integration with Nigeria and reunification with the 
French Cameroons. The preferred alternative was to secede from 
Nigeria and function as an independent state within the Commonwealth, 
leaving reunification as a desirable but distant goal. In August,
1959 a plebiscite conference met in Mamfe to decide the wording of the 
referendum and whether migrants from Nigeria and the French Cameroons 
would be allowed to vote. The majority of the forty-three 
representatives from the Southern Cameroons (twenty-nine, or sixty- 
seven percent) felt that the referendum should be a choice between 
secession from or integration with Nigeria, leaving aside any 
discussion of the future relationship to the French Cameroons. The 
remaining fourteen (thirty-three percent) thought that the choice 
should be between integration with Nigeria and reunification with 
French Cameroons.^
Premier Foncha had already presented the United Nations with the 
wishes of the Southern Cameroons Assembly. He now added the opinion 
of the Mamfe plebiscite conference that the referendum should be a 
choice between integration and secession. Secession, as a choice,
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however, did not fit into the polarities of the United Nations in 
1959. As a result, rather than reshape their ideas to the Cameroon 
reality, the UN committee put pressure on Premier Foncha to accept 
their version of how events should be seen. Shortly after his return 
to the United Nations in September 1959, therefore, Foncha 
unilaterally agreed that the question should be a choice between 
Nigeria and the French Cameroons.^
The decision was widely opposed within the Southern Cameroons and 
a number of efforts were made throughout 1960 either to abandon the 
referendum or to rewrite the question to include the secession 
alternative. All of these attempts failed.** At the same time,
Foncha made several efforts to negotiate the terms of reunification 
with Ahidjo, the president of the newly-independent Republic of 
Cameroon, as of January 1960. Significantly, Foncha insisted that the 
new federation not be a member of either the Commonwealth or the 
French Community, a condition which Ahidjo would not accept at all.^
In November 1960, a conference was held in London between the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and various leaders of the 
Southern Cameroons to consider making a case in the United Nations for 
abandoning the plebiscite and requesting instead an independent 
Southern Cameroons outside the control of both Nigeria and the 
Republic. This also failed,^ and in February 1961, the plebiscite 
was held based on a question that was at best an indequate 
representation of the range of choice desired in the Southern 
Cameroons.
The Vote
A number of factors influenced the vote. Most people would agree 
that the boundary established between the British and the French 
Cameroons took little account of the geographical, cultural and 
historical links which existed in the area and that there was a strong 
cultural bias in favour of reunification. Maps 10, 11 and _12 display 
the corner of Cameroon which contains both the former Southern 
Cameroons and the regions bordering it in former French Cameroons. 
There are several features of these maps which should be noticed. To 
begin with, the Bamoun and Bamileke people of the former French 
Cameroons share the same mountainous plateau where one finds the 
Grassfields people of the British Cameroons. Moreover, long before
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Map 10. GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES ALONG THE MANDATE BOUNDARY OF THE
SOUTHERN AND FRENCH CAMEROONS
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Map 11. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS CROSSING THE MANDATE BOUNDARY
OF THE SOUTHERN AND FRENCH CAMEROONS
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Map 12. AREAS OF MAXIMUM POPULATION DENSITY ALONG THE MANDATE
BOUNDARY OF THE SOUTHERN AND FRENCH CAMEROONS
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the plateau was split between a French and a British region there was
r
considerable trade, conquest and migration occuring among theA
different towns and tribes of the plateau people. Not surprisingly, 
there are considerable similarities in culture, politics and 
languages.
Second, when compared to the lower forested regions of the 
coastal plains, the plateau has experienced a much higher population 
density. Under the Germans and then under the French, this relatively 
dense population meant that much of the forced labour for the lowlands 
plantations was recruited from the highlands areas. When forced 
labour was finally abolished, the pressure of population growth on 
traditional farming practices in the plateau —  in addition to various 
economic and cultural factors —  meant that the coast continued to 
receive a large number of workers from the plateau region. Some of 
this labour went into Mungo, some into the city of Douala, and a large 
number of people crossed the border to work on the German plantations 
in British Cameroons, which later became the CDC estates.
There is a third factor of more questionable importance in the 
vote of reunification. Namely, the area fanning out and upwards from 
the coast to the plateau was that area of Cameroon which had had the 
longest and most intense contact with Europeans. Here, the standard 
of Western education is higher and there is a certain unity based on 
European influence. Paradoxically, this might not always tend to 
inspire reunification. According to an interview with S.J. Epale, 
those people living along the Anglo-French border were more aware of 
the different cultures which had grown up around the British or French 
administration and were among those least in favour of 
reunification.^ Still, a growing acceptance that some form of 
reunification was inevitable seems to have been influenced by all 
these historical and cultural factors.
The actual campaign, however, was not fought on the social links 
and similarities. Instead, in the choice between Nigeria and 
reunification, it was easier to stress the known evils of the Nigerian 
association than to project the dangers of a federation which had not 
yet been formed. In this respect, much was made of the disliked 
presence in the Southern Cameroons of Ibo traders from south-eastern 
Nigeria. A skilful campaign was based on equating Nigerian
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administration with Ibo conduct in the villages and towns. There was
also the comparison between development in the British Cameroons and
in the French Cameroons. Up until the end of the Second World War,
the British seem to have paid very little attention to their
responsibilities in Cameroon. There was a deplorable lack of roads,
railroads, hospitals and schools, all of which compared unfavourably
with the higher level of material development in the French Cameroons.
Finally, one rather suspects that in the climate of general economic
well-being that prevailed in the late 1950s, there was a certain
complacency about the vote on the part of those who favoured Nigeria.
The compaign o-f those who preferred the option —  Dr. Endeley's party
among others —  seems to have got off to a slow start, over-confident
perhaps that their record of achievement during the 1950s would speak
for them in the referendum. However, according to one interview, the
general population understood very little of the reunification debate
and were easily persuaded to vote for the first person1or party who
promised independence. In this, the British Cameroons1 arm of the UPC
(the OK party) would seem to have had the upper hand. They were among
the first to canvas the bars, introducing songs that equated
reunification with independence and taking up a grass roots campaign
1 ^that was off and running before Dr. Endeley's group even began. J
With all of these factors, the vote to reunify won. Throughout 
the campaign it would seem that no discussion of the economic 
consequences of reunification was ever raised. Nor, strange as it may 
seem, did Elders and Fyffes or other British companies in the British 
Cameroons attempt to take sides during the months before the vote. 
Elders and Fyffes at least were well aware of the dangers of joining 
the Republic of Cameroon and the French Union to which it was 
attached. So, doubtless, were the British administrators of the CDC. 
And yet, strangely, Elders and Fyffes do not seem to have taken sides. 
Instead, they may have limited themselves to warning the Cameroonian 
leaders of the potential economic problems involved in reunification. 
Whether the warnings were never received, or never believed or 
dismissed as the exaggerations only to be expected from the British 
people in power, is difficult to gauge. What is true, is that 
although many people today in Anglophone Cameroon regret the passing 
of the banana trade and the lost prosperity of the 1950s, none of them 
remembers the prospect of that loss being discussed at all In the
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reunification debate which, as described by Victor Mukete, "was a very 
emotional affair".1^
The Process of Federation
By 1958, the policy of reunification was adopted by the 
established pre-independence government of the French Cameroons.
Their endorsement may have been an attempt to undercut some of the 
appeal of the UPC, which was still active although outlawed. But the 
idea of "One Kamerun" was fairly widespread by this time and not 
completely unreasonable. What form that reunification would take, 
however, was not widely discussed, either within the French Cameroons 
or within the Southern Cameroons, or even between them.
By the time negotiations with the Republic had begun at a 
conference in Foumban, the Southern (now West) Cameroonians were at a 
severe disadvantage. Given that a majority of the leadership of the 
country had preferred reunification as a distant rather than an 
immediate goal, there had been little thought among West Cameroonians 
as to the form of the new Cameroon Federation. At best, according to 
W.R. Johnson, they anticipated "... a loose federation with a 
diminutive and weak government at the center, and robust states
1 C
endowed with nearly every power they had formerly exercised."
This view ran directly counter to the centralising traditions of 
French administration, traditions which had been incorporated in 
Ahidjofs own plans for the new Federal Republic of Cameroon.
The great divergence of views and values between East and West 
Cameroon took the Anglophone West Cameroonians by surprise. As a 
result, much of the five-day conference at Foumban was taken up by 
meetings of West Cameroonians among themselves, with only one formal 
session of the delegations from both states. It was a session that 
lasted just over an hour and a half.^ The resentment still felt in 
Anglophone Cameroon over the outcome of the conference is still 
reflected in the rumours which circulate today of the trickery of the 
East Cameroonians confounding a rather bumbling naivet& of the West 
Cameroon representatives. The fact that the resentment and the 
rumours have survived until 1982 is in part due to the feeling that 
"centralising" often seemed to mean the elimination of Anglophone 
traditions and the dominance of Francophone objectives.
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As far as the banana trade was concerned, no arrangements seem to 
have been made during this period of political negotiation for the 
eventual incorporation of West Cameroon's production into East 
Cameroon's exports. This is not too surprising, as the French market 
had just been divided in January 1962 into quotas for franc-zone 
producers that gave Cameroon only thirteen percent of the market —  
about 55,000 tonnes. This was considerably less than the 1950s level 
of production and was imposed as the Mungo trade was battling for its 
own survival and going through one reorganisation after another, none 
of which was particularly effective. Mungo's confusion, however, and 
their lack of consideration for the position of the West Cameroon 
trade, did not help the Anglophone producers who found themselves 
increasingly under threat of being squeezed from the British market by 
the demands of Jamaican producers.
The Jamaican banana trade had been one of the early cornerstones 
of the United Fruit Company's business, beginning back in the 1870s 
and trading to Boston. With, however, the introduction of the 
Imperial Preference in 1932 most Jamaican fruit was diverted to 
Britain where it was marketed by Elders and Fyffes. By the beginning 
of the Second World War, the Jamaican banana trade was so dependent on 
the British market that a special subsidy was arranged for the 
Jamaican planters to see them through the war years when no bananas 
were shipped to Britain at all. After the war, Jamaican planters took 
longer than had the British Cameroons to recover. They were also 
hampered by inopportune hurricanes in the early 1950s. By the late 
1950s, however, they were clamouring for the dominance in the British 
market they had had before the war and before the success of the 
British Cameroons. Jamaican producers, therefore, were urging the 
enactment of a tariff that would discriminate against all non- 
Commonwealth fruit —  an act that was finally passed in 1960 .^
The Kumba Federation
In the first few years after the referendum, the most current 
assumption on all sides seems to have been that the access of West 
Cameroon to the British market would somehow be maintained. Even as 
late as March 1964, in a meeting of Anglophone producers with the 
Mungo planters and Victor Kanga, the Minister of the National Economy, 
the Minister spoke of two banana exporting groups in Federal Cameroon:
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one from East Cameroon and one from the West, the latter of which
-} Q
"s'occupe de ses propres debouches". ° This sense of separation 
never really broke down, and it is one of the remarkable features —  
or non-features more exactly —  of the meeting minutes for both the 
Syndicat in Mungo and the cooperative union which came to replace it, 
that throughout the 1960s there are not more than a half dozen 
references to the West Cameroon trade. Only two of these are at all 
revealing. For the rest, and for the rest of the 1960s meeting 
minutes of the East Cameroon banana trade, the West Cameroon producers 
might just as well not have existed.
One of the meetings where West Cameroon interests were 
represented was with FEBACAM.* After the 1959 strike by smallholders, 
the Syndicat had found itself being slowly destroyed by inter-racial 
arguments between European and Cameroonian planters. As a result, 
much of the management of the trade was transferred to 
FEBACAM/UGECOBAM which was charged with the modernisation and 
reorganisation of the banana industry in Mungo. Thus, when in 1964 
the Kumba Federation, one of the larger West Cameroon banana 
cooperatives, decided to try to ship some of their fruit out through 
Mungo, they arranged for the central government to set up a meeting 
between Kumba Federation and FEBACAM to discuss the arrrangements.
Several interesting facts emerge in reading the discussion
between FEBACAM and the Kumba Federation. For one thing, it is clear
that whatever may have been the outcome of the referendum, the
boundary between East and West Cameroon was still treated in 1964 as
an international boundary. Thus, the banana producers of West
Cameroon were required to have an export authorisation and customs
papers before sending any fruit to Mungo for shipping.^ Second,
whatever may have been the pressures on West Cameroon producers, or
whatever obvious geographical sense may have been led to shipping
Kumba fruit through Mungo rather than Tiko (see Map 4 above), the
FEBACAM committee was fully persuaded that the Kumba Federation’s
participation in the Mungo trade was only temporary. In May 1964, 
when this meeting took place, Mungo production was still far below the
* !
F§d§ration Bananiire du Cameroun, later remaned UGECOBAM, Union
GSnSral des Cooperatives Bananieres du Mungo.
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level achieved in the 1950s, but most members of the trade were 
convinced that their production would eventually rise to fill the 
entire quota alloted to Cameroon under the 1962 arrangements with the 
CIB in Paris. The director general of FEBACAM, M. Breton, was 
careful, therefore, to specify that the Kumba Federation’s access to 
the East Cameroon market was only temporary, and could be cut off once 
the final size of the quota had been determined. "Tout arrangement 
avec la Kumba Federation n ’est que provisoire et dlpendra du tonnage
on
qui nous sera attribuS par la France.' In the same manner, the
president of FEBACAM spoke of the railroad freight cars from Mungo
being "lent" to the Kumba Federation, one of the larger West Cameroon
banana cooperatives, with the clear understanding that one day the
91loan would be retracted.
One senses in reading the minutes of this meeting that the East 
Cameroonians were distinctly unwilling to let in this competitor and, 
even with the support of the central government behind them, the Kumba 
Federation was not at all welcomed in Mungo by the banana planters of 
the area. This attitude had hardened five months later in’ the next 
recorded meeting between the banana growers of West Cameroon and the 
Mungo planters in October 1954. The West Cameroonians had come to 
complain that they were not being allowed a sufficient number of 
freight cars to transport their fruit to harbour. Four cars is not 
enough, they argued; we need twenty-one cars to be satisfied. To 
which the East Cameroonians quickly replied through M. Breton, the 
Director General of FEBACAM/UGECOBAM, that the arrangement with West 
Cameroon was only temporary and good only for the period of low 
production in Mungo. The meeting closed with the assignment of six
oo
cars to the West Cameroonian producers.
None of the other 1960s meeting minutes mentions the problems of 
West Cameroon and one surmises that the Anglophone state was left to 
look for its own markets and survive without the help of their new 
brothers in East Cameroon who clearly feared there was not enough room 
for all in the new French system of quotas.
Elders and Fyffes and the Foreign Exchange Office
In 1965 another complication arose in the dealings of the West 
Cameroon banana trade with the new federal bureauracy. In February of
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that year, a new two-page contract had been drawn up between the 
Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers and Elders and Fyffes. Under the 
previous contract, dated 1957, (and discussed in Chapter 2) payment to 
cooperative farmers had been made on the basis of the "net proceeds of 
sales attributable to Union bananas after deduction of costs and 
expenses" and the company's commission.^ The 1965 agreement, 
however, made a different arrangement (one of several differences 
resulting from independence, reunification and the decline of banana 
quality), on the model of what is known as an "FOB (free on board) 
contract". Under the new contract, which was to last only a year, the 
company would pay the Union
at the rate of CFA francs 18204 for each metric ton of bananas 
including stalk discharged from the vessel (the remittance of the 
foreign currency involved to be in accordance with the 
requirements of the Exchange Control Authorities), provided that 
wastage and unsaleable on discharge do not exceed 3% of the total 
weight of the cargo consigned into the vessel by B.C.U.F.^
This clause was followed by provisions concerning the amount to be 
deducted when the waste was greater than three percent and also 
stipulations for an independent surveyor to "assess deterioration" 
whenever waste was high.25 The contract no longer required that the 
cost of freight and sales be deducted from the price paid to the 
farmers because by the new agreement the company bought the fruit 
outright as it left Cameroon, absorbing all costs from that point 
onward, with the exception of any excessive waste or deterioration of 
the fruit.
It is not unreasonable to assume that when the BCUF signed this 
agreement, they did not realise the consequences of Clause 8 which 
made the producers responsible for wasted and unsaleable fruit above a 
certain level. Moreover, the clause made no provision for losses due 
to faulty shipping or handling on the part of Elders and Fyffes, and 
can be criticised on that ground. That it could be an extremely 
damaging clause to West Cameroon producers in 1965, therefore, is 
unquestionable. As the market standard rose and more and more small 
farmers had trouble meeting that standard, the clause clearly served 
the purpose of eliminating from the trade both poor quality fruit and, 
by extension, those who produced it. Thus, at the same time that the 
contract seemed to be giving producers a guaranteed price independent
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of market fluctuations, it also exposed them to the problems of 
meeting a higher market standard just when their own production was 
deteriorating. The impact of that exposure was, very likely, only 
worsened by the fact that the 1965 contract, unlike its 1957 
predecessor, no longer included the secondment of Elders and Fyffes 
personnel to the management of the BCUF. The loss of the management 
in ensuring a high quality of fruit from the smallholders could only 
have aggravated the situation of the cooperative members.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the new government —  which 
at least on the Francophone side came from a tradition of protection, 
even uneconomic protection, of smallholders —  should have sought to 
minimise the effects of this clause. Judging by some of the 
correspondence on the question, however, their approach was at the 
very least tactless and avoided completely any discussion of the 
underlying problem, namely the survival of the small farmer.
The end result of this situation was an attempt, first by the 
Director of Economic Services in Victoria and then by the Foreign 
Exchange Director in Douala, to insist that the company had to pay the 
full price for all fruit shipped and disregard any wastage over three 
percent. An FOB contract, argued Mr. Ebanja, the director of Economic 
Services in Victoria, could not be anything else and no deductions 
could be allowed after purchasing the fruit in Cameroon. "...Until 1 
hear to the contrary from higher authorities, you will, for the time 
being, be bound to repatriate and pay the FOB contract 
price of 18,204 fcs. CFA per metric ton of bananas you purchase from 
West Cameroon.
It is not possible from the correspondence in hand to understand 
fully what followed. The General Manager of Elders and Fyffes, Eric 
Sharpies, clearly believed that the terms of the contract had been 
accepted, and cited in a letter dated 17 August 1965 a meeting with 
Mr. Ebanja in early February to this effect: "... on 8th February,
1965 .. it was then agreed that we would submit our Exchange 
Undertakings on the basis of ’Firm Sales Contract'". Mr. Sharpies 
then argued that this arrangement was also accepted by the Exchange 
Director in Douala on February 25. "You (Monsieur T. Koul§, le 
Directeur des Changes, Douala) confirmed that the Exchange
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Undertakings were to be submitted by us on a Firm Sales Contract 
07
basis... .
However, Mr. KoulS's answer to Mr. Sharpies’ two-page letter of 
17 August 1965 threw the entire argument onto a very different plane. 
Up until August, it would seem that the difference between Elders and 
Fyffes and the new Cameroon government was rooted in the problem 
of wasted and unsaleable fruit. Certainly the 1965 contract itself 
left room for dispute. In Clause 3, the terms of purchase are given 
as: "FOB Tiko or other loading point in West Cameroon" with the 
implication that payment was based on fruit loaded in Cameroon. But
the terms of payment were in Clause 6 described as "payment to be on
the outturn weight of the cargo sold".^ The difference between 
Clause 3 and Clause 6 was very clearly the wasted and unsaleable 
fruit, which under the contract was the responsibility (when over 
three percent of the cargo) of the producers. Arguably, then, 
resolution of this question should have been tied to a reworking of 
the contract.
Instead, M. Kouli dismissed the importance of the contract
entirely. "J’ai toujours declare que l 1Office des Changes ne se
prioccupait pas de vos conventions avec les producteurs du Cameroun 
Occidental et que seules vos ventes sur l ’itranger 1 ’intSressaient."
He also described the meetings Mr. Sharpies cited as nothing but "une 
serie de malentendus," and argued instead that the company was obliged 
to repatriate to Cameroon not just the earnings owed to producers, but 
the gross earnings on sales. "Vos engagements de change doivent done 
etre Stablis sur la base du contrat de vente sur l'etranger et non sur 
la base de la convention d'achat aux producteurs."^
It is difficult, nearly twenty years after the affairs, and with 
little more than a handful of letters as evidence, to understand 
exactly what purpose lay behind M. KoulS’s September 3, 1965 letter 
to the General Manager of Elders and Fyffes. The 1965 contract with 
West Cameroonian producers committed the company to buying 20,000 
metric tonnes of fruit at a fixed price at a time when the British 
market was almost completely closed to Cameroonian fruit, and when the 
quality of the fruit sent was lower than it had been in earlier years. 
The position taken by M. KoulS, however, attacked this contract and 
thereby ignored the problems of West Cameroonian producers, endangered
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their ability to continue to do business with Elders and Fyffes, and 
showed an ignorance —  whether deliberately contrived or genuine, one 
cannot say —  of the usual practices of the banana trade in both East 
and West Cameroon; whether M. KoulS knew it or not, the full price of 
sale had never in East or West Cameroon been repatriated to Cameroon 
without first deducting expenses and commissions.
In an interview, David Philp, now a director of Fyffes Group, 
London, and formerly the manager of the BCUF seconded by Elders and 
Fyffes, mentioned that the exchange control problem contributed to the 
company’s decision to leave West C a m e r o o n . H o w  much it 
contributed is difficult to say. It is equally difficult to judge the 
government’s motives for requesting a change in the nature of payments 
to Cameroon, particularly one that runs counter to the practice of the 
trade generally. While Koule’s request to repatriate the total of 
banana sales receipts before paying off expenses could be seen as a 
decision based on ignorance or simple misunderstanding, it is also 
much too easily interpreted as a bureaucratic manoeuvre to eliminate 
an important British firm from West Cameroon thereby forcing West 
Cameroon to join the economic chasse r€serv€ of the French-speaking 
Republic of Cameroon. Alternatively, it may have been a simple 
request for a bribe, which was either not understood or, by conscious 
decision, simply ignored.
Regardless of the interpretation one puts on the correspondence 
with the Office of Exchange or even how one views the meetings between 
the Kumba Federation and the organisation of Mungo planters, it is 
clear that the process of federation was not at all simple or 
straightforward. More Important, however, is the sense that, at least 
in terms of the banana trade, federation was an unequal affair. When 
compared with the Mungo trade, particularly in the early 1960s, the 
strengths of the West Cameroon banana trade were considerable. Its 
biggest assets were the managerial structure which had been created to 
coordinate the shipping and sales of very different kinds of 
producers, and the management of the farmers’ cooperatives. These, 
not unlike the Mungo cooperatives, had begun to experience some of the
O 1
same problems of rapid growth and corruption. A But notwithstanding 
the inevitable strains, one cannot help but feel that the organisation 
of production and sales in West Cameroon was intrinsically stronger 
than that in Mungo. Moreover, much of the strength of that
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organisation in the late 1950s was due to the role played by Elders 
and Fyffes. And yet, none of these advantages was of much value when 
trying to harmonise the two systems. Inevitably, it seemed that one 
system or the other would have to yield. Given that the only 
surviving market was in France, it is not surprising that, of the two 
systems, it was the one serving the French market which endured.
Withdrawal of Elders and Fyffes
In the destruction of the West Cameroon banana trade which 
followed reunification and federation, the first organisation to 
withdraw was Elders and Fyffes. In terms of the triangular managerial 
structure which had grown up in the 1950s, they were in the pivotal 
position, serving all producers and coordinating the timing of the 
evacuation of fruit from the fields as well as acting as fruit 
inspectors. With the departure of the company, the rest of the trade 
was on much weaker ground.
The decision to withdraw was not easy. During the 1950s, twenty 
percent of the company's sales in Britain had been coming from 
the Southern Cameroons, and profits were consistently over £1,000,000 
year. Throughout the early 1960s, however, profits were low and 
erratic and in 1966, the company recorded its first net trading
o 9
loss. * In this situation, to have Britain cut off as a market of 
Cameroonian fruit but still to be under contractual obligation to sell 
that fruit became too much of a strain, and the company’s decision to 
leave was finally made in the summer of 1966.
Some of the difficulties of the early 1960s come through in the 
files, which were found in the Buea Archives, of correspondence 
between the West Cameroon government and Elders and Fyffes. A letter 
from J.A. Taylor, acting General Manager of Elders and Fyffes,
Likomba, dated 13 February 1963 was sent to Prime Minister Foncha in 
Buea. The letter quoted from a cable sent to the company’s Likomba 
office from the Elders and Fyffes head office in London. The cable 
gives some idea of the extent to which even in 1963, the company was 
supporting the West Cameroon banana trade:
... Glad to say slight improvement market situation and in order
to assist general position and contingent on government and CDC
co-operation regarding export duty and charges will make ex
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gratis allowance from general funds on this occasion of one pound 
ten shillings per ton as from Changuinola loading February 
nineteenth while boat price at present level must point out still 
subsidising boat price to extent of nine pounds per ton.
"Under the circumstances," added Mr. Taylor in his letter, "it will 
not of course be possible for us to make any other allowances or 
concessions.
The Search for Markets
In September of that same year, a circular went out from Eric 
Sharpies, General Manager of Elders and Fyffes, Likomba, which gives 
some idea of the problems involved in finding non-British markets.
The circular quotes from another cable from London which says:
... because of delay which occurred over obtaining agreement in 
West Cameroon to accept the West German offer ... the West German 
importers concerned made otheK arrangements."'*
West Cameroon’s rejection, even as a pocket veto, of the West German 
offer was not surprising. The German’s final offer had been an FOB 
Tiko price of £20.7 shillings per ton "based on outturn rates of 
saleable fruit —  price net of commission and includes diothene 
w r a p p i n g , w h i c h  must have seemed derisory compared to the prices 
West Cameroonians had received from Britain. And yet, the position of 
West Cameroon’s fruit in the British market was hardly secure.
Another item in the Buea Archives files, dated November 1963, notes 
that West Cameroon bananas were unpopular in Britain due to their 
"poor appearance and overall poor quality.
The squeeze, then, on both the West Cameroon banana trade and on 
the company was becoming tighter. After many good years, it was 
difficult for West Cameroonians, both leaders and smaller farmers, to 
understand the change in economic environment. Both Dr. Endeley and 
Elders and Fyffes were often accused of sabotaging the market, 
presumably in retaliation for the reunification vote going against
07
them. A BCUF delegation was sent to Britain at this time to see 
for themselves what the market was like and what their competition 
could offer. There was also a mission in 1963 composed of Cameroonian 
representatives of the BCUF, the CDC and the government which resulted
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in the German offer described above. Here, too, it was easy for the 
Cameroonians to imagine some trickery was involved. Victor Mukete, 
then chairman of the CDC and one of the largest landowners in Rumba, 
described their trip as a series of frustrations and particularly 
talked of their negotiations with the African Fruit Company in 
Germany, where negotiations were long and drawn out and repeatedly 
inconclusive. According to Chief Mukete, the hidden stumbling block 
'was the United Fruit Company; when the African Fruit Company 
representative was asked to say simply whether or not his business 
wanted Cameroon bananas, the German replied that they did not want to 
cross the United Fruit Company because they would have to deal with 
them elsewhere in the world. When asked to clarify this point, Chief 
Mukete added only that everywhere the Cameroonians tried to negotiate 
a market, largely in Germany and Italy, the Elders and Fyffes company 
In London seemed to know the state of negotiations, and then added 
that the German price was in any case too low.^
The company’s knowledge of negotiations is not in itself unusual. 
Industries function like villages in many respects and will gossip 
about the state of industry affairs in much the same way that 
villagers will gossip about the health and well-being of any of their 
neighbours. Moreover, Elders and Fyffes had an interest in the 
success of the negotiations and would no doubt have used their 
contacts in the business to keep track of what progress was being 
made. What the interview with Chief Mukete points up, however, is 
the degree of suspicion which arose during the difficult years of the 
1960s and a desire to be able to blame the company for the complicated 
collapse of that time. A high level of trust, one is tempted to 
argue, is a luxury only good times can afford.
In fact, the brutal fact was slowly apparent that there were no 
European markets open to West Cameroon bananas in the 1960s that could 
even approach the favourable terms offered by the British markets in 
the 1950s. As the consequences of that reality began to show 
themselves, It was inevitable that relations between the company and 
people in West Cameroon would become somewhat strained.
Giving Up the Bavenga Plantation
A similar breakdown of understanding seems to have occurred over
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Map 13. ELDERS AND FYFFES PLANTATION LAND AT BAVENGA/ 
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the future of the Bavenga and Bafia plantations (see Map 13). This 
land, which the company was planning to clear and plant in about ten 
farms, was 10,000 acres (or 4048 hectares) and had been obtained from 
the villages of Bafia and Bavenga through a long process of 
negotiation both with the villagers and the Buea government that 
finally resulted in 1961 in three Certificates of Occupancy for the
OQ
land in the name of Elders and Fyffes. Consent to use the land 
had been given to the company much earlier by the villages, who 
accepted what can only be considered derisory compensation by Western 
standards, but which by village standards would seem to have been more 
than sufficient. According to Dr. Endeley, who took part in these 
negotiations, the chief of Bavenga had asked for a new black coat, to 
show that he was chief, and a cow. In return, he would grant Elders 
and Fyffes use of the village land. Dr. Endeley raised the price by
requesting in addition that the chief be given a cement block house
and Land Rover, and that the company put running water into the
village.^ All of these conditions were met, and while the formal
arrangements were being made through the government, Elders and Fyffes 
began clearing land and putting up buildings. By 1956, a five-room 
house had been constructed on Farm 1, and in 1958 the company began 
clearing 150 acres for a nursery. By 1961, they had cleared three 
farms, and had planted nearly 1000 acres (405 hectares) in Cavendish 
bananas. In the three camps taken together there were nearly 1000 
men, a workshop, a sickbay and a modest pumping system for getting 
water from a rather distant stream into the plantation.^
The development of the Bavenga/Bafia lands was considered by many 
people to be proof of the company's long term commitment to Cameroon, 
and indeed the company saw it that way t h e m s e l v e s B a v e n g a  was a 
form of insurance —  against losing the Likomba lease, against the 
decline of the smallholders, and against the reduction of CDC acreage 
in bananas. Bavenga, it was reasoned, would help maintain a high 
level of banana exports from British/West Cameroon.^
Any yet, by 1964, it was becoming increasingly difficult to keep 
the plantations going and pay for their further development. The 
files of the Buea Archives hold a letter dated 4 May 1964 from
Taylor, acting General Manager of Elders and Fyffes, Likomba, to 
the acting Prime Minister of Buea. In the letter, Mr. Taylor 
Indicates that he is sending the acting Prime Minister maps of Bavenga
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and details of Farms 1 and 2. Mr. Taylor
"... reiterates that buildings and cultivations will rapidly 
deteriorate if not properly maintained and of stressing the 
importance of the property being surrendered being put to 
whatever use the government has in mind for it without delay if 
this is to be avoided."
He ends the letter with an offer to show the acting Prime Minister or 
his representative around the farms and encloses a list of the 
buildings at Farm 1, which was the most developed*^
At the end of June, 1964, the secretary to the Prime Minister 
passed Mr. Taylor's letter to the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry 
of Cooperatives and Community Development in Buea. "I should be glad 
if you would let me know early whether the cooperative movement will 
require this plantation area." And by mid-July, 1964, the letter had 
reached Simon Shang, the Registrar for Cooperatives, at which point 
the correspondence disappears into the sand.^^
Notwithstanding this correspondence, there is a note of shock in 
the introduction to a plan that was drawn up in the summer of 1966, 
two years after the correspondence cited above. The plan is titled 
"Scheme for Immediate Use of Land Surrendered at Bafia/Bavenga by the 
Elders and Fyffes" and is undated, but seems to have been drafted 
sometime in July of 1966. The first four paragraphs of this scheme 
are worth quoting in their entirety for the sense of grievance they 
contain and for some of the charges which are made against the 
company.
"A" INTRODUCTION
1, Some time last year, the Elders and Fyffes informed groups of 
West Cameroon banana producers, i.e. the Cameroon Development 
Corporation and the Cooperatives that the Company would cease 
operations on their banana estates at the end of 1966. Early 
this year, the General Manager - Mr. Sharpies, in an informal 
manner informed the Prime Minister of his Company's 
intentions. All along, therefore, the West Cameroon 
Government has kept its mind prepared to take over the 
properties by December 1966, and on 12th July 1966, a meeting 
was held in the office of the Director of Land and Surveys to 
propose ways and means of putting Into proper use, the 
properties, including the existing banana crops, after the 
known date of surrender by the Elders and Fyffes.
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2. Government had a shock last week when Mr. Sharpies announced 
that his company had now taken a decision to stop the farm 
operations by July 31st 1966, five months earlier than had 
been proposed; the Company had further taken action to give a 
formal notice of surrender, the said notice to take effect on 
15th October 1966.
3. Government felt very concerned about this aggressive attitude 
of a Firm which has operated in the territory under very 
favourable conditions, not counting the huge profits it has 
reaped from our virgin soil. Accordingly, the Secretary to 
the Prime Minister summoned Mr. Sharpies - the General 
Manager to explain to selected Government Officials why his 
Company had decided to take the West Cameroon Government by 
surprise, considering that we were being given one week's 
notice to work out a scheme to take .over an existing banana 
plantation.
4. At the end of the meeting with Mr. Sharpies, the Government 
Officials were convinced that, despite much talk of
Government being given a "free gift", there had been a
calculated plan to sabotage the whole scheme so that 
Government would eventually inherit a liability.^
The feeling that West Cameroon had not been given adequate notice 
of the company's intentions was, and still is widespread. Dr. Endeley 
says that he had no notice of their withdrawal from Bavenga until a 
boy who was delivering letters for the Company told him.^ This is 
not impossible, as the 1964 notice had been given to the government, 
and Dr. Endeley, as Prime Minister Foncha's long-time political 
opponent, may not have had much access to the thinking of the 
government at this time. On the other hand, as President of the BCUF, 
the 1964 offer of the land to the Cooperative Movement should have 
come to Dr. Endeley. More surprising perhaps, was that one of Elders 
and Fyffes chief employees at Bavenga, Anthanacious Eddia, was also 
taken unawares. When he was sent out to work at Bavenga in 1961, he
was told the company was planning to renew their lease on the land for
A Q
ninety-nine years. °
What seems to have happened is that after having given notice to 
the government in writing in 1964 (and perhaps later as well, although 
those few files that were found did not show this), the company did 
not announce its plans publicly until the government had decided what 
to do. The government, however, seems to have kept silent. As the 
correspondence from 1964 had ended with Simon Shang, he was asked in 
an interview in Yaounde in May 1982 why the government had not 
prepared earlier for the withdrawal of Elders and Fyffes. He answered
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by admitting that the government knew the company was giving up the 
Bavenga estates, but that no one believed they were serious. The 
company, he argued, had too many investments in West Cameroon to pull 
out. Moreover, they were mistrusted because of their monopoly as 
sales agents and none in Cameroon had any way to confirm the financial 
difficulties of the company. It, therefore, he said, seemed 
impossible that the company was seriously planning to leave.^
The sense that the company had sabotaged the plantations of 
Bavenga would seem to be a little more accurate, Athanacious Eddia 
reports being asked to uproot all the young banana plants (the 
suckers) on Farm 2 so that they could be shipped to the West Indies. 
Most of the planting, according to Mr. Eddia, on the Bavenga farms 
was in Poyo, Lacatan or Giant Cavendish varieties, all resistant to 
Panama d i s e a s e . I t  is not unreasonable to suppose that once the 
company had decided to leave, they felt free to take out one of their 
major investments —  the planting material. More recently in the 
1980s, John Robertson of the CDC banana estates, has gone up to 
Bavenga looking for any Lacatan plants which he might use in a 
collection of banana varieties he has been establishing on* the CDC 
estates. Nothing, he says is now left.'*-*- All of which does 
indicate that the "free gift" Mr. Sharpies thought they were making 
was not quite so valuable as it could have been.
In the simimer of 1966, the BCUF took over the management of the 
Bavenga farms, leaving Athanacious Eddia in charge. He was given 
little of the material or managerial support he had come to expect as 
an Elders and Fyffes employee. Correspondence in Dr. Endeley's file 
on the Bavenga plantation provides some idea of the difficulties which 
were experienced after Elders and Fyffes gave up the Bavenga 
plantation. In late April 1967 (27th April), Anthancious Eddia wrote 
to the manager of the BCUF saying: "This is to inform you that the
whole new farm operation is delayed now owing to the fact that there 
Is no lorries to carry out the work." On 8 August 1967 the manager of 
the BCUF wrote to the Registrar of Cooperatives:
From the time BCUF took over Bavenga Farm on 1/3/67 the 
production has steadily declined. The average production per 
shipment of 1000 cartons which was before 1/3/67 gradually 
dropped to 700 and harvesting has been on every other shipment.
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This fall in production, added the letter, coincided with a fall in 
price from 36,000 francs CFA per ton in March 1967 to 15,000 francs 
CFA per ton in June. Another letter from Mr. Eddia to the President 
of the BCUF dated the 20 June 1969 reads:
Dear Sir,
Beg to remind you that, last time X wrote you about the 
state of the farm but, since then I have heard nothing.
In fact, Sir, if something can not be done now in the way of 
spraying, I should then draw the conclusion here that that is the 
end of things in Bavenga Farm.
Imagine that an area of 118 acres we could only cut 135 
stems. There is no other reason than green ripe, caused by 
SIgatoka disease which has swept the whole farm. If not of farm 
II, where we managed to get 235 stems, thereby we were able to 
make 339 cartons. Our next turn in July, we shall not even make 
50 cartons out of Bavenga Farm.^
By 1970, the farms were shut down. Some of the workers from the 
plantation settled on the land which, according to Mr. Eddia, they 
"farm like that now", growing mostly subsistence food crops. Farm 1, 
with its buildings, had been taken over by the Prison Department in 
July 1967 and is used as a work farm for prisoners. Dr. Endeley, 
meanwhile, uses one of the manager's houses as his country retreat and 
has put in coffee bushes and fruit trees in a part-time farming 
experiment that would require full-time management and attention 
before it was truly productive. Dr. Endeley Is planning to apply for 
the former Elders and Fyffes1 Certificate of Occupancy so that he can 
develop the land more fully.
The history of the Bavenga plantations illustrates some of the 
problems Involved in the withdrawal of Elders and Fyffes from West 
Cameroon. If the loss of the company's presence in Bavenga was felt 
so keenly, It is probably due to the fact that in Bavenga it was 
operating very much on its own. The Likomba plantation in the Tiko 
Plan was eventually absorbed by the CDC, with the exception of a small 
0CB estate set up in 1967. As of 1982, nearly all of the Likomba land 
was in palm oil or rubber. Similarly, the BCUF policy of urging crop 
diversification should have softened the blow to small farmers as the 
banana trade declined. But Bavenga was an example of company 
development in an area that was beyond the reach of both the CDC and 
the BCUF. By the time the company farms were coming Into operation, 
the village water supply was provided by the company, employment was
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provided by the company and access roads, although first cleared as 
timber roads, were maintained by the company. The loss of these 
things was, therefore, that much more noticeable, as nothing replaced 
them or replaced the benefits (or ills) that had attended their 
development.
After the withdrawal of Elders and Fyffes in 1966, only the CDC 
and the BCUF were still trying to ship bananas. Gradually the 
smallholders' produce from West Cameroon was being eliminated from the 
market. Unlike the situation in Mungo, the West Cameroonian 
producers' earnings were by now based on the actual fruit each 
producer sent, rather than being based on the undifferentiated 
shipment of plantation and smallholder production combined. As a 
result, smallholder earnings were declining faster than those of the 
plantations and before long no smallholder from West Cameroon was 
still shipping fruit to Europe. The CDC kept going, but reduced their 
acreage in bananas to about 800 hectares, which was enough to help the 
Mungo planters keep the better boats filled and so helped to keep the 
whole trade alive. However, the uneconomic position in the British 
market, the decline of production standards generally, the loss of 
Elders and Fyffes and the lack of any reasonable form of integration 
with the French-speaking planters all combined to eliminate what had 
been a very prosperous crop from Anglophone Cameroon.
The answer to why the banana trade from the former British 
Cameroons has disappeared is usually simplified by saying that "there 
were no markets”. But this statement hides a more complicated
situation. If the Southern Cameroons had voted to stay with Nigeria,
and by extension with the British Commonwealth, the British market 
would have remained open to Cameroonian fruit. Similarly, it is not 
unreasonable to hypothesize that if British Cameroonians had been 
offered the option of seceding from Nigeria, but staying in the 
Commonwealth, they would not have voted to join the French-speaking 
Republic of Cameroon; if that had been the case, bananas from English- 
speaking Cameroon would still have been sold in Britain. Given, 
however, the fact that the 1962 referendum vote was for reunification, 
then the fact that there was no market is also due to the
unwillingness of French-speaking Cameroon to share their access to the
French market with the English-speaking banana producers. This can be 
even more strongly stated by contending that many of the actions of
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the new government's bureaucracy actually served to eliminate the 
Anglophone trade and the competition it represented.
The extent of the damage caused by this chain of decisions is 
impossible to measure, but some of the bitterness that it created is 
reflected in the decision of Elders and Fyffes to withdraw from 
Anglophone Cameroon and local reactions to it. In terms of the 1982 
trade, the loss of the finely balanced business from the former 
British Cameroons has meant that the management of present affairs has 
descended from the structure that had been created in Mungo during the 
1950s. The importance of that, however, is a matter which is 
discussed in the following chapter, "The Politics of Independence in 
Mungo".
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CHAPTER 5
THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE IN MUNGO
While the vote to federate with the former French Cameroons had 
the effect of ruining the banana trade from West Cameroon, the 
politics of independence in Mungo resulted in the embittering of all 
working relationships among the participants of the Mungo banana 
trade, and with that a weakening of almost every aspect of the 
management of the industry. Exactly how that situation developed is a 
matter of social and political history, some of the elements of which 
will be discussed in this chapter. It is a history that has, in many 
respects, defined the terms of reference used in Mungo in discussing 
any of the problems of the trade. They are terms which have often 
obscured the fundamental technical and commercial realities of the 
business, complicating beyond measure the task of modernising the 
banana business in the years following the peak of the later 1950s. 
Moreover, while the politics of reunification in Anglophone Cameroon 
can be taken as a lesson in the blind impact of a political decision 
on a commercial operation, the politics of independence in Mungo 
demonstrate the ways in which the organisation of the trade itself 
acquired political overtones and consequences which were most 
violently expressed in 1959-60, but which continued to reverberate for 
many years longer and which will undoubtedly shape the future of the 
industry.
In this chapter we will look at four aspects of the politics of 
independence in Mungo. The first is the social and economic history 
of the area. The second concerns the actual events that led to a de 
facto civil war In 1959 and '60. Third, we will consider what effects 
those events had on the ability of the trade to modernise smallholder 
operations, and finally we will look at the impact of the civil war on 
the Syndicat de Defense des Intir^ts Bananiers and by extension on the 
management of the banana business of Cameroon in the 1980s.
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Background History
Land
In one of the land tenure files of the Yaounde National Archives 
there is a list of planters who had acquired concessions in Mungo by 
June 1, 1938. The list is only a rough draft, but in the same file 
with it are other notes relating to this "Relevt complet des planteurs 
installes au T e r r i t o i r e " T h i s  information provides a few clues to 
the background of the disputes in Cameroon over twenty years later.
The list is not much more than an unordered parade of names and next 
to them the acreage which has been attributed to each concessionaire 
or land holder. In trying to regroup this list of names, inevitably a 
certain element error has occurred, but has been indicated in thefa
Notes to the following discussion.
Before the arrival of the Europeans, the Mungo area was only 
thinly populated, largely by the Mbo and Mbang people. The major 
immigration began in the 1930s and the figures presented here on land 
concessions provide some idea of that migration. These figures should 
be treated with a certain amount of circumspection, however, and 
cannot be taken as an indication of the distribution of all land 
holdings in Mungo. What they show is the size and distribution of 
those land holdings conceded to private individuals or companies by 
the colonial government. Any land holding, therefore, that was based 
on customary title, or resulted from a customary form of land 
transfer, would not appear in these figures. This becomes 
particularly important when considering the growth of land holdings 
being developed by Cameroonians from outside the Mungo region, most of 
whom came into the province as labourers working the European farms.
- Ill -
Table 3
MUNGO LAND CONCESSIONS - 1 JUNE I9382
Number of Number of Number o:
planters concessions hectares
European 81 147 22,773
(70%) (77%) (94%)
African 35 44 1,579
(30%) (23%) ( 6%)
TOTAL 116 191 24,579
(100%) (100%) (100%)
SOURCE: Domaniale 759, Archives Nationales du Cameroun
As can be seen in Table 3 , Mungo Land Concessions - June 1,
1938", nearly all of the land awarded as concession land went to 
Europeans, with only six percent being granted to Africans. This is 
not surprising. The policy was designed to assist Europeans in 
setting up farms to develop the productive potential of the rural 
areas. Of these areas, Mungo had long been singled out as one of the 
richest, and of all the regions in the French Cameroons, more land had 
been conceded in Mungo than in any other area. The land tenure file 
in the National Archives breaks down by region the amount of land in 
rural concessions in 1938:
Table 4
1938 RURAL CONCESSIONS ACCORDING TO REGION OF THE FRENCH CAMEROONS
Region Number of hectares Percentage of
Mungo 24,452
conceded land 
34%
Sanaga-Maritime 20,481 28%
Noun 15,043 21%
Nyong et Sanaga 5,071 7%
Haut Nyong 2,158 3%
Kribi 1,721 2%
BenouS 929 1%
N 1 tan 904 1%
Adamaoua 751 1%
M ’Bam 488 .7%
Boumba N ’goko 407 .6%
Lom et Kordei 291 .4%
N ’Kam 190 .3%
Wouri 97 .1%
TOTAL 72,983 100.1%
SOURCE: Domaniale 759, Archives Nationales du Cameroun
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What is of particular interest in this table is that those areas 
where over ninety percent of the concessions were held —  Mungo, 
Sanaga-Maritime, Nyong and Sanaga, and Noun (which includes the 
Bamileke Plateau) —  are exactly the same areas where in the 1950s and 
early 1960s a guerrilla war was fought out between the government and 
the supporters of the UPC. This was especially true of Mungo and the 
Sanaga-Maritime, which account for thirty-four and twenty-eight 
percent of the concession land respectively. While probably not all 
of the concession land was held by Europeans, certainly in the case of 
Mungo, over ninety percent was. Moreover, even given that the land 
held by concession did not represent all of the land held in these 
areas, the coincidence between this 1938 record of land tenure and the 
later political unrest is worth noting.
In the case of Mungo, one can see from Table 3 , "Mungo Land 
Concessions", that although Europeans held over ninety percent of the 
concession land, they represented only seventy percent of the people 
holding such land. In fact, thirty percent of the concessionaires 
were Africans, even though only six percent of the concession land is 
in African hands. Given that the programme of granting concessions 
only began in the 1930s and was designed principally to attract 
Europeans, this distribution is not surprising. The government’s bias 
in favour of Europeans appears again in the following table, Table 5 , 
on the average size of holdings.
Table 5
AVERAGE NUMBER OF HECTARES HELD ON CONCESSION 
Mungo 1938
Europeans 
(N = 81)
Africans 
(N - 35)
Per
planter 
281 ha.
45 ha.
Per
concession 
154.1 ha.
35.9 ha.
Range of 
holding size
4 - 4730 ha.
2 - 416 ha.
Range of con- 
cession size
.6 - 4730 ha.
1 - 300 ha.
SOURCE: Domaniale 759, Archives Nationales du Cameroun
From this table it is clear that Europeans are favoured not just 
by the fact that they are more likely to be granted a concession, but 
also by the fact that the concession is likely to be almost five times
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as large as an African concession. Moreover, European concessions 
could be quite large. While no African was granted a concession 
greater than 300 hectares, and that was done only once, the largest of 
the European concessions was over 4000 hectares.
Table 6 on the following page, "Size of Concession Holdings,
Mungo 1938" details this observation. While there is only one 
European planter with a holding that is less than twenty hectares in 
size, sixty-nine percent of the African planters manage concessions 
less than twenty hectares; the average size of their holdings is nine 
hectares. While for the Europeans, forty percent manage holdings 
between 100-200 hectares and thirty-seven percent were working land 
areas larger than 200 hectares.
This bias in the distribution of concession land is a reflection 
of several factors. One, certainly, is political. While the British 
were experimenting with the protection of native land rights first in 
Northern Nigeria and later in the British Cameroons, the French were 
enacting a policy of economic development based on the allocation of 
unoccupied land to European developers. Unlike German colonial 
policies originating before World War One, the 1930s French 
concessions were generally on a small scale. With the exception of 
the 4730 hectares granted to the SPNP in Mungo, another 1,027 hectares 
conceded to the Societe Niabang, and four concessions between 500-1000 
hectares, the vast majority of concessions to Europeans in Mungo was 
less than 500 hectares. In fact, sixty-nine percent were less than 
or equal to one hundred hectares.
Table 7
SIZE OF CONCESSION HOLDINGS IN MUNGO 1938 
consolidated information
European African
100 ha. 101
(69%)
41
(93%)
100- 499 40
(27%)
3
( 7%)
500- 999 4
( 3%)
1000 2
( 1%)
total
concessions 147 44
(100%) (100%)
SOURCE: Domaniale 759, Archives Nationales du Cameroun
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Thus, the land concession policy of the French Cameroons in the 
1930s as exemplified by the concessions made in Mungo was aimed at 
encouraging individuals with a small amount of capital to invest in 
the development of the rural sector of the French Cameroons. The 
development was geared to cash crops for export, the ultimate market 
for which was France. The policy does not seem to have taken any 
cognizance of the indigenous people's rights to the land in Mungo, but 
was very likely encouraged by the low population of the area and the 
fact that the customary laws on land use and ownership permitted the 
use by outsiders of land not required by villagers.
African Immigration to Mungo
The number of labourers required by the Europeans can be 
estimated for 1938 by the number of hectares in the concessions. If 
one assumes that every hectare held by Europeans required one to two 
men to work it, and then multiplies that by the number of hectares 
(22,773 by 1.5 "men"), one arrives at an estimated 34,160 men working 
on the European-held land. Even at the rate of one man per hectare 
(taking into consideration that not all hectares would be worked or 
all crops require the same amount of labour) one realises that the 
colonised areas of Mungo along the railway line to Nkongsamba were in 
need of some 22,000 labourers by the late 1930s.
Not all labourers settled in Mungo. Undoubtedly in the early 
years the majority returned to their villages once their contracts 
were finished, or, when recruited by force, simply ran away as soon as 
possible. But a certain number stayed. One ethnic group which is 
heavily represented in Mungo is the Bamileke, who originated in the 
French-speaking side of the highland plateau which also sent labour to 
the plantations in the British Cameroons. According to Jean-Louis 
Dongmo's study of Bamileke migration, Mungo was one of the first areas 
the Bamileke people went to in migrating from the Bamileke plateau. 
Dongmo reports that many of those who had gone to Mungo as labourers 
felt unable to return to the Bamileke plateau because a high rate of 
population growth had limited the availability of arable land.
Dongmo also points out that the Bamileke inheritance laws are such 
that a man's heir is not known until just before the man dies. He 
will then choose from among his sons the worthiest of them to succeed 
to his position and property. His choice is based largely on the 
accomplishments and material success of each one of them. Thus, the
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sons are encouraged to advance themselves first before they can be 
considered eligible to inherit the father's estate. As families are 
often quite large and opportunities within the home community can be 
limited, an ambitious son will be forced to leave the Bamileke plateau 
in order to achieve a respectable position.^
In Mungo, this resulted in a number of Bamileke labourers staying 
in the plantation area, but taking up independent farming, either (in 
the minority of cases, no doubt) by applying for concession land, or 
through the acquisition, by customary rules, of land under the control 
of the Mbos.-*
The other major group of Cameroonians holding concession land in 
1938 was the Douala who had been the coastal middlemen to European 
traders since the days of the slave trade and who had already 
established plantations along the coastal rivers by the 1920s. ^
The arrival of the Douala in Mungo probably resulted from an expansion 
from these plantations although there is little published information 
about the Donala in Mungo. What is certainly true is that in addition 
to conflicts between Africans and Europeans in Mungo, there was also 
considerable uneasiness between those Cameroonians who were native to 
Mungo and those who had come from outside the region.
La Guerre Morale
The importance to our discussion of this brief land tenure and 
ethnic history of Mungo is that it forms the basis for many of the 
post-war conflicts in Mungo and in the banana trade of the area. Not 
all of the land being developed in Mungo in the 1930s was in bananas. 
According to a note in the 1938 land tenure file, only about twenty 
percent of the concessions in Mungo were given over to either bananas 
or bananas and coffee (see Table 8). This may have represented as 
much as thirty-four per cent of the concession land, but was still a 
long way from dominating the export economy of Mungo. The information 
in Table 8, "Number of Concessions in Bananas", is roughly confirmed 
if one compares Maps 9 (in Chapter 3) and JL4 of the Mungo banana zone 
in 1937. Unfortunately, the 1937 map from Alistair McLaurin does not 
show the 1930s development in bananas of non-concession land, much of 
which would have been held by Cameroonians.
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Table 8
NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS IN BANANAS 
MUNGO 1938
total
coffee/ containing other 
bananas bananas bananas crops total
number of 20 20 40 151 191
concessions (10%) (10%) (20%) (80%) (100%)
estimated 3499 4819 8318 16,261 24,579
hectares (14%) (20%) (34%) (66%) (100%)
SOURCE: Domaniale 759, Archives Nationales du Cameroun
That bananas were already an important crop in the development of 
Mungo, however, is hardly surprising. The diseases which later came 
to plague the banana had not yet arrived in Mungo and the crop was 
able to produce within less than a year and keep producing on a 
regular basis after that. This allowed for a fast and regular income 
which could be used for the development of other crops, e.g. coffee, 
that might take longer to begin showing a profit. Nor is it 
surprising that the crop would be taken up by both Africans and 
Europeans. Its simplicity alone would recommend it as a popular crop. 
That the crop did expand can be seen in Map 15 of the 1955-1958 banana 
plantations of Mungo. This map should also be compared to Map 9 , which 
shows the banana plantations of 1937.
The first sign of conflict in the trade came, according to 
Salomon Mpondo, one of the cooperative presidents, as early as 1935* 
when several Cameroonians began growing the Gros Michel bananas. This 
was the beginning of what Mpondo called "la guerre morale" between 
Africans and Europeans, which lasted until 1948 and the introduction 
of export quotas. At this time, the Cameroonians were opposed by the 
Syndicat de Defense des Intir^ts Bananiers which was the exclusive union 
of European banana planters. The issue of Cameroonian exports was 
eventually taken to the government in the French Cameroons for resolution 
where the matter foundered intermittent discussions over the next several 
years. These talks were dropped when banana exports to France were cut
Mpondo's dates are used here, but all seem to be a few years 
early. For example, he dates the cut-off of banana exports due 
to the war at 1938.
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CM
cut off by the war.
M. Mpondo names some of the Cameroonian planters who were 
involved in this pre-war complaint: Walter Dibao-Kalla, Saint-Miguel
Dimithe and Mabolle-Elesa.^ What is interesting about this 
complaint is the fact that it exists at all. To begin with, according 
to Mr. McLaurin of the Compagnie des Bananes, the pre-war African 
exports of bananas were handled by neighbouring European plantations, 
which implies that African production alone was not of a sufficient
Q
quantity to be handled separately. But the complaint that M.
Mpondo describes would suggest that at least a certain number of 
Cameroonian planters saw themselves achieving a rate of production 
that rivalled the output of the average European banana planter and 
therefore deserved to be handled on an independent basis. If 
Cameroonian production, at least in part, was at a "European" level 
during the 1930s, another hypothesis can be suggested. This is that 
the 1930s leaders of the Cameroonian planters were not small farmers 
promoting a collective cause. On the contrary, they had probably 
arrived in Mungo to invest, or had been able soon after arriving in 
Mungo, to achieve a position that allowed for investment.' It is also 
not unlikely that as the post-war banana crop developed, these men, 
and others like them who came into the area in the 1950s, took 
advantage of the post-war cooperative movement to organise around them 
the smaller planters who were attracted to the banana boom. If true, 
this provides the historical basis for the personal hierarchies which 
formed the core of successful smallholder cooperatives in Mungo, and 
which were such a distinct contrast to the village-based cooperatives 
of the British Cameroons.
The conflict between Cameroonian and European banana growers was 
taken up again after the war. In 1947, according to Salomon Mpondo, a 
quota of four percent of the exports was given to the Cameroonians. 
This was clearly insufficient and discussions continued with the 
mediation of the Overseas Ministry at the rue Oudinot in Paris, and 
with the colonial government in the French Cameroons. In this same 
year, the Syndicat had admitted certain Cameroonians, among them 
Salomon Mpondo, Nguisse, and Louis Wambo, all of whom represented 
planters’ cooperatives, according to M. Mpondo. In 1948, the 
Commission de la Recensement des Plantations de la Banane was created 
to provide a census of banana plantations, both African and European,
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which provided the basis for revised export quotas. During this same 
year a meeting was held at the Overseas Ministry in Paris to settle 
the affair. Four Europeans: M. Penanhoat, M. Pallier, M. Guyot, and
M. Caplain attended; five Cameroonians were also there: M. Mpondo,
M. Kwa Moutome, M. Kinge Jong, M. Mongo Bell and M. Toube Esombe. As 
a result of this meeting, African planters were given thirty percent 
of the exports from Cameroon with the balance to come from the 
European planters. This was later in 1949 revised to allow up to 
sixty percent of the French Cameroons banana exports to come from 
Cameroonian planters, a percentage that was unchanged, according to 
Mpondo, until 1955 when Sigatoka disease began reducing production on
Q
all sides.
The 1959 Smallholders* Strike
The agreements reached in the late 1940s lasted for about eleven
years, during which the prosperity of the banana was unexcelled and
much of the land in Mungo was put in bananas. In 1958, the most 
successful year for the crop, Africans were exporting 51,715 metric 
tonnes of bananas and Europeans 21,782 tonnes.^ However, these 
figures belie an underlying sense of social imbalance which had been 
created with the land concession policy of the 1930s and which had its 
most vocal, and successful, expression in the post-war fight for an 
African export banana quota. As long as the trade was prosperous, 
these imbalances could be ignored. This became more difficult, 
however, as the terms of the trade began to change.
As has already been discussed in Chapter 1, "Markets and
Technologies of the 1950s", difficulties in production had begun to 
set in by the middle of the decade. Sigatoka disease gave rise to the
rw«->
Syndicat’s crop-spraying program, Panama disease was soon to force a 
conversion to Poyo varieties, while soil exhaustion and the diminution 
of available virgin land were slowly squeezing the industry and 
especially the smallholders. Notwithstanding, during interviews in 
Cameroon in April and May 1982, with the banana industry quite clearly 
verging on collapse, a number of people, Cameroonian planters in 
particular, dated the decline of the business not to the mid-fifties, 
but to 1959 and the smallholders’ strike.
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The events of that year are difficult to sort out. The civil 
war, which had begun between the Bassa arm of the UPC and the 
government in the area of the Sanaga-Maritime, was transferred to 
Mungo and the Bamileke Plateau around this time.^ (See Map 16.)
Here the "troubles'* lasted for a considerably longer period than they 
had in the Sanaga-Maritime. How much the smallholders' strike had to 
do with the affairs of the UPC and its war with the government, both 
colonial and Independent, it is difficult to say. But the two 
developments are more than coincidental. One finds, therefore, that 
most people, particularly Cameroonians, who can remember that time are 
reluctant to talk about It. The UPC opposition was not only 
suppressed militarily In the 1950s and '60s but that suppression was 
accompanied by a significant level of harassment of the greater 
civilian population. There Is, consequently, a continuing fear that 
even to discuss such matters as the strike is to present one's self as 
an opponent of the government which is notably intolerant of even 
verbal opposition. Nor is there much in the way of written 
documentation. There is a twenty-five year rule on access to the 
National Archives In Yaounde which meant that any file more recently 
dated than 1957 was still closed to research in May 1982. Secondary 
sources are practically non-existent. Joseph's history of the UPC 
provides some information, but does not go into any great detail about 
developments after 1958, while Dongmo's study, le Dynamisme Bamileke 
only discusses affairs in the Bamileke region north of Mungo.
In piecing together some sense of 1959 events, therefore, one has 
had to rely on the meeting minutes for the Syndicat and the clues 
which did surface in interviews with people still Involved in the 
banana trade. This rather narrows the optic for looking at events 
that clearly had origins and ramifications far outside the banana 
trade itself. Still, the relationship between politics and the banana 
trade, as best it can be understood, is sufficiently intertwined to 
warrant the use of that perspective.
In discussing the management of the Mungo trade during the 1950s, 
we have already made reference to the last Ordinary General Assembly 
of the Syndicat before the strike in 1959. That meeting took place on 
the ninth of April of that year and was attended by nearly all the 
planters and cooperatives involved in the Mungo trade. It was, 
judging by the minutes, an amicable meeting. The annual report and
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Map 16. TRANSFER OF UPC STRUGGLE WITH GOVERNMENT FORCES IN 
FRANCOPHONE CAMEROON: 1956-62
0 300km >
 1______) C H A D
N IG E R IA
ANGLOPHONE
CAMEROON
PAYS (
b a m i l e k e^ Douala
C A M E R O O N
1 9 5 9 -  
6 2
GABON
MUNGO
1 9 5 9 -6 0
1956-58 Armed struggle by 
Bassa people in the 
UPC.
1959-60 Smallholders' strike and 
terrorism in Mungo
Douala j- ^ / sanaga
MARITIME
1 9 5 6  
- 5 8
Atlantic Ocean 1959-62 Armed struggle by 
Bamileke people of 
the UPC.
124
budget were presented and accepted, and M. Penanhoat, who had been 
president of the Syndicat for thirty years, resigned and presided over 
the election of a new African president. His brief retirement 
statement, although redolent of a very colonial paternalism, was 
neither bitter nor pessimistic.
D£s que les africains entrerent au Syndicat, ils participerent 
aussitot a sa gestion et maintenant 1'heure est venue pour les 
producteurs africains de prendre la direction et je pense que 
nous devons demander aux africains d'assumer les charges tant que 
nous sommes la et je continuerai pour ma part 3 vous apporter mon 
aide chaque fois que vous en aurez besoin.^
Mr Penanhoat's resignation was gracefully accepted and in two 
efficient ballots, M. Roger Sandjo was elected in his place. His 
election was followed by equally well-mannered balloting for the 
Syndicat's central administrative committee which was given eight 
African representatives and seven Europeans.^
"African Planters'" Motion of 10 April 1959
After this polite and well-ordered transfer of power, it comes as 
a surprise to find a motion dated the next day, 10 April 1959, that 
was adopted by the "African Planters of Export Bananas".^ This 
motion was sent, together with a letter to the President of the 
Syndicat and another letter to the Director of the CATA, the aerial 
treatment company, about one week later. The motion is of sufficient 
interest to present in its entirety in Appendix C. It argues quite 
simply that banana exports had fallen because of the high expense of 
staying in the trade. Planters, it is claimed, could no longer afford 
even the cost of labour. Because of the high price of production, the 
motion called for the abolition of CATA, which would eliminate further 
aerial treatment, and an end to the polythene wrapping of all banana 
stems. The planters also requested a change in the organisation of 
banana sales and payment. At the time of the strike, the Mungo 
planters —  like those in the British Cameroons at the same time —  
were the owners of the fruit until it was sold in Europe. This left 
producers exposed to all fluctuations, good and bad, in the market 
price for bananas, as well as responsible for all the expenses of 
shipping and handling. The "African Planters" motion rejected this 
arrangement in favour of a fixed price to be paid at Bonaberi.
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In concluding their motion, the "African Planters" of Mungo 
announced that they would begin an indefinite strike if their 
conditions were not met. The letters which accompanied the motion 
asked that the Syndicat discontinue the sales of polythene wrapping 
(which, it was argued, had been forced on African planters so that the 
Syndicat could take a commission from the polythene wrapping company) 
and requested the director of CATA to discontinue aerial treatment as 
of the thirtieth of April.
Perhaps the most curious aspect of this petition is that the
"African Planters" felt required to act from outside the Syndicat.
The perception that the trade was suffering from the growing expense
involved in producing and shipping bananas was one shared by all the
planters in Mungo. No task was mentioned In the Syndicat's annual
report that did not also contain a complaint about the cost of the
particular operation. But the losses in 1959 were due in part to
severe windstorms which would have affected the plantations more than
the smallholdings, where inter-cropping tended to reduce damage from
wind. It must also be pointed out that 1958 had been an exceptionally
good year. The perceived decline in 1959 was, therefore, being
measured against a standard that had not been achieved before or since
1958. Nor was the discontent of the Cameroonian smallholders unknown
to the Syndicat. Their opposition to polythene wrapping was
acknowledged, although the Syndicat's response in making such wrapping
obligatory was clearly less than politic and lacked both tact and a
real appreciation of the micro-economy of the smaller Cameroonian 
1 sfarms. J What is more to be wondered at is that although the 
mangement of the Syndicat was dominated by Europeans and the 
management of the trade was informally in the hands of European 
companies for the most part, there was still considerable 
participation by Cameroonian planters in the Syndicat and in the 
trade. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect that the 
complaints of the Cameroonian smallholders would have already been 
presented, either through Syndicat meetings or through the kinds of 
daily personal encounters that were inevitable in setting shipping 
estimates and evacuating the fruit from Mungo. How does it happen, 
then, that the "African Planters of Mungo" felt obliged to take what 
was clearly a very radical step?
- 126 -
First, it must be remembered that the gap between the market 
standard and the productive limits of the untreated ecology of Mungo 
was growing wider. Since producers could do little or nothing to 
change the market standard, they were forced to begin treating the 
agricultural environment they depended on and to treat the fruit that 
was their livelihood. The expense and reorganisation involved in this 
treatment were resented by all those planters who were used to the 
early days of the banana. It must be remembered, however, that the 
treatment being prescribed was based on the assumption that banana 
production was essentially a plantation affair. This assumption on 
the nature of required treatment was not noticeably disturbed by the 
fact that sixty percent of banana exports from Mungo were coming from 
smallholdings and mixed cropping arrangements. Instead, the pre­
strike mentality among those who generally controlled the trade, would 
seem to have defined the problem not as a matter of adapting treatment 
to the smallholder, but rather of forcing the smallholder to accept an 
Inappropriate treatment that was not well-understood, not seen as 
necessary, and certainly perceived as much too dear.
The ability of the smallholders to argue with treatment plans 
which originated among Europeans was, moreover, seriously undercut by 
the structure of the cooperative movement. Unlike the BCUF in the 
British Cameroons, which was able to function both as a unified 
managerial organisation and a smallholders1 union strongly backed by 
the Government's cooperative department, each cooperative in Mungo 
functioned more or less independently of the others. This made it 
very difficult to present, and answer, a coherent smallholders' 
position on any problem. This was further aggravated by the uneven 
quality of the management of the cooperatives. To the extent that 
cooperative presidents in Mungo were juggling the accounts to the 
detriment of individual farmers, it meant that the farmer was even 
more likely to feel that the cost of treatment was exorbitant compared 
with the profit reaching his pocket, and even less able to perceive 
the real impact of treatment on earnings. To these problems was added 
an institutionalised mistrust of European behaviour. Both the 
concession policy and the fight for banana export quotas had left the 
average African in Mungo with little faith that European behaviour 
might act in an African interest, nor was it always possible to sort 
out what European behaviour was motivated by a desire to keep most 
Africans in a subordinate position and what came from more legitimate
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motives. To hear, therefore, the still European management of the 
banana trade calling on a distant and largely abstract market standard 
to justify what were at the beginning unusual expenses, was to suspect 
immediately that some trickery or deception was behind it all. This 
comes out very clearly in the question of polythene wrapping. The 
trade worldwide was in transition between selling bare stems of fruit 
and selling boxed fruit cut off the stem. The interim protective 
measure was polythene wrapping. While a clear improvement on'the 
naked stem, it still was far short of a commitment to boxing. And 
yet, to Cameroonian smallholders in Mungo, wrapping was just a trick: 
"Vous avez oblige les Planteurs Africains d'emballer les bananes pour 
que vous puissiez avoir la commission a ladite SociSte."*^
None of these reasons, however, explains why the planters who 
signed the motion of 10 April 1959 felt that their own cooperative 
presidents with membership in the Syndicat were unable to present the 
case of the Cameroonian smallholders. Corruption among cooperative 
presidents would undoubtedly increase members’ suspicion of them, but 
there also is the possibility that to a membership faced with growing 
and largely inexplicable difficulties, the very fact that most 
presidents were a part of the Syndicat argued against their ability to 
defend the smallholders. In effect, the presidents’ very necessary 
and hard-won collaboration with the distrusted Europeans alienated 
them from the membership that was their financial basis.
A couple of clues point to the validity of this conclusion. One 
is a 1942 report, included here in Appendix D, from Mme. Dugast which 
describes, albeit somewhat hyperbolically, the process of labour 
recruitment and the corrupt collaboration of Cameroonian leaders in 
that procedure.^
This is not to argue that the administration of African 
participation in the banana trade followed along the lines of models 
established during the period of labour recruitment that Irene Dugast 
describes. But it is cited as an example of the fashion in which the
The company refered to, although not mentioned by name in the 
letter, was probably PLASTICAM, which supplied the wrapping and 
had just begun doing business in Cameroon.
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French administration had the effect of dividing the African 
population against itself. This phenomenon appears again in the 
minutes of the first meetings which were held after the "African 
Planters" motion was drafted on the 10 April 1959.
On the twenty-third of April, the administrative committee of the 
Syndicat, with both its African and European members, met to discuss a 
number of questions, the last of which was the motion of the "African 
Planters". Although most of the discussion was taken up with the very 
practical issues raised by the planters’ motion and with ways those 
issues might be resolved, it is quite clear that the motion had taken 
most of those present by surprise.
"Quel est l'organisme legalement constituS dont se reclament les 
signataires de la motion?" asked Monsieur Dewas.
"Ce n ’est pas un organisme constituS," said Monsieur Sandjo, the 
new Cameroonian Syndicat president, "Mais un mouvement qui semble 
dirigS par Monsieur Epaka qui signe pour le Bureau provlsoire."
"Quel est l ’organisme qui a convoquS la reunion?" asked Monsieur 
Monthe.
1 fi"C'est Monsieur Epaka," answered the President, °
Not even the cooperative presidents would seem to have been aware 
that such a motion was being considered. Salomon Mpondo announced 
that the presidents had met and drafted a motion of their own 
(reprinted in Appendix C),1^ but one cannot avoid the suspicion that 
if the April 10 motion had not existed the cooperative presidents 
would not, on the twenty-third of April, have been meeting to write 
statements that, belatedly, covered the same ground. This feeling 
that the cooperatives were threatened by a movement somehow 
independent of the cooperative presidents is reinforced by a statement 
from Monsieur Monthe, a Bamileke economic advisor attending the 
meeting. "II faut que les Cooperatives soient appuyees, car elles 
reprSsentent 1*Element stable de la profession," he said, thereby 
suggesting that the motionnaires were somehow uncontrollable. There 
were, in addition, several suggestions, ususally from Europeans, that 
the whole affair was caused by outside agitation: "J'ai assistS a la 
premiere reunion tenue avec les motionnaires," stated Monsieur 
Gilliot, "Je pense que les planteurs obeissent a un sentiment de 
crainte et ils cedent a la menace .... il y a des elements Strangers a
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la profession, ce qui donne a ce mouvement un aspect politique et 
syndical. "2^
What these remarks point to is a sense that the Syndicat, which 
represented the ruling class of the banana trade, both African and 
European, found itself faced with a threat of rebellion from within 
the trade, particularly from the small members. Since before the war, 
the major conflicts had been on the issues of European versus 
Cameroonian rights. Here, however, one senses a very different 
conflict, namely smallholders versus the African and European leaders 
of the profession and the decisions taken by those leaders in the name 
of all planters large and small. Monsieur Peroneille, sales agent for 
many of the African planters, pointed out: "Ils demandent ce que le
9 1
Syndicat aurait du demander depuis longtemps.
On the fifth of May a meeting was held between the Syndicat and 
the Chamber of Agriculture, a body comparable to a national Chamber of 
Commerce. At the meeting, both the "African Planters" motion and the 
motion from the Cooperative Presidents were put forward for 
discussion. Once again, the discussion —  to which none of the 
signatories of the April 10 motion was invited —  reveals a split 
between the Syndicat and the planters involved in the motion.
Monsieur Peroneille opened consideration of the two petitions by 
emphasizing "que c ’est la motion des Planteurs arret§e par un Bureau 
provisoire designe lors de la reunion S Loum le 10 Avril 1959 de 2,500 
& 3,000 ’planteurs1 qui a provoqu£ la motion des Presidents de 
Cooperatives." To which Monsieur Wambo, vice-president of Syndicat, 
asked that "... on n ’emploie pas le term de ’planteurs1 pour designer 
les signataires de cette motion, car tous ne sont pas planteurs,"22 
Both remarks only emphasize the split between the presidents and their 
members.
By far the greatest part of the meeting, which seems to have been 
quite long, was taken up with a discussion of the "African Planters" 
specific complaints and remedies to them. But that sense of distance 
returned when Salomon Mpondo asked "... s'il n ’est pas possible que la 
Chambre d'Agriculture £tablisse des maintenant une circulaire aux 
planteurs disant qu'elle etudie toutes les questions posSes et donne 
la garantie de rSponses favorables Monsieur Mpondo’s
circular was not approved, but Monsieur Lucot, comptoller of the
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government cooperative movement, also argued that "... 11 faut avant 
tout avoir une explication franche avec les planteurs africains car 
beaucoup de faux bruits circulent. What is of interest about 
both remarks is that they come —  one from a Cameroonian and one from 
a Frenchman —  in the name of the leadership to the masses with whom 
they are in danger of losing mutual understanding and cooperation.
More to the point, despite all the meetings and belated efforts of the 
cooperative presidents, the smallholders’ strike began, as scheduled 
in the 'African Planters’ motion, on the third of May.
Role of Outside Pressure
The economic position of the banana trade in Mungo was 
unquestionably difficult at this time. Monsieur Peroneille noted at 
the meeting of the Syndicat on 23 of April that expenses were running 
at 57 francs CFA the kilo while the market in France was paying only 
60.65 francs CFA the kilo for the f r u i t .25 This represented an 
unusually steep fall in prices and served to exaggerate the expense 
involved in treating the banana crop so that it could stay 
competitive. It was a situation in which smallholders in particular 
were bound to suffer, while the cooperative presidents, who were among 
the richer members of the African community, and the Europeans were 
able to continue meeting the cost of the trade.
But it is a legitimate question whether the combined effect of 
these commercial problems and of the economic divisions within the 
African community would have had sufficient weight to launch a 
rebellion against the Syndicat and its African and European leaders 
without additional outside pressure. The presence of outsiders has 
already been suggested by several of the preceding quotations and, at 
this point, one returns to the role of the UPC in the political life 
of the French Cameroons at this time.
The party had been outlawed in 1955, but was not without 
supporters and was still in 1959 looking for ways to assume a 
recognised position in the politics of an independent Cameroon. In 
this respect, the situation in Mungo was tailor-made for both the 
ambitions and ideology of the UPC. One of their principal 
disagreements with the RDA, Rassemblement D&mocratique Africaine, was 
over the question of economic independence from France, which most of
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the other parties in the RDA were willing to sacrifice in return for 
the more visible political independence of the 1960s. Thus, the UPC 
had decided to hold out for a complete political and economic break 
with the metropole, a policy that anticipated the neo-colonial 
critiques of the late 1970s, and which was specifically directed 
against the "colon who exploits wealth and men".26
As a policy, it undoubtedly forced the annihilation of the UPC as 
a recognised political party in the French Cameroons. But in Mungo in 
1959, the dominance of the banana trade by French interests can only 
have exacerbated the sense of grievance caused by the decline of the 
smallholder and made the idea of expelling French businesses and 
planters that much more attractive. Moreover, it would have been a 
relatively simple matter to portray many of the cooperative leaders as 
corrupt collaborators holding lucrative positions in the Syndicat 
where they were hand-in-glove with French interests and had left the 
concerns of their Cameroonian countrymen behind.
To what extent these arguments were used or believed is difficult 
to judge. One cannot help suspecting that they helped tip the balance 
towards the "African Planters" motion of April 10 and that political 
training received with the UPC may well have supplied some of the 
leadership of the original April movement. That it was a popular 
cause, however, was initially the most important factor. This is 
reflected in Monsieur Peroneille*s report of two and a half to three 
thousand people attending the Loum meeting on April 10. The 
popularity of the motion also comes through in a communique dated 25 
May from the Minister of Economic Affairs in Yaounde, Monsieur Fouda, 
who had been in Mungo during the first week of May, and reported that,
"Trois reunions furent tenues le 2 Mai a Mbanga, Loum et NlohS,
2 7auxquelles les planteurs assisterSnt en foule."*'
Many of those who are still in the banana trade and were also 
involved in 1959 now say that the strike was only successful because 
the participation of many smallholders was coerced by terrorism and 
violence. This is a convenient interpretation in that it acknowledges 
that many people withheld their produce from export, but excuses their 
protest on the grounds that it was coerced and, therefore, cannot be 
considered a rebellious action. In spite of the latter-day 
convenience of this interpretation, there are grounds for believing
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that coercion was an important factor* The initial popularity of the 
protest forced the Syndicat, the Chamber of Agriculture and ultimately 
the government to review the terms of the banana trade in greater 
detail than had occurred since the 1948 census.
The results of this review were published in the communique sent 
out by the Minister of Economic Affairs, M. Kouda, on 25 May. It 
argued that the problems of the trade were rooted in a dramatic fall 
in the price of bananas in France, and that the only way to cope with 
this reduction was to reduce the expenses of production and export 
from the French Cameroons. The communique then announced eight 
measures designed to reduce expenses, many of which, as the government 
noted "... vont au-dela des d^sirs exprim&s par les planteurs." These 
measures were worked out in meetings held in Yaounde on the 8, 12 and 
14 May 1959 between the shipping companies, the railroad, the aerial 
treatment company and the forwarding agents, and had followed the 
earlier meetings during the first week in May with the planters of 
Mungo.2® It is of interest to compare the communique with the 
original strike demands, and, for the purpose, the communique appears 
in Appendix C.
It is first clear that although the strikers' specific demands 
for the abolition of the aerial treatment company, wrapping and sales 
on commission were not met, the overall request that expenses be 
reduced was seriously considered and answered. The tax which had gone 
to pay for CATA was abolished and a number of other expenses were also 
eliminated or reduced. Thus, although the provisions for wrapping 
fruit continued, the practice of selecting fruit at the portside after 
the expense of wrapping and shipping had already occurred, was 
changed so as to permit inspection and selection in Mungo.
Altogether, the government reasoned that if the exports continued at 
"normal" levels, the compensation to planters should rise by 280-300 
million francs CFA for a year. The only issue raised by the strikers 
which was not covered by the communique was that of sales on 
commission versus fixed price sales in Bonaberi.
One is forced to conclude from this communique that a serious 
attempt to meet the planters' demands had been made and that the 
grounds for protest had been substantially undercut. It is not 
unreasonable to assume, therefore, that a number of planters would
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have been willing to discontinue the strike, begun during the first 
week in May, and to return to a normal exporting schedule.
This impression is confirmed by the monthly export statistics for 
1958 and 1959, which compare African and European tonnages and which 
appear in Figure 8, "European and African Banana Exports from Mungo in 
1958 and 1959.” One sees that the 1959 figures for Europeans are 
consistently equal' to or greater than those exports in the previous 
year for every month from March to December. The African statistics, 
however, show the effect of the protest. The exports for May 1959 are 
less than a quarter of the exports shown for the previous year. In 
June, however, exports are slightly higher than previous years, 
showing what would seem to be a willingness to accept the government's 
proposals for a reduction of expenses. By July African exports are 
down again —  thirty-seven percent lower than July exports of 1958 —  
and in August a thirty percent drop is seen, compared to the 1958 
figure. The really dramatic fall, however, comes from September 
through December when African exports for those four months are 
fourteen, three, six and five percent of the amounts exported in the 
previous year.
There is little in the minutes to explain the fall in African 
exports. A meeting on 23 May, anticipating the end of the tax which 
had hitherto paid for the aerial treatment, was held to determine 
which planters were willing to continue spraying at their own direct 
expense. Both European planters and Cooperative Presidents subscribed 
to the treatment, but the Africa Cooperative Presidents were 
committing only their personal holdings on the grounds that they would 
have to meet with their "adherents" before speaking for them as 
well.29
The only other meeting of note was held on 18 May, again before 
the Minister's communique, between the signers of the motion, the 
sales agents and members of the Syndicat's administration 
c o m m i t t e e . T h e  meeting is of interest in that clearly many of the 
Minister's final proposals were already rumoured to be coming and, 
therefore, a number of the motion’s complaints were likely to be 
de_,fused. The only outstanding issue was that of sales on commission 
which was the main topic of this very brief meeting. In part, the 
meeting hoped to clarify what the motion had actually asked and often
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took the form of schoolroom questions and answers. Monsieur Job (of
la Compagnie des Bananes): "Vous voulez §tre payes lorsque la
marchandise est arrivee a BonabSri ou bien lorsqu'elle est sur le 
bananier?"
Monsieur Epaka: (strike leader): "Lorsque la banane est embarquee."
Monsieur Peroneille: (sales agent): "C'est done une vente FOB."
M. Peroneille and M. Job sales agents, argued against FOB sales 
and were supported by President Sandjo, one of the cooperative 
presidents as well as the new president of the Syndicat:
"Vous voulez que la banane soit achetee FOB, mais vous ne savez 
pas ce que c'est. Avant la guerre les Europeens vendaient FOB 
mais ils ont demand^ la vente a la commission, car c'est le mode 
de vente le plus avantageux pour le producteur. Pour ma part, je 
continuerai a vendre a la c o m m i s s i o n .
The meeting ended in a discussion of what would be an acceptable
FOB price, during which Monsieur Epaka stated that they were asked for 
thirty francs CFA FOB per kilo. At which, Monsieur Job, who had been 
showing considerable signs of impatience, suggested that the 
protesting planters had better look for other sales agents since the 
best price that had so far been received in France was only sixteen
francs the kilo, in 1958.^
Monsieur Epaka's proposal for thirty francs per kilo may have 
been nothing more than an opening bargaining position from which 
compromises could be made. But it is also tempting to imagine that 
those who helped initiate the "African Planters" motion of April 10 
sensed that they needed an issue to keep the protest going. In the 
end the sale of bananas on commission was the only issue they could 
claim had not been satisfactorily met by the government communique of 
25 May. In fact, it was a matter that was repeatedly discussed and 
finally reformed during the next several years.
As an issue, however, it is not very dramatic and cannot explain
the almost complete lack of exports from African farmers that began in
September. Moreover, in the light of the return to normal levels of 
exports in June, and the costs reductions of the communique, it seems 
unlikely that the strike would have continued over the matter of sales 
on commission. But can one then say the Cameroonian planters were
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forced by terrorism to discontinue the shipping of fruit in July, 
August and afterwards?
There are no meetings in the files between the dates of 2 June 
and 10 November 1959.^3 When the Syndicat does meet again on 10 
November, Monsieur Penanhoat, honorary president, is presiding and 
only one of the Africans who had attended the Spring meetings is 
present, M. Mangwa, secretaire adjoint of the Syndicat. In opening 
the meeting, M. Penanhoat recalled the "§vinements douloureux" of the 
past few months and argued that "N§amoins malgrS 1 Tattentat dont notre 
President* a Ite victime, notre Syndicat doit se reunir, prendre des 
decisions et les appliquer". There were two points: the African
planters were no longer exporting, and crop spraying treatments had 
been discontinued. During the discussion that followed on the reasons 
for the halt to African exports, M. Mangwa acted as spokeman for the 
absent cooperative presidents. In the course of the discussion, M. 
Mangwa stated that exports would only resume if a system of FOB 
payment were introduced, and in any meeting with the presidents they 
would ask for the FOB system. M. Moulende, treasurer of the Syndicat, 
had already suggested that the "... planteurs ont peur d'etre 
assassines s'ils chargent". This point was repeated by M. Sulla, one 
of the sales agents, who asked M. Mangwa "... si l'arr^t des 
chargements est du & la peur ou au fait que les bananes ne soient pas 
payees comptant." M. Mangwa replied that both reasons motivated the 
lack of exports, adding that the cooperative presidents wanted to 
ship.^ ^
This meeting is of interest on several counts. One is that 
violence had become a part of daily business, and it was a terrorist's 
form of violence, as exemplified by the attempt on the life of M.
Sandjo. He, it will be remembered, had been in favour of continuing 
with the system of sales on commission and, as the first African 
president of the Syndicat, was in a position to moderate the 
differences between the African and European planters. Second, the 
meeting shows that the issue of payment had indeed become the formal 
hardline argument for continuing the protest. Finally, the most 
important feature of this meeting is the virtual absence of the 
cooperative presidents.
* Monsieur Sandjo, the first Cameroonian president of the Syndicat.
- 137 -
With the effective rejection of the communique from the Minister 
of Economic Affairs, the position of the cooperative presidents became 
more difficult. They had been party to and supporters of those 
Yaounde meetings which had led to the Minister’s proposals. And yet, 
it was the radical elements within their own cooperatives which were 
rejecting the measures proposed. Therefore, the presidents had to 
choose between siding with the Minister of Economic Affairs and, by 
extension with the French planters in Mungo, or siding with the 
radical element within the cooperatives and by extension the rest of 
the cooperative membership. Judging by the comments at the 10 
November meeting, their choice was partially Influenced by the climate 
of violence then prevalent in Mungo which, according to one report, 
encouraged several presidents to retire to Europe until conditions had 
improved.^ But clearly by November 1959, the majority of 
cooperative presidents had decided that unless they could present 
themselves as siding with their membership rather than with the French 
planters, their own positions would not be tenable. In this sense, 
they were in direct competition with the radical left-wing individuals 
in the banana trade for the loyalty of the mass of small planters.
This shift of the cooperative presidents, whose motion dated 23 
April had conspicously avoided any support of the call for FOB 
payment, was probably vital if the presidents wished to retain any 
influence within their own community. However, their choice also 
undoubtedly distorted any realistic analysis of the problems of the
Mungo banana trade in 1959 and 1960. As has been repeatedly 
mentioned, these years, in both the British and French Cameroons, were 
critical not just for the politics of independence, but for the fact
that the banana trade had reached a crucial turning point in its
development from a "mined" crop to a managed crop. One would like to 
believe that in a more pacific political climate it would have been 
possible to reconcile the difficulties of smallholder cultivation with 
the standards demanded on the world market, or least to have effected 
a diversification programme that would have lessened the impact of 
losing the extraordinary prosperity of the 1950s. And yet, when the 
cooperative presidents chose to take sides with the strikers, whose 
cause they had only partially shared in April and May, it became much 
easier to interpret the entire disruption as a quarrel between French 
and African producers rather than as a legitimate crisis in the long­
term economic survival of both plantation and smallholder production.
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In the years that followed, therefore, there was no discussion of the 
reform of the banana profession that did not carry an implicit 
colonial/anti-colonial element. In this sense, many of the 
cooperative presidents, who had grown up with "la guerre morale" from 
1935-1948, were probably more comfortable with the simplistic analysis 
of the radical anti-colonial opposition than with the difficulties of 
modernising the trade. It is also undoubtedly true that among the 
cooperative presidents were those who would have enjoyed gaining 
access to the land held by Europeans, and who may have hoped that the 
radical opposition would win. Finally, those presidents who had been 
reapportioning the cooperatives’ earnings in their own favour rather 
than overseeing the equitable distribution of earnings to all members 
were in danger of having the opposition turn on them, a situation they 
could best avoid by assuming a unity of cause against the Europeans 
which had not really existed in early 1959.
Guerilla War and Government Reprisal
From July 1959 onwards, the region of Mungo was in a state of 
persistent guerilla war. By this time, the question of the 
modernisation of the industry and the more complicated issue of the 
survivial of smallholders had been completely pushed aside. By 
December and January, the European plantations had been reduced to 
armed camps operating under seige, while the Cameroonian planters did 
not even pretend to be able to continue producing and exporting. The 
Syndicat, from its 1958-9 identity as the organisation which contained 
all the elements of the trade, had become a rump caucus of Europeans 
repeatedly petitioning the new government to bring the situation under 
control. Letters sent from Antoine DecrS, vice-president of the 
Syndicat, to the Prime Minister between the 8th and 28th of January 
1960 detail the level of violence experienced at that time.
Letter dated 8 January 1960:
Des bandes armees circulent librement dans la region, de nuit 
comme de jour, semant des tracts, menaqant les travailleurs et 
executant lSchement ceux qui continuent d travailler.
Letter dated 16 January 1960:
Au mois d'Octobre, un planteur avait ete attaqu§, en plein jour, 
par une bande forte d ’au moins vingt assaillants; grace a son 
sang froid, il avait pu mettre ses agresseurs en fuite. Le 30 
Novembre, un planteur de Manengoteng etait assassin€. DSbut 
Dicembre, un village de manoeuvre iatait attaqu&j grSce a la 
courageuse defense de quelques travailleurs armSs, les bandits
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Staient mis en fuite. Quelques jours apres, une nouvelle 
agression se soldait, sur deux plantations ger^es par des 
europiens, par des cases brulees, des camions incendi&s et 
detruits, des installations saccagees. ...
La plantation Nassif incendi§e, la gare de Loum-Chantiers brulSe, 
un garage de Penja dStruit par l'incendie, les cases des 
manoeuvres de la C.A.M., plantation du Haut-Penja en bordure de 
la fronti^re, entierement detruites par le feu. L'assassinat de 
six manoeuvres, le 5 Janvier, sur la plantation Nassif Loum- 
Chantiers entraine le dipart des cing cents travailleurs de cette 
plantation. ...
Le 10 Janvier, l'incendie ravage le village de la plantation du 
Boubou & Penja situee en bordure de la frontiers du Cameroun sous 
tutelle britannique.
Letter dated 28 January 1960:
Le 18 Janvier la totalite des ouvriers de la S.P.N.P. a Nyombe 
refussait de travailler obeissant a un tract qui avait iti 
repandu dans la nuit. Ce sont 1,154 manoeuvres qui ne 
travaillant pas vont se trouver rapidement dans le besoin et 
devenir la proie des trublions.
Le 18 dans la soiree les hors la loi incendiaient de nouveau la 
C.A.M., plantation situee S la frontiire du Cameroun sous tutelle 
britannique.
Le 21 un ancien combattant etait assassinie et son corps depose 
sur la route de Tombel, en face du village de la C.A.M. Depuis 
ce jour aucun manoeuvre ne travaille plus sur cette plantation.
Les planteurs de bananes du Mungo emploient en temps normal pres 
de 5000 manoeuvres. L'effectif actuellement au travail est de 
700 manoeuvres.^ 6
In addition to these letters, a delegation of planters from the 
Syndicat went to Yaounde in order to inform "Monsieur le Premier 
Ministre et le Gouvernement Camerounais de la graviti extreme des 
Svinements dans la Rigion du Mungo et de faire ressortir les 
consequences catastrophiques qui en dicouleraient si des mesures 
rapides et efficaces n ’etaient pas prises pour ramener le calme."
The visit resulted first in a tour of inspection of the banana 
zone of Mungo by General Briand, Colonel Lauriere and Lieutenant 
Colonel Richard, commandant of the Cameroon Gendarmerie. On 29
January 1960, an arr§t§ was published which, according to the
Syndicat!s report of that visit, put into effect those "measures 
preconisees afin de renforcer le maintien de l'ordre dans la region
bananilre." The Syndicat*s report, which is undated, but would have
been written perhaps in early February, notes finally that: "Nous
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sommes Sgalement heureux de constater deja les effets salutaires de 
ces dispositions qui ont permis de reprendre le travail d'une faQon 
satisfaisante sur les plantations."^^
Return of Pressure to Modernise
It is important to remember that in 1958, seventy percent of the 
Mungo banana crop was coming from smallholders. Moreover, as shown in 
Figure 8, "European and Banana Exports from Mungo in 1958 and 1959", 
it was the smallholders who had suffered most from the effects of the 
de facto civil war. The war had not only prevented them from 
exporting for the latter half of 1959, but had destroyed most of the 
cooperative structure that had supported those exports. This occurred 
just when the industry, and particularly smallholder production, 
needed to be modernised purely on commercial grounds.
Thus, it is not surprising that the principal concern of the next 
six or seven years was the reform of the smallholders’ banana trade. 
For the Europeans, once they had won the right to stay in Mungo 
through their own defiance of the terrorists and the more important 
military intervention of the French forces who were sent to act in the 
name of the new government, the problems of modernisation were fairly 
straightforward. Their businesses were already being run on the style
of monocrop plantations covering relatively large units of land. The
process of converting to Poyo and setting up boxing stations would be 
expensive, but for those who had fought to stay in the trade it was 
reasoned that the expense was worth making. Moreover, the practice of 
scheduling routine treatment, whether of Sigatoka disease, weevils or 
nematodes, had finally been accepted as a necessary evil. This does 
not mean that the Europeans were consistently successful modern 
plantation managers, or that the period of most acute violence had not 
affected their shipments. A meeting on 15 April 1960 In Douala, 
reported on a trip to le Havre. In the meeting, the fruit of five 
plantations -- one of them the IFAC researchers1 plantation —  was 
described variously as "fruits en marmelade; rlgimes pourris, tres 
mauvais; les r&gimes ont it§ jetesj les Gros Michel sont arrives 
completement murs; mHrs."^® These were all, however, problems 
susceptible to careful plantation management, a rigorous selection 
procedure, and the availability of investment capital which does not 
seem to have been too difficult to obtain.
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The smallholders, however, were faced with a different dilemma.
As was recognised in a report prepared by the Syndicat for an economic 
commission sent to Mungo in February 1961, the trade was sending out 
two classes of bananas: fruit coming from the industrial plantations 
was classified as first choice and could be sold for more than seven 
French francs per kilo, whereas the stems called "ordinaire" or "tout 
venant" which came from the Cameroonian planters were selling for less 
than seven francs. The difference, said the report, was due strictly 
to the difference in quality. "... Deux principaux problemes ... nous 
prSoccupent et dont d^coulent tous les autres ... Tout d ’abord le 
mScontement g§n§ral des planteurs camerounais dont le pouvoir d*achat, 
les revenus et les moyens d !existence sont nettement insuffissants. 
Ensuite le m£contement de nos acheteurs europSens qui, A juste titre, 
critiquent la quality des fruits qui leur sont expedites a certaines 
Spoques de l'annee ..."^ The Syndicat’s report goes on to argue 
that with the example of quality production in the European 
plantations which neighbour the African growers, "111 parait done 
facile de dire aux paysants camerounais: copiez, transformez vos 
plantations pour faire le meme travail et exporter les memes fruits 
que vos voisins."^
The effect of this argument was that the smallholder should given 
up his practice of mixed cultivation. Cameroonian farms at the time 
were returning only three to four tonnes per hectare, earning anywhere 
from 40-50,000 francs CFA per year. According to the Syndicat's 
report, with one labourer per hectare paid roughly 37-40,000 francs 
per year, the Cameroonian farmer could barely meet labour expenses, 
let alone the cost of improvements.^ The coffee crop, said the 
report, brought in some income just when the banana earnings were at 
their lowest each year, but even that had failed recently and the 
Cameroonian planters were in very poor shape. The report finished by 
suggesting a number of measures, many of which echoed the arrangements 
which existed before the strike and civil war of 1959-60, or which 
were on the verge of being made.^ Like their predecessors, the 
assumption behind these measures was that banana cultivation was to be 
directed towards an industrial plantation model rather than the mixed 
holdings held by the majority of Cameroonian farmers. The problem 
with much of the advice offered was that it meant nothing because it 
had little or no relation to the situation in which the vast majority 
of Cameroonian smallholders found themselves.
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Smallholders’ Response
The Geographic Service of ORSTOM undertook a study in 1966-’67 
entitled "Enquete sur la situation du planteur dans les zones de 
reconversion banani^re". It was completed as part of a much larger 
study under the direction of M. Jeanteur at the Nyombe research 
station of IFAC, the Institut Fran$ais de Recherches Fruitieres 
Outre-Mer (predecessor of I R A ) T h i s  large study became the basis 
for the plan which resulted in the creation of the OCB banana 
plantations in Mungo and TIko. Most of the work involved the 
identification of large sites with good soils, near enough to a source 
of irrigation water, which could be converted to an intensive form of 
plantation production. The study contains several maps, one of which 
has been simplified for presentation here as Map 17, "Banana 
Cultivation In Mungo - 1967 Smallholders and Plantations". A 
companion report argues the merits of the OCB plantation plan and a 
third study entitled, "Etudes Financieres", considers the range of 
earnings that could be expected from the reorganisation. But only the 
study from ORSTOM considers at all the situation of those farmers 
whose land would be used and whom the reorganisation intended to 
benefit.
The ORSTOM study was done in three areas of Mungo and covered a 
sample of thirty-six families (see Tables 9-12). There were, on 
average, seven people in each family, nearly half of whom (forty-three 
percent) were less than fifteen years old. The majority of families 
cultivated less than seven hectares of land —  for eighty-nine percent 
of the families the average was 3.4 ha per farm. Ninety percent of 
this land was used to grow some export crops, usually bananas, coffee, 
and cocoa, but these plantations were intercropped with food, 
principally macabo. In fact in two of the three areas studied, the 
three export crops accounted for only sixteen percent and eleven 
percent of the crops represented in these mixed fields. In the third 
area they represented fifty-five percent of all crops (see Table 12).
Perhaps the single most interesting feature of this study, when 
the data for the three areas are analysed collectively, is the very 
small proportion of the agriculture which is committed to the banana 
crop in 1967; on average, seven percent. On average, seventy-three 
percent of the species in mixed fields were of food crops, with the
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Table 9
1967 ORSTOM SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDERS 
demographic Information
1
1
Mpoula ! Mangamba 
1
Etam-Ebonyi TOTAL
1
sample size | 
1
11 families
1
| 10 families 
1
15 families 36 families
1
average |
1
1
family size | 
1
8 I 5.3 
1
7.2 6.8 people
1
percent |
1
1
less than |
15 yrs old 1 
1
49% I 28% 
1
51% 43%
1
sex of I 44% male
!
| 53% male 51% male 49% male
population | 
1
56% female I 47% female 
1
49% female 51% female
i
ethnic I 
origin of I
7 - local 
6 - Bamileke
i
1 7 - local 
| Bakaka
7 - Bakossi 
4 - Bamileke
20 - strangers 
(55%)
1
head of I 
household | 
1
3 - Douala
1
| 3 - strangers 
1 
1
3 - Yaounde 
1 - Banyangui
16 - local 
(45%)
SOURCE: ORSTOM "Enqu§te sur la situation du planteur," 1967
- 145 -
Table 10
1967 ORSTOM SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDERS
size of family holdings
Mpoula 1 Mangamba ] Etam-Ebonyi TOTAL
Less than |
1 ha. t 2 holdings ] 2 holdings 1 3 holdings 7 holdings
18% | 20% ] 20% 19%
average size:] . 8 ha. | .24 ha . | .75 ha. .6 ha.
1-5 ha. I 5 holdings ] 4 holdings ] 4 holdings 13 holdings
45% I 40% 1 27% 36%
average size:I 3.2 ha. ] 2.9 ha. I 3.2 ha. 3.1 ha.
5 - 1 0  ha. I 3 holdings i 3 holdings I 6 holdings 12 holdings
27% | 30% ] 40% 33%
average size:] 6.8 ha. ] 6.9 ha. I 6.0 ha. 6.6 ha.
over 10 ha. ] 1 holding I 1 holding ] 2 holdings 4 holdings
9% I 10% [ 13% 11%
average size:] 17.6 ha. 1 32.1 ha. ] 22.6 ha. 24.1 ha.
average size:] 5.1 ha. I 6.5 ha. | 6.7 ha. 6.1 ha.
N equals: I 11 holdings I 10 holdings 1 15 holdings 36 holdings
99% | 100% ] 100% 99%
SOURCE: ORSTOM, "Enquete sur la situation du planteur", 1967
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Table 11
1967 ORSTOM SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDERS 
style of planting
1
1
Mpoula | Mangamba 1 Etam-Ebonyi 
j
1 TOTAL 
11
only in J 8.2 ha. | 4.1 ha. I 9 .6 ha.
\
| 21.9 ha.
food crops I 
1
15% I 6% . 1 10% 
1
1 10% 
1
1
mixed food |
1
1
1
1
and | 47.6 ha. I 60.9 ha. 1 90.2 ha. 1 198.7 ha.
export | 
1
85% 1 94% 1 90% 
1
I 90% 
1
1
TOTAL | 55.8 ha. | 65.0 ha.
I
1 99.8 ha.
1
1 220.6 ha.
1
1
100% I 100% I 100% 
1
1 100% 
1
SOURCE: ORSTOM , "Enquete sur la situation du planteur", 1967
Table 12
1967 ORSTOM SURVEY OF SMALLHOLDERS
percentage of crops in mixed fields
1
I
Mpoula Mangamba 1 Etam-Ebonyi 
| '
! TOTAL 
|i
Export | 55% 16% I 11% i 27%
coffee | 28% 6% 1 5% 1 13%
bananas ] 16% 6% I 2% 1 7%
cocoa | 
1
11% 6% I 4% 
1
1 7% 
1
1
Food | 45% 84%
1
i 89%
1
1 73%
macabo | 28% 41% 1 49% I 39%
others | 
1
17% 43% I 40% 
1
1 33% 
1
1
TOTAL | 
1
100% 100% I 100% 
1
1
j 100% 
1
SOURCE: ORSTOM , "Enquete sur la situation du planteur", 1967
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balance going largely to coffee and cocoa. At best, sixteen percent 
of the crops in the mixed fields of Mpoula was some variety of 
bananas, while in the two other areas studied the banana crop 
accounted for only six and two percent of the mixed plantings. In the 
study’s figures for farmers’ incomes, which appear only for the third 
area (sample size fifteen families) where the banana crop was two 
percent of the crops grown on mixed plantations, bananas accounted for 
only six percent of the farmers’ income: 3,802 francs CFA out of a
total earned of 66,363 francs CFA. In contrast, coffee and cocoa each 
made up about one third of the family's income.
What these figures demonstrate is that the average smallholder, 
as represented by this sample of thirty-six families, had already 
converted his holdings out of the 1950s involvement with the banana 
and had taken up cocoa and coffee as the principal cash crops. Given 
that it takes several years for coffee and cocoa plants to mature, it 
is interesting that the farmers were getting an income from these 
crops in 1967, indicating that the process of conversion had begun 
soon after the strike, if not even earlier. The study does not 
discuss whether the income and standard of living represented by these 
figures and the pattern of cultivation shown, were an improvement or 
decline from the days of the bananas. What the figures in the study 
do suggest, however, particularly with the income being received from 
the long-term coffee and cocoa crops, is that smallholder agriculture 
in Mungo had stabilised in its organisation around a model.which 
relied heavily on the production of food crops for home consumption 
(although more than fourteen percent of the income came from food 
crops), with cash needs being met largely by the income produced with’ 
coffee and cocoa.
The fact that this stablisation has occurred by 1967 very 
pointedly illustrates the complete failure of the banana trade to 
modernise the smallholder's operation. It is not surprising that this 
should be the case. Modernisation, as defined after the events of 
1959 and 1960, was a process of industrialisation. As such, it could 
only operate if all attachments to mixed farming were completely 
abandoned. And yet, as shown In the ORSTOM sample, the practice of 
mixed cultivation was deeply engrained and one suspects that the risk 
involved in committing land to the monoculture of the banana was too 
great for farmers supporting half a dozen dependents on less than
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seven hectares of land to consider it a serious option. Moreover, the 
price swings of the industry had probably done much to frighten off 
participation, and were not likely to be overcome by any modification 
in the payment schemes for export bananas. Better, may have been the 
reasoning, to leave the banana behind than to risk all in what had 
become a very expensive enterprise. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that among the thirty-six families studied by ORSTOM, only one 
homogeneous plantation of bananas existed on some eight and a half 
hectares of land.^
There is another very fundamental reason why it would have been 
difficult to modernise the smallholder's banana operations, namely, 
the size and location of land holdings which comprised any single 
farmer's total holdings. Over half of the household heads in the 
thirty-six families represented were from outside of the Mungo area, 
twenty-eight percent from the Bamileke plateau. This, according to 
the study, had an impact on the land tenure arrangements in the area. 
For locals, the property they worked would have been acquired through 
inheritance. For most of the others, however, their land was either 
bought or acquired as collateral for a loan. The ORSTOM study does 
not give any figures for different kinds of land tenure arrangements 
among the families represented. But it does explain that a man might 
acquire land by lending money to an owner who needed the cash more 
than he needed the land. The lender would then acquire the use of the 
land for varying periods of time depending on the size of the 
loan.^ It is unfortunate that no indication is given of the number 
or percentage of holdings involved in this kind of an arrangement.
But if the numbers were very large, and if the periods of the loan 
were very short, then a problem of security of tenure arises which 
might well affect a farmer's interest in making the kinds of long-term 
investments that some modernisation would require. More importantly, 
the holdings —  at least as represented in Figure 9 , "Three Small 
Holdings in the Banana Zone of Mungo, 1967", —  were not at all 
consolidated. Rather, a man might have three hectares in one 
location, three in another and a small field for food crops in yet a 
third area. This posed logistical problems in the efficient 
organisation of work, particularly work done on the model of 
industrialised agriculture. To industrialise land under cultivation 
in small scattered plots would have been a problem outside the 
resources of any smallholder who did not have the means to create a 
consolidated holding.
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From 1959 to 1966 there were at least five organisations (the 
Syndicat, UNIBACAM, FEBACAM/UGECOBAM and the OCB) who were charged 
with the reorganisation of the smallholders' banana cooperatives. And 
yet, by 1967, the smallholder himself had largely abandoned the banana 
as a cash crop. How much his shift was caused by the disorganisation 
of the trade in general and the cooperative movement in particular is 
difficult to judge. What is more likely is that the farmer perceived, 
sooner than the rest of the profession was willing to admit openly, 
that with affairs structured as they were and with the fall in prices 
from France, no smallholder could reasonably expect to achieve a 
living off the fruit which had been such a boom crop in earlier 
years.
Creation of the OCB Plantations
The Organisation Camerounaise de la Banane (OCB) was first formed 
in 1964 as one of the efforts to reorganise the trade and the 
cooperative movement. In 1968, it was given responsibility for 
implementing the plantation plan which had been surveyed and designed 
by IFAC. It is interesting to look at this IFAC program in light of 
the response smallholders had already made to the condition of the 
banana trade in the early 1960s, but one thing is quite clear about 
the IFAC Conversion Program: it answered the needs and structures of
the banana trade, and the industrial agricultural requirements of that 
trade, far more than it adapted either to the real condition of the 
smallholders of Mungo or even to the more privileged position of the 
cooperative presidents. In a simplistic fashion, one might say that 
in the same way that the Europeans had won the terrorists' war, they 
had also won the underlying argument over agricultural style.
The single best illustration of that accomplishment is in the 
reorganisation of agricultural land taken over by the OCB. The 
conversion plan called for the establishment of consolidated one- 
hundred-hectare blocks which had suitable soils and were close to a 
source of irrigation water. Some of these blocks were taken over from 
European planters who had left Cameroon either because of the 
economics of the trade, or because of the terrorism which persisted in 
outlying areas even after the military entered in 1960. The single 
OCB plantation in English-speaking Cameroon is on land in Tiko that 
had been part of the Elders and Fyffes plantation in Likomba.
- 150 -
Figure 9. THREE SMALLHOLDINGS IN THE BANANA ZONE OF MUNGO. 1967
Holding of Joseoh METIKIE at Mangamba. 
Total holding: 5ha +
Crops: coffee, plantain, bananas, macabo. 
manioc, oil palm, mangos, cocoa, rapnia 
palm, food crops.
Holding of M artin  MOUKETTE at Ehom. 
Total holding: 6ha +
Crops: cocoa, coffee, macabo. plantains, 
bananas, food crops.
Holding of Jean NTECK MBUEMI at Mpoula. 
Total holding: 6ha ■+■
Crops: coffee, banana, plantain, avocado, 
mango, palm, kola, oranges and food crops.
Source: O R S TO M . Enquete sur la situation du planteur dans les zones de reconversion 
banamere , 1967
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However, apart from these holdings which came from previous European 
plantations, the majority of the land now held by the OCB came from 
the smallholders of Mungo.
In comparing the ORSTOM description of smallholders' scattered 
land holdings and land use to the plan drawn up by IFAC for monocrop 
one-hundred-hectare blocks, one is immediately aware of the radical 
change in the life style of the smallholders this new arrangement 
imposed. Today, these blocks function along the lines of plantation 
management, with a hired labour force, a hierarchical structure of 
supervision and an industrial schedule of work. However inadequately 
observed, this still represents a considerable departure from the 
working habits of the independent farmer holding less than seven 
hectares of land. It is, therefore, of interest that so many planters 
were willing to cooperate with this plan.
This would seem to have been based on two factors: first, 
according to the "Etudes Financieres" which was done as a part of the 
Conversion Program, the actual situation of the smallholder was 
deteriorating rather than improving.^ The report cited the fact 
that, in the ORSTOM study, the active population was really quite 
small —  less than three people per family —  because of the number of 
young people who had emigrated to town in search of work or for their 
education. In addition, the state of the coffee and cocoa plantations 
was less than adequate. Many were old, badly maintained and afflicted 
with disease. According to the IFAC financial study, the small­
holders' safest investment would have been in food crops for the 
Douala and Victoria markets. Even here, however, it would have been 
necessary to Intensify cultivation practices in order to cut down on 
the amount of time required, under the traditional shifting pattern of 
agriculture, for fields to be left fallow.
What this points to is a condition in which the natural resources 
of Mungo were being increasingly strained under the dense population 
and cultivation that had grown up since the land was first being 
cleared in the 1930s. The point of shift from "mined" to "managed" 
agriculture had been reached in the banana trade in the late 1950s. 
What the IFAC financial study suggests in addition, is that by the 
mid-1960s that same point had also come for the other crops being 
raised in Mungo. This put the smallholder under the pressure of
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diminishing returns and must have made the proposals from IFAC and the 
OCB seem fairly attractive.
Only two documents have given us any idea of the exact nature of 
those proposals. The most important is the signed account, amounting 
to something like an option contract, of a meeting held with the 
planters of Npaka. The account was signed by thirteen planters or 
their representatives as well as by the Secretary of the Loum sous- 
prefecture, and M. Jeanteur, author of the IFAC study and chief of the 
FED (Fonds EuroppSens du Developpment) mission which was paying for 
the implementation of the plan. The meeting had been called, 
according to M. Jeanteur, in order that the Planters of Npaka could 
given their final agreement, ”leur accord d^finitif", to the plan 
being proposed by FED. The document goes on to explain that this plan 
involved the creation of a one-hundred-hectare banana plantation block 
and would include the construction of an access road into the Npaka 
region, the building of a packing station and a hangar for materials. 
"Ces cultures seront r£alisees par le planteur, qui sera conseille par 
des techniclens." The first clearing and planting, however, would be 
the responsibility of the organisation (later the OCB) in charge of 
the programme. In spite of M. Jeanteur's description of the meeting 
as an occasion for the planters to give their final agreement to be 
the plan, the planters more cagily noted that they were agreed in 
principle, on the condition that they were compensated for any shrub 
crops (i.e. the coffee and cocoa) which were cleared off the land. M. 
Jeanteur replied that "il sera recommandS par la mission qu'une 
indemnity d ’arrachage soit etudiie," but added that with all the 
foreign aid being used for the benefit of the planters, some "effort” 
might well be required from them.^
This problem of compensation comes up again in the second 
document: the signed minutes of a meeting on 7 May 1967 of nearly
sixty Cameroonian planters who were worried about the destruction of 
their holdings under the conversion plan. The opening resolution of 
this meeting is a good illustration of the hopes of what the plan 
would bring as well as the more easily imagined fears of what would be 
lost:
...Nous acceptons de bons coeurs la reconversion bananiere dans
notre secteur de Mangamba, mais a condition que:
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.. .Le planteur soit d§dommag& des plants arraches dans ses 
plantations a savoir:
Cafeiers - Bananiers - Banane-Plantain - Macabos - 
Taros - Igname - Pruniers - Nolsetiers (Caso) - 
Kolatiers - Cocotiers - Palmiers a huile - Palmer 
Raphia - LSgumes etc...
Ceci pour assurer la vie du Planteur selon les difficultes 
du temps a savoir:
Frais de maladie - Frais de Scolarisation des enfants 
- Le Paiement de l'Impot - Frais de vivre 
(Nourriture) - Frais d'habillement etc...
The resolution continued with a request for the improvement of roads 
in the area and mentioned a number of other worries, among them that 
only the indigenous people of Mungo were going to be affected by the 
plan: "A consid&rer que: la reconversion n ’a arr%t& que toutes les 
plantations autochtones." There is no indication whether 
'autochtones' referred to all Cameroonians in Mungo or only to the 
original ethnic groups, but the fear of being tricked was quite large. 
So, too was the fear of losing their homes. "A savoir, nos cases ne 
seront jamais d<§placies. Nous demandons aussi de laisser 25 a 30
AO
metres nos cases avant de faire les plantations bananieres. °
Altogether, the terms of agreement with the planters would appear 
to have been extremely vague for a plan that was to result in such 
great changes. Nor does there seem to have been any sense that it was 
a plan for smallholders, although their difficulties had been one of 
the motivating factors in the design. Instead, judging from the 
resolutions of the planters of Mangamba, the plan was seen as a 
European exercise. "La reconversion doit Stre bas§e sur un contrat 
par 6crit entre les europeens traitants et les planteurs proprietaires 
dans terres prises.
However, the very vagueness of the terms of agreement must have 
left room to imagine greater benefits from a share of the plantations 
than from continued smallholder agriculture. Certainly the idea of a 
permanent income from the land in the form of rent or profit-sharing 
must have had considerable appeal. It is also possible that after a 
decade of economic disruption, terrorism and military reprisal, a 
large number of people were more than willing to turn over the
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management of their affairs to a larger organisation. On the other 
hand, it is said that the terrorists continued to interrupt normal 
business in Mungo until the early 1970s, and one cannot help but ask 
how many of those terrorists were farmers who disagreed with the OCB 
plan or who were survivors of the early 1960s who may even have still 
believed in the smallholder causes that had originally been 
proclaimed.
By and large, however, and for whatever reasons, the OCB 
plantations were accepted. In the process, the original idea that the 
crops would be raised by the expropriated planters working with the 
advice of technicians, had become by 1982 little more than a standard 
labour/management structure. The major difference is that among the 
plantation labour pool are those who, instead of receiving a share of 
the profits of the plantations as Michel Foyet of IRA argues they will 
do once profits are made,^® are receiving (albeit irregularly) rent 
payments for the land they once worked themselves on an independent 
basis.
The establishment of the OCB plantations clearly marked not only 
the end of the massive participation of smallholders in the banana 
trade, but for a certain number of planters the conversion, not from 
Gros Michel to Poyo, but from independent small producer to wage 
labourer, with perhaps a smallholding on the side for the production 
of home-consumed foods. The irony of this development is that however 
much the banana trade itself required the conversion to a plantation 
style of production, the OCB plantations represented the complete 
abolition of the hopes for smallholder participation which were so 
vehemently expressed In the early days of the strike in 1959.
Collapse of the Syndicat
The other casualty of the 1959 strike was the leadership position 
of the Syndicat. While the responsibilities of the Syndicat itself 
were never that great, it did serve to legitimise managerial decisions 
made informally and did function as a very effective lobby both in the 
colonial government of the French Gameroons and with the government in 
France. During the year of the strike and the civil war, however, it 
became once again an organisation representing only the European 
interests in the banana trade, a polarisation it was never able to 
shake off In the following years.
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In May I960, there was a General Assembly meeting of the 
Syndicat, which was the first meeting since the cooperative presidents 
first stayed away that was attended by representatives of both the 
European plantations and the African Cooperatives. The Assembly 
observed a minute of silence in memory of "... des planteurs et 
presidents de cooperatives qui ont trouve la mort sous les coups des 
terroristes," and approved unanimously the reading of the annual 
report. Notwithstanding this appearance of reconciliation, the 
meeting broke up a few moments later on the grounds that some members 
wanted to examine the balance sheet of the Syndicat before approving 
that as well.*^ By mid-July, however, an ordinary general assembly 
met to elect a new president and administrative council composed again 
of Cameroonians and Europeans. This time, Salomon Mpondo was elected 
president, a position he continued to hold for most of the next ten 
years and from which he exercised a curiously disruptive authority.
The minutes for the next ten years are sketchy and not always 
very well-written or well-organised. Still, in reading through them 
both for the Syndicat and the FEBACAM/UGECOBAM organisation of 
planters' cooperatives, one is struck by the sense of an industry 
which is unable to function coherently. Numerous reforms are 
proposed, some are adopted, and some either fail immediately or are 
replaced before they have had enough time either to succeed or fail. 
The Syndicat meetings are dominated less by the problems of organising 
the trade than by the problems of organising the Syndicat itself, 
whose constitution is written, rewritten and at times completely put 
aside. The plight of the smallholders does not improve, no matter what 
organisation is put into place, violence continues to break out 
sporadically, and where planters —  usually Europeans —  eventually 
succeed in converting to Poyo and enjoying a fairly steady income, it 
would seem to have been as much in spite of the overall management of 
the banana profession as because of it. There is a sense, finally, 
that the rebellion, which grew in part out of a desire to eliminate 
the French presence in Mungo, had not only failed to do so, but had 
destroyed the fragile manners of consensus which had made that 
presence constructive. In the resulting distrust and disorganisation, 
it was impossible to bring about an equitable reform of the banana 
trade that would have taken into account the difficulties of bringing 
smallholder production into an economic framework that was becoming 
more and more subject to the special constraints of the industrial 
plantation ideal.
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This breakdown of consensus is clearly evident in meeting minutes 
of the Syndicat. It is also quite clear, although Impossible to 
detail from the sketchy clues of the meeting minutes, that within the 
Syndicat a considerable struggle for control was taking place. 
Countless meetings discuss the question of membership, in particular 
whether membership and voting rights should be based on export 
tonnage, which in the days after the strike would give a clear 
advantage to the European planters, or on the number of planters 
involved in the trade, which would weight the balance towards the 
cooperatives. Many efforts were made to eliminate those members who 
had participated before the strike, but who had not paid any dues 
since then. There is also a revealing exchange in the minutes of the 
finance committee in late March 1962 in which the president of the 
Syndicat, Salomon Mpondo, tried first to move that members of the 
administrative council could be reimbursed "... les dipenses de 
deplacements et autres frais fait au cours de l'annge derni^re,” and 
then more pointedly claimed reimbursement for various expenses of his 
own. The treasurer, Madame Andri, answered him by observing that the 
statutes of the Syndicat had no provisions for reimbursing the members 
of the administrative council and that it was outside the power of the 
finance committee to decide the question. As for the president's own 
expenses, Mme. Andr§ argued that those were covered by the payment of 
a chauffeur's salary as of June 1961 and that any other expenses 
should have been included In the budget for the year beginning In June 
1961 if M. Mpondo wanted to be reimbursed. The president made a third 
attempt in the same meeting to change the nature of the financial 
control of the Syndicat by proposing to prepare the budget for 1962. 
This suggestion was also rejected by the treasurer on the grounds that 
the outgoing administration did not prepare the budget for the next.
"A mon avis," said Mme. Andr§ "c'est au nouveau Counseil 
d'administration a le faire."-^
The next general assembly of the Syndicat elected a provisional 
administrative council charged with drawing up the new rules of 
membership, dues, and administration. On 16 July 1962 another general 
assembly met to vote on the proposed changes, but "Apr§s diverses 
interventions en particulier de Monsieur Mpondo, les modifications 
propos^es par le counseil provisoire ne sont pas approuv§es.
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On 18 August 1962 an extraordinary general assembly was held 
with M. Deere of the provisional council acting as president. This 
meeting was also unsuccessful and broke up after only an hour.
Although Monsieur DecrS stated there was a quorum, Monsieur Mpondo 
moved to adjourn on the grounds that too many people were absent. In 
the resulting stand off between Monsieur Mpondo, former president of 
the Syndicat, and Monsieur DecrS, the provisional president, the 
assembly refused to take sides. One of the European planters, M. 
Pallier then took the floor and said that "Les obstructions 
continuelles faites par certaines personnes pour les raisons 
personnelles ne peuvent pas mener £ bien notre action. II est 
impossible de vivre dans'une atmosphere de mefiance, et je constate 
avec regret que chaque stance est systematiquement boycottee." This 
led to "vives discussions," people walking out of the room, and the 
adjournment of the meeting to a date ten days later.^
A meeting on 28 August 1962, moved in the end to eliminate all 
membership dues on the grounds that the Syndicat*s role had been taken 
over by the new federation of banana cooperatives, FEBACAM, which 
included both Cameroonian and European planters. In the vote for a 
definitive Syndicat administrative council, however, the first round 
of voting left M. Mpondo in a poor second place at which he and his 
adherents left the room and the second round of votes was
<55
abandoned.
There are no more meeting minutes until the middle of 1963 when 
M. Mpondo appears again as president, although there is nothing to 
indicate how he achieved his position. Another general assembly 
meeting was held at the end of December 1963.in which the question was 
raised by M. Mpondo whether the survivial of the Syndicat was 
necessary or "must it be dissolved?" The assembly was unanimous for 
continuing, but failed to elect a new president and decided to 
continue with the administration of 1961 with Monsieur Mpondo as 
president and Madame AndrS as treasurer. In asking for the 
dissolution of the Syndicat, Monsieur Mpondo observed that the 
organisation since the last General Assembly of August 28, 1962, had 
"rest£ en sommeil §. cause des divergences de vues," a state of 
dormancy the Syndicat has largely maintained ever since.
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It would seem that after the disagreements of 1962, only one
other attempt was made to revive the Syndicat as a professional
organisation. This occurred in 1971 under the chairmanship of the
Sous-Prefet of Loum, Monsieur Nicol Njilla, who also held the position
of l’Inspecteur de Travail et des Lois Sociales, Nkongsamba. In a
series of meetings held 20 and 21 October and on 18 November, the
Syndicat was dissolved and restructured with a new administrative
council of Cameroonians and Europeans. It was not a success. In the
October discussions, two of the Europeans who had been elected to the
administrative council resigned in disagreement over the new statutes.
Monsieur Alain Moreau, of the SPNP plantations, was one of them and
announced that he would not continue "a si§ger dans les reunions
ou il y a trop de discrimination. II suffit qu'un planteur europeen
imette une idie qu'elle soit automatiquement combattue. Tout ce que
S7j'ai sugg§r6 a £t£ refus§.
His objections were finally reduced to a request that of the four 
vice-presidents in the administrative council, the first vice- 
president should be a European. During the next meeting of the 
administrative council the Sous-Prefet made several attempts to smooth 
things over, observing: "... on a l'impression qu’iliy a une lutte 
entre Camerounais d'origine et Camerounais d fadoption; il faut que la 
profession soit unie et qu’il n'y ait pas de frictions entre les 
planteurs. L'objectif principal doit etre la sauvegarde des intSrets 
de la profession bananiere. Je vous demande done d ’lviter les 
tiraillements et d'^tudier tous les problemes dans le sens de 
1 ’intSret g&n§ral."^ His words had no visible effect, any more 
than did the reassurances of the new president of the Syndicat, Michel 
Njaleu, who had been elected under the new statutes which the European 
planters felt discriminated against them. "Je prie tous mes 
collaborateurs de travailler la main dans la main avec moi. II faut 
Sviter la lutte d*influence pr^judiciable pour la bonne marche du 
Syndicat et de la profession en general. Je ne suis et ne serais 
influence par personne. G'est le devoir et les conseils eclaires qui 
me guideront. Le d^sordre ne rSsourd aucun probleme serieux."-^
While it is impossible to work out the details of manoeuvering, 
factions and argument which lay behind the many tensions which surface 
in these meetings, it is clear that a major struggle for the control 
of the industry was taking place. It is a struggle that began with
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the smallholders' strike in 1959 and which continues to this day, 
distorting any sustained concentration on the organisational needs of 
a very disorganised industry. At a recent meeting in May 1982, one of 
the Cameroonian planters accused one of the European sales agents of a 
corrupt collaboration with the buyers in France to discriminate 
against Cameroonian planters' fruit. It is an accusation that 
obscures the real issues of low quality production and sours any 
attempts at improving the overall performance of the trade. Even had 
the accusation been true, which is unlikely, it is better attacked 
through the concerted action of all planters, than through an 
unsupported allegation aired in the course of other discussions at a 
general meeting.
And yet the concerted action of all planters is exactly what is 
missing. The unity and the consensus of the profession — historically 
under considerable strain and exceedingly fragile —  would seem to 
have been permanently damaged by the events of 1959 and the ensuing 
struggle for control. This history continues to interfere with all 
other considerations of the well-being of the profession and of the 
planters and workers who earn their living from the banana.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CAMEROON BANANA TRADE OF 1982
The banana trade of Cameroon in 1982 still confronts the same 
issues that faced the trade in the 1950s. The nature of the market 
being supplied is still critical in defining production standards as 
well as in determining the price to be received by farmers. They, in 
turn, still struggle with the same technological problems of disease 
control, soil fertility and packing stations. Similarly, the 
managerial structure of the trade, although in some respects quite 
different from the structures of the 1950s, is still just as 
influential in determining the efficiency of the trade and the working 
relationships between participants. In effect, the 1982 business is 
still organised around the same components of market, technologies and 
managerial structures which have already been discussed for the 1950s 
trade.
What is clearly not the same in 1982 is the near collapse of the 
business. What were two young and fairly healthy agricultural 
industries in the 1950s have become by 1982 a single trade which can 
no longer afford to pay its own bills, let alone clear a profit. This 
difference offers considerable scope for analysis and theory and some 
of the political explanations of change have already been presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6_ on reunification in Anglophone Cameroon and the 
politics of independence in Mungo.
In this chapter, however, we concentrate on the other important 
elements of the trade which have been considered in this thesis: the
nature of the market, the field technologies planters employ, and the 
managerial structure of the 1982 trade. In looking at these aspects 
of the business, we focus on some of the operational differences 
between an optimum effective working of the trade and the actual 
functioning of affairs in 1982. What emerges from this examination is 
that the economic collapse of the industry in recent years has not 
resulted from any single cataclysmic event, but instead from a slow 
accumulation of small mistakes, misjudgments and ignored investments.
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In the end, it was in all these internal details of the industry that 
the transition from a "mined" to a managed agricultural resource, one 
of the top priorities of the late 1950s and early 1960s, was not 
effectively accomplished. While one can blame the loss of Anglophone 
production on the decision to reunify and can show how the politics of 
independence in Mungo soured many working relationships, the trade has 
also suffered from a high level of mismanagement on the part of nearly 
all the participants in the business. It is this mismanagement which 
has affected the profitability of the trade in 1982 and which will, 
regardless of political history, destroy what is left of the 
flourising business of the 1950s.
In studying the 1982 banana business of Cameroon, we look at the 
same components of markets, technologies and managerial structure 
which have already been examined for the 1950s trade. However, we 
begin with a discussion of the markets open to Cameroon, since, as was 
true during the 1950s, the nature of the market will determine both 
the quantity and quality of fruit that Cameroon must produce in order 
to stay in the trade.
The Nature of the Market
Nearly all bananas from Cameroon in 1982 are sold in the French 
market. It is a controlled market, and has been so in one form or 
another since the 1930s when any bananas from outside the franc zone 
were prohibited from entering the French market. The undisguised 
purpose of these controls has always been to protect the banana 
industries of Martinque and Guadaloupe from competition. This 
protection was further refined in the early 1960s when the Comite 
Interprofessionel Bananier (CIB) found itself unable to negotiate the 
conflicting claims on the French market that were coming from the 
Antilles (Martinique and Guadaloupe) and the newly independent African 
states of the Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Madagascar. The issue was 
finally resolved in favour of the (pro-de Gaulle) Overseas 
Departments, Martinique and Guadaloupe, on the fifth of January 1962 
when President de Gaulle shared the market between the two groups of 
producers. By his decision, the Antilles were allowed to supply two- 
thirds of the French market and the African producers were limited to 
the remaining third.^
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Table 13
JANUARY 1962 PARTITION OF FRENCH BANANA MARKET
Percentage of 
French market
Percentage of 
Antilles quota
Percentage of 
African quota
Martinique 35% 53%
Guadaloupe 31% 47%
(sub) total (66%) (100%)
Ivory Coast 17% 52%
Cameroon 13% 40%
Madasgascar 3% 8%
(sub) total (33%) (100%)
TOTAL 99%
SOURCE: Gravellini, Contribution a 1* §tude de la production et de la
commercialisation des bananes antillalses, camerounaises et 
ivoiriennes, p 45-6*
According to a December 1980 report on the banana trade of the 
Antilles, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, this quota system was designed 
not only to arbitrate the conflict of interests between the African 
and Caribbean producers, but also to "adapt volume to prices and not 
prices to volume".^ Thus, it was reasoned, the producer would 
always receive a fair price for his fruit since supply would never 
exceed demand and thereby drive down the price of the fruit to the 
farmer’s loss. The same system was expected to control the price to 
consumers.
The organisation for administering these arrangements was, and 
is, the Comite Interprofessionel Bananier (CIB) which consists of 
roughly sixty people who represent planters, importers, ripeners, 
retailers and shippers as well as the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Competition and Commerce, and the French Overseas Departments and 
Overseas Territories. There are two administrative sub-committees, 
the Comite Restraint Interprofessionel Bananier, and the Groupment 
d ’Int§r§ts Economiques Bananiers (CRIB) and GIEB repectively)
The first of these, the CRIB meets once or twice a month to estimate 
the coming market demand for bananas and from that determine the
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amount of fruit to be supplied by each country. The GIEB meanwhile is 
more concerned with maintaining for the fruit an average annual price 
that does not fluctuate too greatly. Towards this end, the GIEB fixes 
an annual average price based on Antilles monthly prices and weighted 
to include shipping and landing expenses.^
In those cases when the combined production of the franc zone 
fails to meet the market demand and thereby starts to drive up the 
price of the fruit beyond the fixed annual average, the GIEB steps in 
again. At such times, they are responsible for buying bananas on the 
open market at the lowest possible price and reselling it at prices 
fixed by schedule. Any profits made on this transaction are deposited 
in the State Treasury. Between 1970-79, the Treasury received some 53 
million francs (about £5 million), fifteen percent of that amount 
having resulted from the 1978/79 b u s i n e s s .  ^ The manipulation of the 
entry of non-franc zone fruit is designed to ensure that demand never 
exceeds supply and that there is a fairly level price nearly all year 
round, both for the consumer and the planter.
Before the advent of the fixed market quotas in 1962, the bananas 
entering the French market were forced to compete with the fruit from 
other franc-zone producers. Thus, for example, the fruit from 
Cameroon had to be able to meet the standard set by the Antilles, and 
the Antilles had to be able to match the low costs of Cameroon. As 
the Caribbean islands found their costs rising faster than the cost of 
growing bananas in Africa, and their competitive position thereby 
undercut, pressure from the Antilles for a quota system was 
increased.^ Since 1962, therefore, all franc-zone producers have 
been able to count on a guaranteed price for their fruit and a 
guaranteed quantity of sales.
Although this system has protected growers from extreme 
fluctuations in market prices, it has also allowed franc-zone banana 
producers to ignore pressure from the more competitive world market to 
raise production standards. In 1977, for example, the FOB (free on 
board) price of bananas from Martinique was $350 per metric tonne and 
bananas from Cameroon were $278 per tonne when sold in France. In 
contrast, Jamaican bananas were selling for $185 in Britain and 
bananas from Central America were at $160 in Italy.^ While such 
comparative figures are never exact given fluctuations in rates of
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exchange and similar problems, it is still roughly correct to say that 
in 1977 bananas from Central America were half or three-fourths the 
price of fruit from the Antilles and Cameroon respectively and, 
generally speaking, of a better quality. However, as long as the 
French market did not admit bananas from the dollar zone of Central 
America and Equador, this difference in the price and quality of fruit 
could have no real influence on the stability of the French banana 
market *
That situation began to change with two serious hurricanes in the 
Antilles in 1979 and 1980, David in 1979 and Allen in 1980. The 
figures for 1978 and 1979 show that banana exports from the Antilles 
to France fell by nearly 118,000 tonnes between 1978 and 1979. As a 
result, other producers within the franc zone were under pressure to 
make up the loss from the Antilles, and together the Ivory Coast and 
Cameroon managed to increase their exparts by slightly over 11,000 
tonnes. However, a more important 58,000 tonnes from the dollar zone 
was admitted to France in 1979, 46,000 tonnes more than had come in 
the year before. Thus, over thirteen percent of the French banana 
market of 1979 was being supplied from dollar-zone fruit coming from 
Honduras, Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador.^
While this represents a significant proportion of the French 
market for that year, what was even more important about the entry of 
these bananas was that the quality of the fruit was consistently 
superior to bananas from the franc zone and the price was, on average, 
360 francs cheaper per tonne or about £37, an eighteen percent 
reduction of the franc-zone price.^ Much the same turn of events 
hit the French banana market in 1980 when hurricane Allen again 
destroyed a large proportion of the Antilles banana crop. Moreover, 
the fact that it was the second year running made the losses from the 
franc zone that much greater and the resulting invasion of dollar-zone 
fruit that much more important again.
There had been an additional change in the nature of the French 
market which only emphasizes the differences of quality and price. 
Writing in 1973, Ardagh said that:
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"After a slow start, the supermarket movement has made something 
of a breakthrough in France in the past six years. ... The number 
of supermarkets, nil in 1957, rose to over 1,000 by 1969 and over 
2,200 by 1972. Their share of the total retail trade in food 
rose from a mere 4 per cent in 1969 to 20 per cent by 
1972... "10
This trend has continued into the 1980s when a sizeable percentage of 
the bananas sold in France are sold through the large retail stores 
and retailers cooperatives which could foreseeably come to dominate 
the trade.^ With this change from the gpicerie du coin to the 
supermarket has come an increased sensitivity to price.
Again, quoting from Ardagh:
After the war the housewife grew so used to the steady rise in 
prices that she ceased to question them, and in a land so 
snobbish about quality, anything cheap came to be regarded with 
suspicion. Soon after the war the Government carried out an 
experiment that consisted in cutting cheeses in identical halves 
in a number of shops, and giving them different price-tags: most
people chose the dearer halves. With price-fixing so widespread, 
the notion of a valid 'bargain* never really developed. In the 
past few years, however, the influence of Leclerc and the new 
competition has helped to make the housewife more price-wise, at 
least for ordinary goods.^
In the case of the banana, this process was much accelerated by the
appearance in 1979 and 1980 of more dollar-zone bananas at a cheaper
price and higher, more even, quality. It thus became harder to
justify the high fixed price for franc-zone bananas and became more
difficult to get ripeners to buy franc-zone produce when they knew
they could get a better quality fruit for less from the dollar 
13zone.
There is a third factor which is increasingly important. When 
the Common Market was established in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome, 
special provisions were made to guarantee protected access to at least 
the French market for the produce of the former French colonies. 
However, as more countries have joined the EEC and more overseas 
producers have shared in the protection offered to the ex-French 
territories, the protection has begun to lose some of its meaning.
The entry of Britain was particularly significant in this respect and 
forced the rewriting of the Lomi Convention to include selected 
members of the British Commonwealth. However, the general policy of
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protected access for associated territories is becoming more difficult 
to sustain in the European Economic Community and the arrangements 
which have protected the Antilles and French-speaking African 
producers of bananas so far are in danger of being seriously modified. 
This is even more the case since the election of President Mitterand, 
a number of whose policies run counter to accepted Gaullist wisdom, 
and who is less likely to see any advantage in protecting the special 
interests of the very Gaullist voters of the departments of Guadaloupe 
and Martinique.
Thus, for a number of reasons, the 1962 system of banana quotas 
set up by Charles de Gaulle is becoming more and more fragile. The 
simultaneous and seemingly irreversible' decline of the Cameroon 
banana trade makes that fragility even more pronounced. Of the four 
major producers -- Martinique, Guadaloupe, Ivory Coast and Cameroon 
—  the last is in the weakest position. But none of the others is 
without problems and it is debatable whether they could make up the 
difference if the Cameroon banana trade failed completely. This would 
then leave the French market with a permanent deficit of franc-zone 
bananas and would open the way for permanent participation of superior 
dollar-zone fruit.
Exactly how the remaining French-speaking producers would react 
to that competition remains to be seen, as is the nature of the 
Socialist government's reaction to appeals for support from the 
Overseas Departments. Not surprisingly, there is considerable 
pressure from the Comite des Int£r§ts Bananiers on Cameroon. In May, 
1982, the President of the GIEB spent nearly a week in Cameroon 
speaking to planters, the government in Yaounde and the Organisation 
Camerounaise de la Banane in order to press for a higher standard of 
production and the maintenance of Cameroon's share of the market. The 
fact that Cameroon has not been able to respond effectively to this 
pressure requires some explanation, and leads us into an examination 
of the major components of the business in Cameroon in 1982 and of the 
production and export standards the business should be meeting in 
order to survive through the 1980s.
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Technologies of 1982
The photographs in Figures 10 and 1_1 provide a rough idea of the 
different qualities of bananas coming from different countries. All 
photographs were taken in English and French supermarkets or groceries 
in September and October 1982 and are meant to show what the fruit 
looks like when it reaches the retail market. Bananas from three 
locations are shown here: one photograph shows the fruit from the 
dollar zone and the others are of fruit from the Antilles and 
Cameroon. The lower quality of the fruit from Cameroon represents 
several weaknesses in the chain of activities from field to ship, some 
of which we shall examine here. We shall also consider the different 
responses to technical problems which have been made by various 
producers. In doing so, we shall suggest some of the considerations 
that may have affected producers1 decisions.
Those banana planters still operating in Cameroon are not 
numerous, but are extremely diverse (see Map 18). Their plantations 
and farms differ significantly in their size, productivity, 
management, size and capitalisation. Of the thousands who joined the 
banana trade in both Cameroons in the 1950s only a handful are left. 
There are four private French companies controlling about 3000 
hectares of land, and an equal number of major Cameroonian producers, 
but with about one tenth the land surface. Together they represent 
the whole of the private sector of banana planters and manage about 
sixty percent of the total land still in banana production.
The balance is controlled by parastatal organisations. The 
Cameroons Development Corporation, one of the few institutions in the 
former British Camero’ons to have survived reunification, manages 
roughly 800 hectares of bananas. The Organisation Camerounaise de la 
Bananes (OCB), which was created in 1964, works another 1200 
hectares. Finally, showing the highest productivity per hectare 
(forty-two tonnes), there is IRA, the Institut de Recherches 
Agronomiques, which is part of the Cameroon government, but which 
began as part of IFAC, now known as the Institut de Recherches des 
Fruits et Agrumes (IRFA), in Paris. IRA has about forty hectares in a 
demonstration plot at Nyombi in Mungo and provides the management and 
technical advice to the OCB plantations, often using personnel from 
the Paris office of IRFA.
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Figure 10. C A M E R O O N IA N  A ND P A N A M A N IA N  B A N A N A S . 1982
Chiquita, dollar zone bananas from Panama in a S a fe w a y  superm arket
London, N ovem ber 1982
Bananas from  Cameroon in a small neighbourhood grocery 
Paris, September 1982
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Figure 11. C A M E R O O N IA N  A ND  A N T IL L E S  B A N A N A S . 1982
Antilles bananas in a covered m arket .  
Paris. S eptem ber 1982
Cameroonian bananas in a Paris superm arket.  
S eptem ber, 1982
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Map 18 ESTIMATED CAMEROON BANANA LANDS. 1982
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Sigatoka Disease
Certainly one of the most revealing points at which to study the 
efficiency of the banana industry is in its treatment of Sigatoka 
disease and many of the weaknesses in the Cameroon trade show up here. 
As banana cultivation became more widespread, particularly in the 
1950s, the disease became more entrenched and less easily controlled 
with occasional treatment. In the earliest days of the disease’s 
appearance when bananas were still being raised on small more widely 
separated parcels of land, it was possible to treat Sigatoka with 
seven to eight treatments a year of a fine mineral oil spray.
Beginning in 1965-66, however, as many as thirty to forty applications 
of oil were required, with spraying occurring every week or ten days. 
This much treatment itself became counter-productive as the oil was so 
thickly laden on the leaves that the plants were unable to function 
normally. At this point it became advisable to use a fungicide mixed 
with the oil. However, in order to avoid the development of a strain 
of Sigatoka resistant to treatment all of the recommended dosage 
should have been used and, when possible, alternated with another 
fungicide. These treatments should have been applied at regular 
intervals in calm weather in order to achieve maximum 
effectiveness.^
The treatment of the disease in Cameroon has been consistently
less than optimum. There was considerable reluctance among planters
to spend money on aerial treatment. Thus, the decision to use a
fungicide was postponed as long as possible and then it was used
invariably, without any alternation with another product. This was
largely a matter of cost. The fungicide, Peltis, which was used
first, costs about 400 francs CFA (80 pence) a litre while the
alternative, Imazalim,- costs 15,000 francs CFA (£30) a litre. The
decision to use only Peltis, while clearly economic in the short term,
caused long term problems as the Sigatoka fungus developed a
resistance to the fungicide. This resistance was hastened on those
plantations where a lower than recommended dose of Peltis was applied.
The problem of resistance was further aggravated by a four to five-
year lag between the time the resistant strain was first reported by
M. Gaudin, then the manager of the privately-held CAM and Boubou
plantations, and the time it was recognised by the Institut de
15Recherches Agronomiques at Nyombe. By this time it had become
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imperative to use the more expensive treatment, Imazalim, and there 
was no longer the time available to do any research into cheaper 
alternative sprays.
Both the lack of research and short-sighted economising were 
considerably aggravated by extremely uneven applications. According 
to LassoudiSre, an IRA technical advisor, the following treatments 
were provided in the following years and between them demonstrate the 
lack of any coherent, regularly scheduled spraying based on a far­
sighted policy of disease control:
Table 14
TREATMENTS OF SIGATOKA DISEASE, MUNGO 
1968-1981
Year Number of treatments per year Type of treatment
1968 10-12 mineral oil alone
1969 40 mineral oil alone
1972 14 mineral oil alone
1978 7 mineral oil plus Peltis
1980 14 mineral oil plus Peltis
1981* 20 mineral oil plus Imazalin
SOURCE: Institut de Recherches Agronomiques, Nyomb§.
The importance of regular treatment is emphasized on a chart in 
John Robertson’s office at Ekona showing the monthly production 
figures from the CDC plantations in Ekona, for the period from 
February 1981 to April 1982. After achieving a plateau of regular 
yields averaging about thirty tonnes per hectare in each month in
early 1981, there were two sprayings missed in July and August of that
year. Roughly six months later the average yields had fallen to
eighteen to twenty-two tonnes and required four months to recover the
1 fiearlier high levels.
Soil Fertility
A similar problem which crosses the boundary between routine
treatments and agricultural research concerns the soil fertility. It
* M. Lassoudiere did not have information for all years, although the 
plantations would have been treated in every year. The figures here 
only represent the degree of variation in treatment.
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was Lassoudiere's contention that long-term cultivation of bananas 
does not alter the soil structure in any way or introduce hazardous 
elements in the way, for example, that manioc will fix cyanide in any 
soil where it is allowed to grow for long periods. Therefore, the 
only soil problem to consider, in his opinion, was that of fertility 
which, he implied, was fairly simple to adjust.^ According to 
several of the plantation people, however, there were considerable 
problems with the soil and one suspects that the long-term effects of 
banana cultivation on soil fertility in this area have not been 
adequately studied. Ronald Senfftlenben, whose company, Agrichim, is 
a major owner of the Nassif plantation in Mungo, found that nothing he 
could do in the way of disease-control improved yields on the 
plantation. He then turned to adjustments in the fertilizer treatment 
being applied and found results were much better.
John Robertson found himself with a similar situation on CDC land 
in the Southwest Province. The land he manages in Ekona has been in 
bananas off and on since the area was first cultivated by the Germans. 
Part of the land is old volcanic soils, and part of it new, the latter 
being considerably more fertile and less mixed with clay than the 
former. And yet even on new volcanic soils, the fertility of the soil 
is not producing the yields it should do and by 1981 John Robertson 
asked the Ekona research station to look into the effects of long-term
I Q
banana cultivation on soil fertility. ?
It was Ronald Senfftlenben1s contention that the fertilizer 
treatments used to date have been inappropriate to the soil and have
been used in an inflexible formula by at least all the private
20European managers in Mungo. According to Lassoudiere there is no
detailed soil map of the banana growing areas of Mungo, and so there
is no way of knowing whether the fertilizer applications are indeed 
21appropriate. Such maps do exist for much of the land in Ekona, 
in Anglophone Cameroon, but these were done at least twenty years ago 
and there is no recent research to show how cultivation patterns may 
have changed soil fertility and structure, at least not until John 
Robertson's request to the Ekona research station.
What both the problems of Sigatoka disease and soil fertility 
suggest is a lack of timely research by scientists in the area as well 
as a rather insouciant attitude on the part of the planters, who often
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failed to take a long-term view of land and crop management. By 
several accounts, planters were able to earn sizeable profits through 
much of the 1970s. It is, therefore, not surprising that they felt no 
compulsion to produce a greater quantity of better quality fruit which 
was not yet required. Their short-term perspective was mirrored in 
the behaviour of the research station at Nyombe which does not seem to 
have anticipated and tackled in timely relevant detail the kind of 
operational problems planters were bound to confront. One also senses 
a lack of pragmatic interaction between planters and the research 
station. There is, for example, more than a suggestion from planters 
that IRA’s research was often directed away from planters' problems to 
field trials of competing products, none of which was clearly 
superior. Since, however, researchers may have had financial 
interests in one product over another, it was to their advantage to 
spend time "proving" the benefits of one treatment. As rumour, there 
is no way to test the validity of such a claim. That the rumour 
exists, however, points to an unhealthy estrangement from and 
suspicion of the research station by the planters who should instead 
be exploiting the scientific group as a valuable managerial tool.
Irrigation
The failure to invest in constructive operations research has 
been a failure of one kind of long-term capital investment, but the 
responsibility for that failure lies in part in the way IRA has chosen 
to define its role in the industry and in part with the banana growers 
themselves who do not seem to have pushed for more relevant research. 
The other failure of capital expenditure at the level of field 
production has been in irrigation. Irrigation was not a serious 
problem in the 1950s when the market was less competitive but by 1982 
it had become a necessity. Here, however, the decision to put in 
irrigation or not has been made by the individual planters themselves. 
In this respect, it is of interest to note that those plantations 
operating within a parastatal structure are the only ones to have made 
any effort to put in irrigation. The private planters, both French 
and Cameroonian, have no irrigation at all.
That irrigation makes a difference to productivity is undisputed. 
It can also make a considerable difference to profits as the best time 
to sell bananas in Europe is during the European spring and summer
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22months. Unfortunately, it is exactly during these months that
22Cameroon banana production is at its lowest.
The dry season in Cameroon in the banana zone begins in November 
and starts to break only in March and April (see Figure 12). Because 
of the dry weather, the growth rate of the banana plants is much lower 
and the plants are considerably weaker. They are also less resistant 
to disease and_ to the windstorms which usually accompany the first 
rains. Moreover, because of the lower growth rate, the leaf coverage 
is reduced and, at the first rains of the season, weeds spring up in 
the sunshine between the banana plants and further slow down 
development. Where the plants have been inadequately treated against 
Sigatoka disease or any of the other pests, such as weevils and 
nematodes, they offer even less resistance to any sudden shock. The 
plant which has not had enough water, with a bulb riddled with the 
tunnels of weevils, and with roots partially destroyed by nematodes is 
more likely to be pushed over in a sudden stormy wind and will produce 
fruit of a lower than standard size even .if the plant remains 
standing. Taken altogether, the full effects of the dry season 
accumulate to produce more than usually substandard fruit at precisely 
the moment when the market is most open and lucrative.
The value of irrigation has been known for a long time and, in 
the late 1950s, Elders and Fyffes had installed a system on their 
Likomba plantations. This has since been moved by John Robertson to 
Molyko, one of the last CDC estates in bananas. Together with the 
partial irrigation of the OCB estates and the complete irrigation of 
IRA's demonstration forty hectares, these works represent all the . 
irrigation that exists. On a rough calculation, 750 out of a total of 
5500 hectares in bananas are irrigated —  an insufficient fourteen 
percent.
None of these irrigation systems is complete, however, with the 
exception of the minor acreage at IRA. In the case of the GDC, senior 
management at Bota has not changed its long term policy of eliminating 
bananas from the crops under their increasingly vast management, and 
does not plan to continue in bananas for much longer. Their 
involvement rests on the repeated request of the President of the 
country for the CDC to stay in the trade.^ That being the case, it 
is not surprising that the CDC does not want to make any long-term
- 176 -
R
ai
nf
al
l 
(m
m
)
Figure 12. AVERAGE MONTHLY RAINFALL IN TIKO AND LOUM
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Source: Climatologie et Statistiques, Direction de la M eteorologie Nationale, Douala, Cameroon.
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commitment to irrigation that would only be required for bananas.
They would prefer to save the money and look forward to the conversion 
of the CDC banana land to simpler tree crops.
The OCB’s dilemma has been somewhat different. The Organisation 
Camerounaise de la Banane was set up in 1964 to help in the conversion 
of smallholders1 farms from the Gros Michel to Poyo banana varieties. 
By 1967, these efforts had failed and an alternative plan was drawn up 
for developing industrial banana plantations on blocks of consolidated 
smallholder land. It would seem that in the early years of these 
plantations1 there was never sufficient investment money available to 
establish the plantations at a profitable working level.
There are also accusations of corruption and diversion of funds 
to private pockets that should have gone into plantation development. 
Moreover, the organisation has been chronically plagued by an 
inability to synchronise the arrival of government financing with the 
exigent and rigorous schedules of banana plantation management. Thus, 
for example, during a week when fertilizers, or pesticides needed to 
be applied it might be that none of these products was available 
because there had been no money to buy them two weeks before. Or, as 
one planter expressed it, the plane, the fungicide and the pilot might 
all be ready, but there would be a shortage of petrol for the plane 
and so no treatment was possible. With this kind of systemic 
mismanagement and bad timing, the OCB has never been able to generate 
any profit from its plantations and has continued to rely on the 
rather uneven delivery of government money from Yaounde just for 
operating expenses. The resulting hand-to-mouth financing seems to 
have left little room for consideration of long-term investments based 
on savings from earnings or on loans that might be mortgaged against a 
good record of production.
The situation of the French planters is of a different order.
Most of those still working on privately-held French plantations in 
Mungo do not believe that any of these company plantations will 
survive. Although every Cameroon government official interviewed 
during this study denied strenuously that there was subtle, piecemeal 
attempt to force the French companies to leave Mungo, no Frenchman 
working in the area felt that his position was secure. Some thought 
they might last another five years, others perhaps ten or twenty, but
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the general sentiment was that the time left to them in Cameroon was 
really very short.
This attitude of living always on the edge of departure seems to 
have originated in the de facto civil war of Mungo that began in the 
late 1950s and lasted for five to ten years, deteriorating into 
unpredictable brigandage during the late 1960s. Many of the French 
planters who had been active in the trade during the 1950s left at 
this time.
For those who remained and survived the financial losses of both
the war and the conversion to Foyo and boxing stations, the 1970s
offered spectacular returns. It was during this period, according to
Ronald Senfftlenben of Agrichim, that money could have been set aside
2 5for capital development. Most of the earnings, however, were sent 
to France, and some may also have gone to repay debts incurred during 
the disruption of the civil war and the conversion to Poyo. That 
money was not put into long-term investment and that operating 
expenses were repeatedly short-changed reflects the attitude of a 
people who did not expect to reap any of the rewards of durable 
investments or be able to pass on these benefits as they saw fit.
Instead, there is a belief among French planters that Cameroon’s 
export agriculture is going to be increasingly managed by parastatal 
organisations along the lines of the CDC in Anglophone Cameroon.
There is, therefore, no point in investing in a plantation which might 
well be nationalised without sufficient compensation being paid to the 
owner. Nor is there much faith that, once nationalised, the value of 
the plantations would be maintained. Instead, there is a fear that 
equipment would deteriorate, routine sprayings would be missed, and 
the whole level of care and management of the property would
dramatically decline. It is difficult to believe that such fears are
completely justified. Yet it seems to be the combined worries of
being dispossessed and of seeing their plantations unable to survive
their own time that has encouraged managers and owners in a radical 
short-term exploitation of many of the private French plantations in 
Mungo.
That Cameroonian growers, who are clearly planning to stay in the 
country, have not invested in irrigation is due to slightly different
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circumstances. Like the European planters, they were badly affected
by the civil war of 1959-60, and even more so by the decline o'£ the..
Gros Michel. Of those planters who survived and who were not 
incorporated into the OCB, none of them controls more than seventy- 
five hectares of land, the average being somewhere closer to fifteen 
or twenty hectares for each farmer. It is doubtful whether any 
holding that size in Cameroon can be earning its way from the banana 
crop alone and one suspects that a number of hidden subsidies have 
kept these banana plantations going. The single most important form 
of subsidy that has maintained these more marginal producers in the 
trade exists in the way banana shipping and sales accounts are kept.
One of the legacies of the transition from the Gros Michel to 
Poyo was a decision made around 1963 that each planter’s earnings 
would be based on the amount of fruit shipped and not on the actual 
fruit he sold in Europe. Thus, the lower quality fruit from the more 
marginal producers was sold with the fruit of better growers and a 
single quantity of earnings was then distributed according to the 
various proportions of the shipment that had been contributed by each 
planter. This arrangement meant that lower quality producers could 
share the earnings of better quality fruit and, in effect, acted as a 
subsidy to the smaller and less professional growers.
It is also argued, though not proven, that many of the 
agricultural supplies intended for the OCB plantations find their way 
on to private fields, and some growers, both French and Cameroonian, 
are suspected of offering either stolen or rejected fruit from other 
plantations as their own. Both practices, if actually occurring, 
would tend to minimise the real losses of marginal holdings and 
further obscure their real viability. A third factor, which may be of 
considerable importance, is that many of the Cameroonian producers 
have financial interests in several different areas and the earnings 
from the non-banana operations may be pooled with those of the bananas 
in such a way as to obscure the real accountability of the banana 
plantation. Of the Cameroonian banana planters in Mungo, one has a 
small trucking business, another is a full-time government bureaucrat 
and party secretary for Mungo, a third has a hotel in Yaounde and a 
coffee plantation and factory in Nkongsamba to the north, and Michel 
Foyet, who has twenty hectares, is also head of IRA’s agricultural 
research station at Nyombe.
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It is impossible for an outsider to know the real profitability
of any of the private holdings, large or small. What is true, is that
for two operations which are less than one hundred hectares, the IRA
demonstration acreage (forty hectares) at Nyombe and la Compagnie des
Bananes’ sixty hectares at Penja, the latter is admittedly
9 (\
unprofitable in today’s market and the former, IRA, is in a 
position to benefit from the Cameroon government’s research budget as 
well as aid from its former parent and founder, IRAF in Paris. That 
being the case, it is very likely that the bananas on similarly-sized 
Cameroonian holdings do not earn their expenses, let alone find the 
finance for an investment like irrigation. For many of the 
smallholders, in fact, one of their first steps in developing from 
marginal smallholders to more professional producers has been to 
borrow money from their sales agent to set up their own packing 
stations, thereby avoiding dependence on the inferior government 
packing stations at the railway. As these debts have often not yet 
been cleared, and are considerably lower than the cost of irrigation 
would be, it is likely that Cameroonian failure to invest on such a 
scale is based on hard economic fact.
Packing Stations and Shipping
It has always been true that field production was only partially 
reponsible for the quality of the fruit that reached the retail 
market. The balance lay firmly with the handling and shipping. Today 
these factors are just as important —  if not more so —  than they 
ever were at the beginning of the trade. And, as has been true of 
other factors, Cameroon’s standard of achievement is considerably 
lower than it should be for their exports to be competitive in the 
1980s.
The responsibility for this state of affairs and for the failure 
of the industry generally to modernise its handling and shipping is 
widely dispersed. The Mungo planters are in control of events only 
until the fruit has been boxed and is ready to be loaded onto the 
train going to the docks at Bonaberi. The CDC fruit stays under 
plantation management a while longer, being sent down by lorry from 
Ekona to Bonaberi because there is no train that runs into Bonaberi 
from that area of Anglophone Cameroon. Either way, it is up to the 
planters to see that the fruit is out, graded, disinfected and packed
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with the greatest efficiency and the least amount of bruising to the 
fruit. As a planter's responsibility, the packing stations show 
considerable variation in design and quality and supervision. Some of 
this variation is a reflection of the amount of capital available for 
investment in a packing shed. The balance is more accurately a 
managerial problem and, therefore, one notices that the standard 
achieved depends heavily first on the individual supervisor in charge 
and secondly on the style of the management of each plantation.
The accompanying photographs in Figure 13 provide a rough idea of 
the many small ways in which the work of the packing station can vary 
from one planter to another. Only two stations are shown here: 1) the 
OCB station at Manjo and 2) Maurius Talla's packing station near Loum 
Chantier. Both the private French plantations and the CDC plantations 
will have slightly different arrangements again, but the two 
represented here provide a very important comparison between what the 
smallholder can afford to achieve, as represented by M. Talla's 
operation, and what even a badly-managed industrial plantation like 
the OCB aims to accomplish in its arrangements.
There are a number of similarities in the two stations. Both 
hang the fruit by the stem so the hands can be cut off and graded.
Both also have a series of three separate tanks for sorting the fruit, 
washing it and finally disinfecting it. In addition, both have drying 
tables at the end of the tanks: round swivelling tables at the OCB 
packing station and rectangular fixed tables at Talla's station.
What is clearly different about the two stations is the scale of 
the operation. Talla's station has only one set of tanks and tables 
which are about half the size of the tanks used by the OCB where four 
or five rows of tanks can be operated simultaneously. It should also 
be noted that Talla's station has no running water. Instead, the 
water is collected from the roof and run into the tanks along the 
gutters shown on the left of the photograph. Finally, something which 
is not visible, is the level of supervision of the work. Partly 
because of size, and partly because of IRA influence, the OCB station 
has several prople specifically charged with overseeing the quality of 
the work; at Talla's station no one seemed to be fulfilling this 
role.
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Figure 13. PACKING STATIONS OF AN OCB PLANTATION AND A MUNGO 
SMALLHOLDER, 1982
OCB packing station
Smallholders packing station
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What the photographs do not show Is that neither station meets 
the standards of packing equipment and supervision of work which are 
normally achieved in the other franc-zone countries. While, for 
example, the OCB station has provision for running water into the 
tanks, there is no equipment for circulating the water in the tanks, 
either to keep the water clean or, in the case of the disinfectant 
tank, to make sure that the chemical disinfectant is well mixed and 
not sinking to the bottom where it cannot affect the bananas floating 
on the surface. Nor is there any provision for cooling the fruit once 
it is packed in containers. This means that any delay in the shipping 
schedule exposes the packed bananas to high heat which encourages 
ripening and thereby reduces the freshness of the fruit on its arrival 
in Europe.
One could go on criticising the standards of the two packing 
stations and the work which is done there. The actual packing, 
however, is only part of the problem of the evacuation of Cameroon 
bananas in 1982. It should also be mentioned, although there is not 
enough space to elaborate here, that the train running from Nkongsmaba 
to the port at Bonaberi can no longer maintain the kind of schedule 
that the evacuation of bananas requires. Despite a concerted effort 
in many other areas of the country to both upgrade and introduce rail 
transport, the Nkongsamba to Bonaberi line has not been substantially 
improved or even properly maintained since the 1950s. The subsequent 
deterioration in service —  both in terms of scheduling and in the 
quality of goods wagons used to transport the fruit —  has been one of 
the most significant causes for the decline in the quality of Cameroon 
fruit from Mungo. Here it should be noted that the generally higher 
quality of fruit from the CDC Ekona plantations in Anglophone Cameroon 
Is widely attributed to the fact that the CDC trucks its own fruit 
down to the port and does not have to depend on anything so unreliable 
as the Nkongsamba to Bonaberi train.
Similarly, the ships, which during the 1950s were either supplied 
regularly by Elders and Fyffes in the British Cameroons or by 
Chargeurs RSunis in the French Cameroons, are no longer arriving 
regularly, or departing directly to Europe, or even sailing with the 
proper refrigeration units to transport bananas. Instead, the trade 
is depending on the uncertain commissioning of ships which are hired 
one at a time to transport bananas to France after, in some cases, 
arriving in West Africa to deliver fish.
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There is, in fact, no better illustration of the need for 
disciplined, vertically integrated management in the banana trade. 
Briefly, the chain of events that led to a decline in shipping began 
with the widespread failure of planters to contain Sigatoka disease by 
regular treatment. This decline in production and in the health of 
the plantations was so serious that the OCB management decided to 
uproot a large proportion of their estates and replant. The temporary 
loss of production that this represented meant that the planters in 
Cameroon were no longer producing enough fruit to fill a ship that 
could then afford to sail directly to France. The previously 
predictable shippers for the Cameroon trade discontinued carrying 
bananas on a regular basis and in the meantime planters have been 
forced to depend on the much inferior service of ships unsuited to the 
banana trade. The loss of income to the planters that this represents 
—  particularly if it is to be a state of affairs which continues for 
very long —  is enough to destroy completely the viability of the 
trade.
What is striking about all the "technical” failures of the 
Cameroon banana trade in 1982 is that they do not seem to be due to a 
lack of understanding about the technical requirements of the trade. 
Instead, the failure seems to be caused by the absence of a coherent, 
unified management which is able to coordinate the many pieces of the 
central chain in such a way that the different producers and 
participants can each operate at their most efficient level. Exactly 
how that management has failed is discussed in the following section.
Managerial Structure of 1982
Tlie management of Cameroon's banana business in 1982 is the 
direct descendant of the managerial structure of the Mungo trade in 
the 1950s. Despite the continued participation of the Cameroons 
Development Corporation as a producer, none of the triangular balances 
that had existed between the CDC, the Bakweri Cooperative Union of 
Farmers, and Elders and Fyffes survived reunification. Instead, the 
CDC plantations have been grafted on to the Mungo business as a 
slightly anomalous, but mostly successful, outsider. Their status in 
Mungo does not have the same force within the 1982 Cameroon banana 
trade that it did during the 1950s industry in the British Cameroons; 
although they remain the dominant economic force in the Southwest
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Province of Anglophone Cameroon, very little of that prestige 
influences their position in the Mungo-based banana trade. Moreover, 
since the mid-1960s and the pull-out of Elders and Fyffes from 
Cameroon, the trade has been almost exclusively with the French 
market, a fact which further strengthens the dominance of the 
Francophone management of the trade, and the weakening of Anglophone 
elements.
There have, however, been several critical mutations in the 
Francophone management since the 1950s, as well as some rather 
unfortunate continuities with the earlier managerial structures. One 
of the most obvious continuities of affairs is the continued pluralism 
of participation, as shown in Figure 14, "Managerial Structure of the 
Cameroon Banana Trade, May 1982". Although the greater number of 
cooperatives and expatriate planters is gone, there are still more 
than a dozen planters functioning with a fair amount of independence 
from each other and representing three very different styles of 
ownership and management: parastatal, French and Cameroonian.
Moreover, since the destruction of the Syndicat's airplanes 
during the civil war, there have been three separate operations formed 
for the purpose of providing aerial treatment: Ardit, Agrair and most
recently a three-plane service set up by the OCB with some new 
government subsidy funds. A similar multiplication has taken place 
among the sales agents. Where it used to be in the 1960s that la
Compagnie des Bananes handled ninety percent of all sales including
most of the expatriate planters' production —  and all of that coming 
from the CDC and OCB —  there are now five separate companies 
operating. There has been a comparable, although in principal more 
temporary, multiplication of the number of shipping companies ever 
since the trade has been obliged to take whatever shipping is 
available. Thus, ironically, just when the number of producers and 
volume of production is at one of its lowest points since the Second
World War, there are more auxiliary, service organisations than have
ever before attended the banana trade of Cameroon. There is a logical 
inefficiency in these arrangements which have grown up haphazardly 
over the past few years and which, one fears, are not easily 
corrected.
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Figure 14. MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE OF THE CAMEROON BANANA TRADE, MAY 1982
Ministere de I'Economie 
et du Plan
Plantation 
Research 
at Nyombe
IRA
OCB:
3 planes
ARDIT: 
1 plane
OCB administers 1982 
Government subsidy 
to planters
AGRAIR:|___
1 plane
IRA provides managerial 
staff to OCB plantations
OCB: CDC,
Mungo & Tiko Ekona
800ha 1300ha
IRA
Nyombd
40ha
Part owner 
of Agrair & 
Nassif
Agrichim: Agrisol:
Part owner 
of Nassif
I _ J
PARASTATAL PLANTATIONS’ J
Fidele Tiani 75 ha
SPNP
NyombS
Fruiti6re
Penja
Nassif La Compagne des Bananes 60ha
Michel Essom Njaleu 40ha
Various Cameroonian small 
holders, less than 25ha each
OCB: cutting 
estimates &
^ instructions J
X
■ PRIVATE PLANTATIONS
I
Packing stations. Largley owned and operated by plantation 
management; washing, selecting and,boxing
I
Government 
packing stations 
by railroad
CDC lorries
to port at
8onaberi
Plantation lorries take 
fruit to stations on 
Nkongsamba railway 
to Bonaberi
I
Government railway 
to Bonaberi
La Compagnie des Bananes 
by lorry to Douata airport 
to be flown to France
ITT
OCB: Hires shipping 
as needed
Various shipping companies
 L _
• OCB: Assigns quotas 
! to sales agents I
Nature of Relationship
Corporate — — -
Source of funding 
Functional ----
Sales
agents
in
France
J
Compagne Omer
desBananes Oecugis Fruitier* Agrisol Stim Muriban
40% 10% 35% 10% 5% 5 %
1
1___ .A
187
During the 1950s, several arrangements in Mungo served as a 
counterweight to the pluralistic nature of affairs. There was, 
however inefficiently organised, the Syndicat de Defense des IntSrets 
Bananiers. The regular meetings of the Syndicat and its defined 
objective of serving the interests of the whole industry provided a 
forum for the discussion of problems and an important lobby that 
formally represented the trade to outside interests. Beyond that, 
there was what appears to have been a fairly effective informal 
network of arrangements- This functioned largely on the basis of 
overlapping French commercial interests and a small rather in-grown 
social structure among Europeans that provided easy informal contact 
between different segments of the chain of activities from field to 
final sale. Finally, there were the efforts of la Compagnie des 
Bananes who, like Elders and Fyffes in British Cameroons, managed to 
coordinate the routine efficiencies of shipping estimates and cutting 
schedules to the satisfaction of most all of the planters.
None of these arrangements has survived into the present. The 
Syndicat never fully recovered from the Mungo smallholders’ strike of 
1959 (as discussed in Chapter 5) and, although many attempts were made 
to substitute various other organisations more suitable to the post­
independence and post-strike climate, nothing was ever created that 
had as much stability or authority as the Syndicat. The informal 
network of French interests lasted much longer, and even survived the 
creation of the OCB whose terms of reference have always been broad 
enough to include the management of the whole trade. During the early 
years of the OCB it seems to have been informally understood that so 
long as the trade was able to make money, the OCB would worry more 
about its own plantations than about the coordination of the whole 
chain of activities. That tacit understanding became more difficult 
to maintain as the banana industry became less profitable and recently 
it has completely broken down. The OCB had a new director appointed 
in 1982 who has been more determined than the last administrator that 
the OCB should take on all of its mandated responsibilities. As one 
planter expressed it, the previous director knew everything about the 
business but did nothing, while the present director knows nothing, 
but is willing to take on everything. Unfortunately, his activities 
have not earned him much praise from any of the planters.
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The position of la Compagnie des Bananes has not been maintained 
either. While the OCB has abrogated some of the functions which had 
fallen to the company, they were much more seriously affected by the 
arrival of Fruitiere, who not only managed to take a third of their 
business as sales agents, but also acquired the management of the 
Nassif plantation which had been under the administration of la 
Compagnie des Bananes since the 1930s when the land was first 
converted from a timber clearing to a plantation. The loss of Nassif, 
one of the largest plantations in Mungo, combined with the loss of 
their command of Cameroon banana sales in France, not only demoralised 
the company staff in Cameroon, but also reduced the company’s prestige 
from that of a company that had always been a leading figure in the 
trade to a group with historical importance only. Although they carry 
a certain diplomatic weight in the trade and are widely respected, 
they are no longer in a pivotal structural position and have thereby 
lost much of their force. In the process, much of the coherence they 
brought to the business has also been lost.
By law, the gap left by the decline in these arrangements should 
now be filled by the OCB. One of the earliest decrees written in late 
1964 to set up the OCB, stipulated in its first articles, albeit 
rather vaguely, that the organisation was to represent, coordinate and 
defend the professional interests of the banana industry.^ Much of 
the balance of its definition at that time, however, was taken up with 
particular problems of the period: e.g. the search for new markets
after the loss of access to Great Britain for West Cameroonian fruit, 
and the conversion to Poyo, here referred to rather vaguely as the 
"plan de renovation bananiere". It is also clear in looking at this 
1964 decree that the organisation was originally conceived as a 
planters' group, much in the same way the Syndicat had been during the 
1950s. Article 4 called for a ComitS de Gestion (management 
committee) of eight planters’ representatives and 5 government 
bureaucrats from one service to another. While this did not go so far 
as to include, as did the structure of the 1950s Syndicat, any 
representation of the shipping lines or sales agents, it still 
weighted the balance in favour of the planters and represented a 
variety of important interests through the government services.
Where the 1964 statutory definition of the OCB again departed 
from the Syndicat, however, was in the organisation’s firm links to
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the central government administration and to the President’s office. 
Thus, where the Syndicat's membership consisted of nearly all those 
involved in the trade and the organisation was managed by a sub­
committee of elected representatives who, in turn, hired a full time 
manager, the OCB had no provisions for the total representation of all 
participants in the trade, other than through the Comit§ de Gestion, 
the mechanism of whose appointments was left disappointingly 
v a g u e . ,
Nor was the day-to-day administration of the OCB to be left in 
the hands of the planters or their representatives. Instead, the 
organisation was, and is, administered by an administrative director 
assisted by a technical director, both of whom are presidential
n q
appointees. This close tie to the government was further
reinforced by the presence on the ComitS de Gestion of "un Commissaire
du Gouveminent" who, acting with the approval of the Ministry of the
National Economy which had to confirm his actions, could veto any
measure proposed by the Comite de Gestion. Finally, the OCB was
to be funded by a combination of a tax on banana exports and
government subsidies and grants, with some income to be generated
3 1rather vaguely from "la remuneration de services rendus". In many 
ways, this financing of the OCB largely through government money has 
only weakened the organisation and with it the trade. As one
0 9
informant put it, "the banana has no time for politics", and yet 
clearly under this arrangement many ordinary operational decisions 
could become politicised or at least subject to expensive bureaucratic 
delays. It also, together with the changes in the composition of the 
administrtive committee, removed the organisation further from the 
planters’ control, and in so doing seems to have made the organisation 
less responsive to the needs of the trade than it is to the 
requirements of bureaucratic survival.
In spite of these problems, the OCB was clearly in a position to 
fill the need for an organisation which could survey the needs of the 
whole trade, represent those needs to the government, and organise the 
solution of those problems which exceeded the capacity of any 
individual participant in the industry. This view of their role was 
further strengthened with a 1968 law under which the OCB was 
specifically charged with the modernisation and conversion of the 
banana culture, as well as with the campaign against disease and
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finally with the "organisation des circuit commerciaux et de la 
profession bananiere". This trend was well exemplified by an 
Arrete dated May 13, 1975 by which the OCB was given the authority to 
assign quotas to sales agents involved in the commercialisation of 
Cameroonian bananas. ^
Notwithstanding the clear legal basis for the OCB’s role, they 
are widely acknowledged to have failed at nearly all the tasks 
assigned to them by law and position. This is, no doubt, in large 
part due to the difficulty any state organisation has when confronted 
with time-constrained commercial tasks. Nor can it be ignored that 
none of the administrative directors of the OCB had had previous 
experience in the banana export trade, although some of them have been 
clearly very able at picking up a basic knowledge and understanding of 
the trade. But it should also be remembered that the OCB was only 
created four to five years after the smallholders1 strike in 1959 and 
the first great difficulties of both the Mungo and Anglophone banana 
trades. In the interim between 1959 and 1964, many attempts were made 
to reorganise the banana trade from within, none of which was 
successful. It was this fact, as much as any other, which forced the 
direct participation of the government and the close bureaucratic 
control evidenced in the 1964 decree and it should not be overlooked 
In any criticism of the OCB, legion though their problems may be.
It should also be remembered that when the OCB was finally set 
up, they were not in a position which was likely to endear them to the 
planters in Mungo. There is nothing written about the transfer of 
smallholder land to the OCB. But it followed an eight-year attempt 
under stress of a local guerilla war to modernise smallholdings, 
convert them to Poyo varieties and make them competitive in the 1960s. 
As is shown in Chapters 1 and 5_ it is debatable whether this 
modernisation was possible even in the best of times, let alone in a 
period of severe social unrest. But the fact that the attempt was 
made repeatedly raised the hopes of farmers that some solution was 
possible that would allow them to remain as small independent 
producers. This hope was transformed by the second conversion plan of 
the OCB, which was not just a plan for changing over from the Gros 
Michel to Poyo, but involved the more traumatic change from small­
holdings to industrial plantation. One senses that for many people 
the opportunity to give up their land for a promised regular income
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was sufficient inducement to join the second OCB plan. This should not 
imply that those farmers holding land in sites chosen by the IRA 
design team had any particular choice in the matter, but it does mean 
that an otherwise bitter pill was made easier to swallow.
But that does not imply, either, that the plan was soundly 
endorsed by smallholders, and it is not inconceivable that it 
functioned in much the same way that the British enclosure acts did in 
creating an industrial working class from the rural population. 
Certainly, a number of smallholders became workers on the OCB 
plantation and others may have left the area entirely. What is also 
true, however, is that as long as the OCB is unable to meet the rental 
payments, the dissatisfaction of the smallholders grows; thus, during 
fieldwork in 1982 there were rumours of the desire to take the land 
back from the OCB.
If this problem of land may hold the seeds of any smallholder 
resentment of OCB, it is no less true that the organisation has not 
been greeted with open arms by the European planters. The trade, with 
all of its problems and in spite of heavy pressure from Cameroonian 
planters, has continued to rest largely in European hands. Thus, the 
OCB is inevitably a threat to European control. In this respect, it 
is of interest that one of the European planters characterised the 
OCB's actions as having "d&responsabilises" the planters, which in 
turn enervated the planters to the point where they are now 
disinterested in looking after some of the critical points in their 
own affairs.
The OCB's acquisition of reponsibilities is, however, not nearly 
so deeply resented as is their inability to carry out their acquired 
tasks with any efficacy. It is widely admitted among the planters 
that there is a need for some organising body to keep the many 
different tasks and timings of the banana industry well-coordinated. 
Nor is there much criticism that a state body like the OCB should be 
the one to accomplish that coordination. What is resented, and 
resented universally by European, CDC and Cameroonian planters alike, 
is the failure of the OCB to manage the industry wisely and 
efficiently.
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In this respect, no action of the OCB's has been so carefully 
watched as their handling of a 1982 government subsidy for the 
industry. As was pointed out in one interview, the subsidy is 
designed to support the planters while they recover from a fall in 
production due to the untimely mismanagement of Sigatoka disease 
control. It is a large sum of money, and to the planters who have
been running up debts for the past two years it is extremely important
if they are to survive at all. There was, therefore, much praise for 
the OCB's decision to buy large stocks of fertiliser and pesticides to
be placed at the disposal of the planters who no longer had the
operating capital to buy such supplies for themselves. On the other 
hand, the fact that the OCB chose to invest in three new aeroplanes, 
when two companies already existed, was considered foolish and 
wasteful. So was a rather expensive refurbishing of the offices in 
Douala and the acquisition of a new fleet of Suzuki jeeps for the OCB 
plantations. The fear among planters is that money which should have 
been directly subsidising private planters' operations is instead 
going into the public image of the OCB itself.
The OCB has also taken over the responsibility for arranging 
shipping, where their performance has been no less bleak. La 
Compagnie des Bananes, in fear of losing all their limited production 
on slow ships, slow trains and the general inefficiency of fruit 
evacuation, decided to start flying fruit out of the country, which is 
more expensive than shipping and only highlights how much the 
mismanagement of the transport has affected the profitabiity of the 
trade. For example, on one occasion, the OCB had notified planters of 
the arrival of two ships, had said nothing while the cutting was done, 
and only when it was finished did they announce that the ships were no 
longer due to arrive. Only when the planters complained were new 
ships brought in, but the delay in their arrival meant that nearly the 
entire shipment was too ripe to be sent.
It has been episodes like that which give planters today little 
confidence In the OCB, and yet with the decline of all other formal 
and informal managerial structures, there is nothing left but the OCB 
to accomplish the very vital organisation of the trade. It is this 
dilemma combined with all the other weaknesses of the business in 1982 
which most perplexes the industry. Nor is it plain, in a country 
where parastatal operations are more and more powerful and in which
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criticism of the state and government is not regarded lightly but as 
an incipient form of rebellion, how the industry is going to reconcile 
the position of the OCB with the exigencies of the banana trade. It 
is not impossible that more and more planters will simply give up on 
the trade. But there are pressures coming from the delicately 
balanced French market which make abandonment an uncomfortable option. 
Whether the government, having endorsed and supported the OCB, and no 
doubt being under pressure from French diplomats to keep the trade 
alive, will continue to subsidise the banana crop remains to be seen. 
It is not impossible, but it is to be feared that subsidies without a 
reorganisation of the trade will only continue the pattern of wasteful 
inefficiency that has been responsible for many of the industry’s 
failings in the past few years.
It is a tedious but essentially revealing process to look at the 
operational details of a failing export trade. While each inexpert 
and half-completed task can be explained on the grounds of its own 
particular failure, these many individual losses of competence suggest 
in sum a wider lack of confidence in the Cameroon banana business or 
its future. One cannot help but feel that this larger lack of 
confidence is due not just to the changing nature of the banana trade 
worldwide, but also to the particular local history of Mungo and 
Anglophone Cameroon in the post-independence period.
In a sense, however, both of these histories are now over and the 
industry needs to be reexamined on the basis of its fundamental 
advantages and disadvantages in order to postulate the future course 
of events. In the next, and final chapter, "Choices, 1982", we 
discuss some of the prospects for the future from the points of view 
of the government of Cameroon and the United Brands Company. It is 
hoped that in this discussion the many ideas presented in this thesis 
have been summarised and examined, not so much for their abstract 
qualities, but for what they imply for the Cameroon export banana 
trade of the 1980s, and for the local society and region on which that 
trade is based.
- 194 -
CHAPTER 7 
CHOICES, 1982
Development is the process and direction of change over time; 
agricultural development is such a process as judged not only by the 
changing amount of a given commodity which is produced, but also by 
the transformation of the social structure upon which that production 
is based. In this thesis we have seen not an increase in banana 
production from the 1950s to 1982, but a decline in production. 
Moreover, that decline has been accompanied by a narrowing of the 
social base upon which banana production is founded. This has been 
caused in part by the slow elimination of smallholders from the trade, 
and in part by the loss of nearly all production from Anglophone 
Cameroon in the early years after reunification in 1962. These two 
factors have been further compounded by a growing and systemic 
mismanagement of the surviving elements of the business.
The loss of smallholders can largely be explained by the 
transformation in the worldwide nature of the trade. From being an 
easy, "goldrush" crop sold to a very tolerant and undersupplied post­
war market, the banana has become in the 1980s a very industrial crop 
serving a highly competitive and limited market. Simultaneously, the 
elimination of production from Anglophone Cameroon was the economic 
consequence of first the political decision to reunify, and second the 
implementation of that decision in the process of reunification. 
Finally, the mismanagement of the surviving elements of the trade has 
resulted from many of the social contradictions inherent in the 
development of Mungo under French administration and which were most 
violently expressed in the civil war period of 1959-60.
The banana trade of Cameroon has now reached another turning 
point which resembles in many ways the crisis of 1959 and the early 
1960s. It is a time when, if the trade is to continue, many of the 
fundamental questions about agricultural development, the export 
banana trade and the role of a multinational company, need to be
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considered again, and it is the purpose of this chapter to go through 
that analysis*
In doing so, it is useful to compare the crisis of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s with the situation in 1982. In both periods, the 
trade had reached a point at which existing standards of production 
and export were no longer adequate for the demands of the European 
market. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the brunt of this 
incompatibility fell on the smallholders and some of the more 
traumatic features of that period concern the difficulties of the 
smallholders in coming to terms with the economic squeeze that 
confronted them. It was also possible in the early 1960s to define 
the weakness of the trade in terras of its adherence to the Gros Michel 
and the need to convert to the more resistant varieties. For this 
reason, the modernisation of the Mungo banana industry is almost 
always, throughout the 1960s and even now, referred to as the 
"Programme de Reconversion". This faith in the modernising properties 
of the Poyo variety was justified through the mid-1970s by a return to 
profitable business and economic well-being. The failure of the trade 
in 1982, however, is much more systemic and cannot be remedied by any 
straightforward technical manipulation comparable to the conversion 
from Gros Michel to Poyo varieties. Even if field production could be 
brought closer to the French market standard set by Antilles fruit, 
the degradation of the selection, packing and transportation sectors 
is serious enough to counteract many of the improvements that could be 
made, on the agricultural side. In this respect, the crisis of 1982 is 
fundamentally different from that of the 1960s.
The danger of the business collapsing has been widely recognised 
since the middle of 1980 when Michel Essom Njaleu, as president of the 
other otherwise moribund Syndicat, distributed a five-page summary of 
the state of the industry and of the consequences of its failure.'*’ 
Although a number of reports had already^circulated on various aspects 
of the industry, this was the first to speak openly of the destruction 
of the trade and the first to have reached the office of President 
Ahidjo. Within a year, the management of the Organisation 
Camerounaise de la Banane (OCB) had been replaced and substantial 
subsidies from the government were being forwarded to the industry.
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Despite the spectre of the Industry failing, there has been no 
thinking done as of May 1982 on what might follow. This next section, 
therefore, considers some of the choices that are now open. In doing 
so, it has been decided to argue first from the perspective of the 
government of Cameroon with its responsibilities for the wider 
interests of the country, and second from the perspective of la 
Compagnie des Bananes and United Brands as an international business 
which has been involved in the trade since it began. The kinds of 
choices facing the other participants are either discussed In the 
context of these two or, in the case of the private firms and 
individuals, resemble the choices faced by la Compagnie des Bananes. 
What is true of all those currently involved in the banana industry, 
is that until the government makes the fundamental decision on whether 
or not to stay in the export banana trade and how to do so, no other 
participant can clearly see what his options might be.
Cameroon Government
In reviewing the future of the banana trade of Cameroon, the 
government will also be deciding the nature of the development of 
Mungo for the next twenty or thirty years. Most of the banana crop 
comes from Mungo with only a small OCB plantation in the Tiko Plain 
and the CDC estates in Ekona in Anglophone Cameroon. The OCB Tiko 
plantation could easily be absorbed by existing CDC operations while 
the Cameroons Development Corporation would in fact prefer to put the 
Ekona land Into simpler crops such as rubber and oil palm. Thus it is 
the future of the banana trade and the development of Mungo which are 
the key issues here. In considering these two issues, there are 
several questions which arise. One of the first returns to the 
central dilemma of this thesis, namely the conflict between the 
commercial pressures to depend on an international industrial style of 
plantation agriculture and the local social pressures coming from a 
long tradition of diversified smallholder agriculture.
One could argue that in the case of Mungo this question has 
already been resolved through the creation of the OCB plantations.
Yet the memory of the "troubles" in Mungo is still too recent for the 
government to feel confident that smallholder discontent is at an 
end. There is also always the possibility that disagreements could
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again surface if the OCB plantations fail to compensate Mungo land 
holders punctually for the territory now incorporated in the 
plantations. There might also be objections if it is eventually 
decided that Cameroon would be wiser to drop out of the banana trade, 
in which case land holders could presumably ask to have their land 
returned to them. More fundamentally, there are basic questions of 
social values and organisation involved. Since the 1930s, Mungo has 
been a pluralistic immigrant society containing social forms and 
values inherited from several African and European cultures. To the 
extent that industrial plantation agriculture has been practiced in 
Mungo it has been a largely European phenomenon. Given the very good 
and necessary possibility that European management is going to be 
increasingly withdrawn from Cameroon and from the plantations in 
Mungo, is it, therefore, advisable to continue with plantations? Or 
would a more enduring form of development evolve from a pattern of 
smallholdings that might come closer to reflecting Cameroonian habits 
and values?
In many respects, this question poses a false dichotomy. As we
have seen, the history of Mungo in the past fifty years has been the
history of plantations, around which most of the present population
has gathered, either as workers or smallholders or a mixture of both.
The plantations in Mungo are, therefore, a feature of the landscape
which is by now taken for granted. It is argued by some that without
the salaries coming from the plantations, the quality of life and in
particular the quality of food eaten in Mungo would decline. While
the women are still managing "chop farms" to raise local foods for the
family and occasionally for sale, the men are working on the
plantations and using the money to pay for "luxuries" like meat and 
o
eggs atid clothes.
It can be argued, in fact, that the relationship of the 
smallholdings and the plantations in Mungo is as much one of mutual 
dependence as It is of conflict. One could say that the small farms 
subsidise the plantations by providing food that does not, therefore, 
have to be paid out of wages which can then be kept low.* On the
(As of Spring 1982, workers were earning about 15,000 CFA or £30 
per month.)
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other hand, if one considers that the centre of a family’s life is in 
fact the farm, then the plantation earnings enable a family to prolong 
the viability of a marginal holding which by itself cannot support the 
family. Without microeconomic studies at family level in Mungo, it is 
impossible to know what the plantations mean for workers, smallholders 
and their families. It should be remembered, however, that when the 
smallholders went on strike in 1959, they were not initially asking 
for the dismantling of the plantations but for the chance to maintain 
the kind of smallholder economic growth that the banana boom had 
offered. When that became impossible, the OCB plantation alternative 
was accepted with relatively little protest.
The Cameroon government’s Fifth Five Year Plan for the 
Agricultural Sector, published in 1981, places its emphasis on 
"Integrated Rural Development" and seems to be imagining development 
as the process of transforming the economy of pure African 
villages. It does not directly address the problems of those 
regions where both African and European styles of agriculture exist 
side by side, as they do in Mungo. As a result, the Fifth Plan does 
not confront the kinds of dichotomies and interdependencies one finds 
in Mungo and elsewhere. The Plan does, however, open with a summary of 
the results of the last Five Year Plan which chose to emphasize both 
the role of export agriculture and of "agro-industrial complexes".
One of the top four priorities of the Fourth Plan is given on the 
first page of the 1981 report: "Procurer des devises pour 
1’acquisition de biens d ’Equipment et de consommation que le pays ne 
peut produire." This is followed in the next paragraph by a list of 
seven more specifically agricultural objectives, the first of which 
is: "La criation et 1 ’extension des grandes plantations modernes et 
des complexes agro-industriels.
This emphasis of the Fourth Plan on industrial agriculture and by 
implication its ability to produce foreign exchange earnings, is not 
made in the Fifth Plan, but it is also not specifically contradicted. 
More importantly, as of 1982, the Littoral and Southwest Provinces 
were showing signs of the continued expansion of plantation 
agriculture, particularly of oil palm and rubber. There is, 
therefore, in addition to the government’s more recent support for 
"integrated rural development" and the advancement of village
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agriculture, considerable continuing development of industrial 
plantations.
Given, therefore, that such plantations already exist in Mungo, 
it is unlikely that these plantations will be eliminated even if the 
banana industry collapses in the next six months or a year. The 
plantations are an accepted part of the Mungo economy and government 
policy supports the development of industrial agriculture. What one 
does find, particularly around the CDG in Anglophone Cameroon, is a 
recent emphasis on smallholder participation in industrial schemes. 
These are, for the most part, projects based on rubber and oil palm in 
which an existing industrial installation —  for processing rubber or 
producing palm oil —  contracts to receive the raw material grown by 
smallholders on their own farms. Such a scheme is designed to reduce 
the dichotomy between plantations and smallholders, and to integrate 
the two systems. While the same problems of quality standards, 
disease control and soil fertility that affect bananas also affect 
products like oil palm and rubber, the greater differences between 
smallholder production and plantation production of these latter crops 
can be minimised through industrial processing. It is also true that 
the time constraints which affect a fresh fruit like the banana or 
pineapple are not as important with agricultural products awaiting 
processing. This fact reduces the management costs of including 
smallholders and is one of the reasons why one finds a return to 
smallholder/plantation partnership in the oil palm and rubber tree 
crops long after the successful partnership of the two agricultural 
systems has disappeared from the banana industry.
This fact raises the second question: given that the plantations
in Mungo are likely to continue, should they be used to grow bananas 
or be put into other crops? The arguments in favour of continuing 
with bananas are considerable: when well managed and producing
regularly, the banana produces a year-round income and with it regular 
foreign exchange earnings. It can also be brought Into production, 
even with a massive replanting programme which might not even be 
necessary, within a year. There is, in addition, the force of habit. 
Bananas have been an important crop in Mungo for fifty years. This 
means not only that there are several related companies in boxing and 
aerial treatment dependent on the bananas, but that there already
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exists a work force which, although it may not have achieved a high 
level of efficiency, is conversant with the requirements of the crop. 
Nor should it be forgotten that the fruit rejected for sale in Europe 
can still be sold in Cameroon. Although this sector of banana 
plantation production has not been fully exploited, it might well be 
that banana plantations could contribute to food requirements In 
Cameroon. Already the banana is known as "le riz du Mungo".
There is also the fact that Mungo offers some of the best banana 
land in the world. Much of that land could be irrigated and although 
production levels would probably never match the peak production found 
in Ecuador and Central America, they might well approach those 
standards. Nor should it be forgotten that, in the foreseeable 
future, the french market will continue to be protected and offer a 
price for bananas which is higher than the world price on the open 
market. Moreover, since the entry of Britain to the Common Market, 
Cameroon once again can sell fruit in Britain, and in fact did so 
until the quality of bananas from Cameroon became so unacceptable that 
they were refused. Reasonably, therefore, if the quality can be 
improved, Cameroon bananas might well expand their markets beyond the 
limits of the French consumer. To these arguments should be added the 
fact that Cameroon is considerably closer to Europe than either the 
Antilles or Latin America and can therefore expect to pay less than 
its competitors in transportation costs. Labour is also cheaper in 
Cameroon than elsewhere although it is argued by some that the low 
wage levels are responsible for the poor performance of workers on the 
plantations. Nonetheless, taken together, all these factors argue 
that Cameroon could produce competitive fruit at a reasonable price 
and benefit from the trade. It should also be remembered that it is 
more than likely that the Comit& Interprofessional Bananiere in Paris 
would prefer to lobby for the survival of the Cameroon banana trade 
rather than face a long-term invasion of dollar-zone fruit that would 
jeopardise both the Ivory Coast and more especially the Antilles’ 
ability to compete.
There are several inter-related arguments, however, which do not 
support the continuation of the banana crop in Mungo, most of which 
refer, in one way or another, to the quality of fruit now required in 
a highly competitive market. To begin with, it should be realised and 
accepted that at this stage in the development of the banana market
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anything less than highly structured industrialised agriculture with a 
high level of capital investment and managerial expertise will 
probably not be able to meet the requirements of the trade over the 
next ten to fifteen years. This is particularly true If the French 
market loses its protective features and franc-zone producers are 
forced to compete with dollar-zone fruit in a saturated world market. 
However, industrial agriculture means, among many other things, that 
the kind of smallholder participation found in the 1950s banana trade 
is unthinkable now. Not even the more serious developments undertaken 
by those farmers, both Cameroonian and European, who are attempting to 
manage less than one hundred hectares of land are likely to be viable 
in today’s market. Nor is it likely that the kind of partnership 
between plantations and smallholders now being tried with oil palm and 
rubber could succeed in the comparatively Inflexible banana trade. 
Therefore, If one wants to continue with the banana crop, in Cameroon, 
it should be recognised that no form of smallholder participation, 
even at the larger limits, is likely to find a way of surviving in the 
industry. If It does, it will be at a loss, that will either be 
subsidised by the state, by the more viable industrial plantations or 
by the kinds of chicanery now rumoured to be rife in Mungo.
The quality of fruit required by today's banana market in Europe
forces producers to adopt the investments and disciplines of
industrialised agriculture, particularly if Cameroon wants to market 
bananas outside of France. It also means that the management 
structure of the banana trade which has evolved in Cameroon since the 
1930s is no longer adequate for the task at hand. Even now it is 
clear that not only is the OCB incapable of meeting the managerial 
requirements of the trade, but so too are the informal arrangements 
between Europeans which had previously substituted for a strong 
coordinated management. Thus, if the government decides that it wants 
to continue with the export banana crop it must also decide how and by 
whom that crop should be managed. This points up another serious 
disadvantage of the export banana, namely the sheer managerial
complexity of timely production, shipping and sales. Here again, the
single fact which separates the banana from tropical products such as 
coffee, cocoa, palm oil and rubber is the fact that it is a fragile 
fresh fruit being sold several thousands of miles away, which cannot 
be stored for any length of time and is susceptible to very little
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processing. This characteristic of' the banana, which it shares with 
other fresh fruits and vegetables grown for export, is what makes it 
such a difficult and expensive crop to manage.
It is, therefore, a legitimate question to pose at this point 
whether there are in Cameroon the managerial resources to meet the 
requirements of the banana trade. If so, can they be spared for work 
on_ this particular plantation crop or are they better employed 
elsewhere? If not, is Cameroon willing to import the managerial 
expertise needed to make Cameroon* s banana industry competitive in the 
European market until such time as local managers can be trained?
It is of some value to recall again the major issues of the 1959 
strike and the civil war which followed. When the strike began in 
April 1959, it began as a desire among smallholders to retain their 
viability in the banana export trade. As matters developed, however, 
first in the events of the civil war and then in the politics of the 
Syndicat, a corollary desire was created to expel the Europeans from 
their plantations in Mungo and from their positions of authority in 
the banana industry. As has been shown, neither objective was 
entirely met. What is of interest in recalling these events is that 
many people fear today that the collapse of the banana trade in Mungo 
could force a return to the brigandage and guerrilla war which 
bedevilled the area throughout the 1960s. And yet clearly, when the 
industrial demands of the banana trade are looked at closely, they 
might, in an extreme development, force a return to some of the issues 
of the civil war. Smallholders can no longer be expected to 
participate in the trade, and most people In Mungo have long accepted 
that fact. But there is still a very evident resentment and mistrust 
of European influence In the Cameroon banana business. Thus, if there 
is not the managerial capacity in Cameroon to organise a revitalised 
trade, which there does not seem to be, then a frank return to some 
form of expatriate management, if only for the time needed to train 
indigenous personnel, will be inevitable. Given the history of Mungo, 
are these developments which the government is willing to risk? Can 
one trust that enough time has passed since the events of independence 
so that the reorganisation of the banana trade on industrial lines can 
be accomplished? Or can such a reorganisation be achieved in a 
fashion which resolves the "expatriate" issues of the 1960s?
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How those questions are answered greatly depends on what 
management is chosen to handle the remaking of the banana industry of 
Cameroon. Of the possibilities to be found in Cameroon, first 
consideration must be given to the OCB, However, the question must be 
asked whether the OCB in its present form can handle the rebuilding of 
the banana industry of Cameroon. Unfortunately, the record of its 
performance to date would argue that it cannot. No one in the OCB has 
ever received the kind of skilled training that most workers in the 
banana trade possess. The employees are, by and large, bureaucrats 
whose salaries depend on government funding rather than the success or 
failure of their trade. "The banana," said John Ngu of the CDC "has 
no time for politics."^ Yet, the OCB is a political creation which 
makes its decisions as often on political grounds as on any coramerical 
or agricultural criteria. It is unlikely that unless the OCB can 
build up a staff of people from the banana industry and in some 
structural fashion free itself from its dependence on decisions made 
in Yaounde, it will never be able to create a banana trade which is 
commercially sound and self-sustaining. Nonetheless, it is a point of 
pride that a Cameroonian organisation does exist as the official head 
of the Cameroon banana trade. Therefore, in any reconstruction of the 
management of the industry, the OCB would have to have some kind of a 
place.
The agricultural parastatal with the best reputation in Cameroon 
for efficiency and economic stability is the Cameroons Development 
Corporation, the CDC. Although most of the CDCTs production Is in 
rubber and oil palms, they have 800 hectares In bananas which are 
considered to be among the most productive in the entire banana trade. 
The CDC's success in bananas, which is still below market requirements 
although higher than other producers in Cameroon, is largely 
attributed to their management. Moreover, in the years following the 
war, the CDC had most of its cultivated acreage in bananas and has had 
considerable experience of the trade. It is not unreasonable, 
therefore, to consider the CDC as a possible management team for a 
rebuilt Cameroon banana trade.
It is unlikely, however, that the CDC would consent to take on 
the job. In the mid-1950s, the Cameroons Development Corporation made 
a very conscious decision to stop producing bananas. This was partly
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due to the problems of Panama disease, but also because of the high 
cost of running banana plantations efficiently, mostly in managerial 
terms, but also in terms of routine operating expenses. Since then, 
the CDC has stayed In the trade only at the request of the government 
and has shown every willingness to get out. Moreover, within the past 
few years, the CDC has taken on heavy committments to expand existing 
acreage in rubber and palm oil. With these new commitments, and the 
debts they have raised, it is unlikely that the CDC will have the 
resources of personnel and finance which would be required in any 
revived banana trade.
A third group in Cameroon which might consider taking on the 
trade, but which would be Ill-advised to do so, is the Institut de 
Recherches Agronomiques. They have so far provided the management 
for the OCB plantations, but again, given the bad record of OCB 
plantation production, one would hesitate to expand the 
responsibilities of the IRA personnel. More importantly, they are by 
definition an agricultural research organisation and have never had 
professional management experience in putting together not just the 
agricultural pieces, but also the full coordination of events from 
field to final sale.
In May 1982, Alain Moreau, manager of the SPNP plantations, said 
that the multinational banana companies were waiting "like cats at a 
mouse hole" to see what happened to the Cameroon banana trade.
While there is an element of exaggeration in his statement, there is 
also a certain amount of sense. Certainly, compared with the muddled 
and diffused management of the trade over the past ten to twenty 
years, the idea of a single professional management team is not 
unwelcome. Moreover, the commercial and agricultural advantages of 
Cameroon are easy to add up and account for the fact that even as the 
banana industry is dying, there are still companies who have been 
willing to invest in the business: Agrichim, Agrisol, Fruitiere, S U M
and la Compagne des Bananes, among others. Significantly, however, 
most of the investment has come from companies which are principally 
sales agents. Apart from the United Brands Company, which has 
historical reasons for being in Cameroon, none of the major 
multinational banana companies (Standard Fruit, Geest or Del Monte) 
has shown any interest at all in Cameroon. The major advantage of
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these companies is their experience in every aspect of the whole chain 
of activities from field production to final sale. In contrast, the 
sales agents who have invested in Cameroon make most of their profits 
from commissions alone. They may be conversant with matters of 
production or transport, but will not have had to manage these affairs 
themselves.
If, therefore, Cameroon finds that it needs to turn to the 
private sector for help in resuscitating the banana trade, it will 
have to decide what they expect the private sector to handle. Would 
sales in Europe and the commissions from them still be apportioned 
among five or six agents as‘they are now? Would the chain of 
responsibilities from field to final sale continue to be divided up 
among several managers and owners both private and parastatal as has 
been the case since independence? Or should a single company be given 
responsibility to manage most of the chain of activities between the 
Cameroonian fields and dockside sale in Europe?
The history of the banana trade in Cameroon, particularly French- 
speaking Cameroon, has been one in which responsibilities have been 
divided and diffused. It is the pattern which, if followed, could 
conceivably be the least disruptive to existing interests. Yet it is 
a managerial pattern which has conspicuously failed in recent years. 
Arguably, a more efficient and productive banana industry would be 
achieved under a single, unified management which could only be 
provided by those companies which have that kind of experience: i.e.
the major multinationals involved in the production, export and sale 
of tropical fruit.
It is not at all clear, however, that the situation in Cameroon
can be made attractive to any of these larger companies. Land
ownership by expatriates is becoming increasingly problematic,
although Thomas Ekaney, Director of Lands, states that there is
7
nothing in the law to prevent It. Would any company be Interested 
If it did not own land? There is also considerable pressure on 
companies not just to employ Cameroonians, but also to employ
Q
Cameroonians in correct ethnic proportions. While there are good 
political reasons, based on the extremely complex ethnic balances of 
Cameroon, behind such a rule, it is one which makes ordinary
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administration considerably more complicated. Qualified people are 
already hard to find; qualified people of the required ethnicity are 
even more difficult to find and hire. There is also the fact that any 
large multinational company coming into the banana trade of Cameroon 
would be faced not just with the task of building up an industry, but 
with the more delicate assignment of building it up out of an existing 
set of interests and commitments. How those are negotiated under any 
new management could make considerable difference to the profitability 
and efficiency of the new administration. There is also the question 
whether any of these larger companies have access or can get access to 
the French market. If they do not and would be looking to Cameroon to 
negotiate that entry, would the Comit& Interprofessionel Bananiere in 
Paris be willing to let a new group into an equation which is at best 
only delicately balanced?
These questions do not make the options open to Cameroon any 
easier to judge. Most fundamentally, the government must decide 
whether or not to continue in the trade. If they do continue, which 
is not necessarily the best choice, then they must decide how they can 
go on, and under what kind of management and ownership they think they 
can succeed.
United Brands and la Compagnie des Bananes
Throughout the politics of independence in Mungo and the somewhat 
haphazard reorganisation of the industry in the early 1960s, la 
Compagnie des Bananes never figured as anything more than one of the 
leading figures of the European community. In that capacity, they did 
as much as any of the other Europeans to defend the interests of the 
European plantations of Mungo. From the time of the strike in 1959 
(and as they had been before) they were routinely a part of every 
major meeting, negotiation, and delegation to Yaounde. When the "rump 
caucus" of European planters in the Syndicat petitioned the central 
government in Yaounde for a military presence in Mungo, Mr. Denis 
Brown, president of la Compagnie des Bananes in Cameroon, was one of 
the men who took the petition to Yaoundl and saw the government
o
ministers involved. What the company conspicuously did not do, was 
to behave in the more conspiratorial style adopted by the United Fruit 
Company in Guatemala in 1954 and in Honduras by Samuel Zemmuray in
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1905.-^ There was, in fact, no need to do so. The central 
government was as eager as the European planters to suppress the 
guerrilla activity in Mungo and behaved, at times brutally, in that 
interest.
The fact that the company lined up firmly with the European 
interests in Mungo during the civil war is not surprising. The 
continuation of the strike forced a polarisation of the African 
cooperatives and European planters which the Syndicat had previously 
managed to avoid. In that polarisation, it was inevitable on social 
grounds alone that the company would have cast its lot with the other 
Europeans. Even today, looking at the relations of Africans and 
Europeans in Mungo, it is clear that outside the issues of the trade, 
the two groups have little in common. As one African planter put it:
"La profession n Ta jamais associee avec les originaux de la
1 1region." However, it was also evident, even in 1959, that the 
economic viability of the smallholder in the export banana trade was 
extremely limited and that any future achievements in the trade would 
be based on plantation production rather than the small farm. This 
must also have affected the company’s judgement on where to throw its 
support during the civil war.
In the twenty years since "The Troubles", the company in Cameroon
has followed a policy of more or less Increasing passivity, which has 
resulted in a significant reduction of its authority and position. For 
much of that time, there seemed to be little reason to take an 
aggressive posture. Until 1975, the company maintained its ninety 
percent share of all sales from Cameroon. Its only competition came 
from Omer Decugis which handled many of the African planters but very 
little of the total volume of fruit and never came close to being a 
serious threat to la Compagnie des Bananes’ commercial dominance of 
the trade. A more insidious challenge was growing In the ever- 
expanding definition of the professional responsibilities of the 
Organisation Camerounaise de la Banane. By the early 1970s, the OCB 
was given statutory authority to take over many of the tasks of 
arranging the evacuation of fruit from Cameroon that had previously 
been handled by the company. Even this, however, could be 
conveniently ignored during the tenure of the previous director of the 
OCB, M. Bitjong. By all accounts, he understood the trade, but was
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content to leave the routine management of it in the hands of the 
company and other Europeans who, therefore, continued to control 
informally the aerial treatment, shipping and sales of Cameroon 
bananas. More Importantly, any attempt by the company to criticize 
the growth of the OCB as the professional manager of the banana trade 
would have put the company in the position of opposing the wishes of a 
central government not known for its tolerance of opposition. Rather 
than risk expulsion from the country, it was certainly more convenient 
to try to work with the OCB than to object to it, even when the OCB 
has not been capable of meeting the responsibilities It had taken on.
A more aggressive policy on the part of the company might have 
prevented the commercial- competition which developed when la Compagnie 
Fruitiere entered Cameroon in 1975. In many ways, It was the 
increasingly passive attitude of la Compagnie des Bananes after 
Independence that meant the planters welcomed the arrival of Fruitiere 
as a form of pressure for improving the services provided by la 
Compagnie des Bananes. John Ngu, at present the general manager of 
the Cameroons Development Corporation, and a member of the board of 
OCB, was one of those who supported the attribution of a fixed' quota 
of Cameroon banana sales to la Compagnie Fruitiere, on just these 
grounds. Arguably, therefore, a more dynamic leadership from la 
Compagnie des Bananes might have helped the company maintain its near 
monopoly of Cameroon banana sales. But it is also undoubtedly true 
that after forty years of dominance by one company, the idea of change 
was not unwelcome. There are, in addition, widespread rumours that 
Fruitiere was allowed to "buy" its quota of the market, which, if 
true, would tend to blunt the effect of any defence put up by la 
Compagnie des Bananes.
Taken together, this progession of events since independence 
has resulted in a steady erosion of the company’s responsibilities in 
Cameroon. Given that this loss of the company’s authority has 
coincided with a general weakening of the trade and with it the 
company's overall profits, it is reasonable to ask why the company 
bothers to stay in Cameroon. It is increasingly powerless to improve 
the situation and the routine costs of staying where no profit is 
being made must be an expense which the company can less and less 
afford. Surely there will come a point when it is wiser to pull out
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of the trade than to continue to invest In an industry which is slowly 
rotting away.
In considering whether the company would be advised to pull out 
of Cameroon, one is forced to consider again the peculiar structure of 
the entire French banana trade. Here the single most Important 
question is whether the French banana market can or will continue to 
operate as a protected market for franc-zone fruit. This question is 
of particular interest to la Compagnie des Bananes because of its 
access to dollar-zone fruit through its parent company, United Brands 
of New York. In recent years, the company’s most profitable periods 
in France resulted from the shortfall of franc-zone bananas due to the 
hurricanes in the Antilles In 1978-79. At this time, the company 
was able to bring in the cheaper dollar-zone fruit, sell it at the 
high French prices set by the ComitS Interprofessionel Bananiere and 
show higher than average profits. Paradoxically, therefore, the 
complete collapse of Cameroon production and the compensating entry of 
dollar-zone bananas could have the effect of raising company 
earnings.
It would be a misinterpretation of affairs, however, to judge the 
company's choices according to such a simple scenario. Among other 
factors, it is important to remember that within the structure of the 
French banana market, the company is not really able to act alone.
Like the other participants in the French banana market, the company 
is subject to the decisions of the ComitS Interprofessionel Bananiere 
(CIB) which attempts to regulate and arbitrate the competing interests 
of the business. In that process, one of the principal assumptions of 
the CIB is the necessity of protecting the French market from any non- 
franc-zone produce. This policy has been in effect since the 1930s, 
was reinforced by the quota system established in the early 1960s, and 
further strengthened by the Lome Conventions of the EEC. Despite 
increasing pressure within the European Community to revise the Common 
Agricultural Policy and with it the Lom€ accords there is still 
considerable doubt whether such pressure will open the French banana 
market to foreign fruit. Even with the threatened collapse of the 
Cameroon trade, it is not at all clear that the CIB will reformulate 
this key, protective policy. What is, more likely is that the Comittl 
will devise new protective mechanisms, or allow the short-term
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admission of foreign fruit, on the assumption that after a short 
transition the franc zone can again fulfil the requirements of the 
entire French market in bananas.
That being the case, the position of la Compagnie des Bananes is 
considerably more difficult. The company first went to Cameroon when, 
in the 1930s, the United Fruit Company's produce from Latin America 
was excluded from France along with all other non-franc bananas.
Since then, la Compagnie des Bananes has always been dependent on 
Cameroon, and even today much of its business is with Cameroonian 
bananas. In the early 1970s, some diversification of the company's 
earnings took place. That effort, however, has not been sustained - 
in part, according to Rene Gacon, president of la Compagnie des 
Bananes from 1969 to 1975, due to a lack of investment available from 
the New York office.^ With only limited diversification in the
1970s, the French company in 1982 still depends on bananas for much of 
Its earnings, and of those bananas a high percentage come from 
Cameroon. Thus, unless the company is allowed to import fruit from 
the dollar zone, which the CIB will probably be unwilling to permit in 
any great quantity or for any long period of time, la Compagnie des 
Bananes must keep open the possibility of developing competitive fruit 
from Cameroon. As long, therefore, as the need for that option 
exists, the company is ill-advised to withdraw.
What is less certain is whether the United Brands Company through 
la Compagnie des Bananes or even Fyffes Group in London would be 
willing take on the managerial task of rebuilding the banana industry 
of Cameroon. It is the only large multinational in the banana trade 
with experience in Cameroon. If the government of Cameroon decided to 
keep the banana export crop and decided it would be best served by the 
management skills of an agricultural multinational, neither of which 
is certain, United Brands would be a logical company to approach for 
discussion. What is less clear, is whether the company would decide 
to accept the assignment and work out the terms of an agreement.
There are, as has already been discussed, the uncertainties about 
whether France will or will not remain a protected market and will or 
will not begin admitting dollar-zone bananas on a regular basis. More 
than that, however, there exists a strong prejudice within the New 
York office against involvement in Africa, a prejudice which,
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unfortunately, the company's experience in Cameroon has done little to 
dispel. In part, this is only the reaction of a company whose 
experience has been either in the Americas or in the Spanish-speaking 
Philippines. Africa, and the African style of business, is something 
alien to the company's experience and instincts.- Partly because of 
this strangeness, the company carries with it a fear that business in 
Africa is unpredictable and uncontrollable. In this sense, the fact 
that Elders and Fyffes was forced to pull out of Anglophone Cameroon 
after reunification only confirms the worry that doing business in 
Africa is too unpredictable to be trusted. More recently, the failure 
of the OCB in particular to make good use of specialised personnel 
seconded from United Brands and its affiliates to Cameroon, has left a 
suspicion in company minds that nothing can be done in Cameroon and 
that the company is only wasting its time and money in trying to 
assist the trade. Moreover, since these people were not effectively 
employed, and did not leave Cameroon with any sense of accomplishment 
or optimism, it is more than likely that the reports they took back to 
their head offices were such as only to affirm the fear that affairs 
in Cameroon could not be trusted. With such a history behind them, 
therefore, on what grounds could a company like United Brands be 
prepared to invest more heavily in Cameroon when their more modest 
contributions had already been ignored? Would the company not be 
wiser to try to expand investments in the Antilles, which are closer 
to their own interests and culture, than to gamble heavily in 
Cameroon?
The company cannot make any decision until the Cameroon 
government has made its own choices. However, the fact of the matter 
is that after years of assuming that the banana trade was in good 
health or about to improve, the government did not seem prepared in 
May 1982 to face the choices that must be made once the industry has 
collapsed. What they will decide once these issues have been 
confronted is impossible to say. It is equally difficult to predict 
how the company will react to the government's position. Neither the 
company or the government, however, is likely to find any obvious 
solutions to what has always been a fairly Intricate equation.
It is almost impossible to generalise very broadly from a single 
case study. One needs comparable studies examining similar questions
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in considerable detail before any pattern can possibly begin to 
emerge. A few observations, however, can be made. We began this 
thesis with an interest in the role of a multinational company in 
agricultural development and conclude by postulating that that role is 
defined by two kinds of pressures. On the one hand, the company, as 
the agent of an international export trade, is forced to respond to 
all the commercial and competitive pressures of that international 
business. On the other hand, as a resident and essentially subject 
corporation working In the Cameroonian context, the company is also 
forced to operate within the many pressures arising from Cameroon1s 
government, society and environment. In this situation, the 
multinational company can become the medium for translating and 
adjusting the conflicts between local and international imperatives. 
Moreover, it is possible to conclude that to the extent that an 
agricultural export trade is deemed to be a desirable development 
activity —  an issue of considerable debate —  the multinational 
company is in a position to offer a valuable and necessary service.
How often that position is well used, either by the company or the 
host society, is a matter for other case studies. In the instance of 
the United Brands Company in Cameroon, however, it is a position that 
has, on the whole and most successfully in the 1950s, been filled with 
tact and diplomacy and a genuine contribution to the development of 
Cameroon.
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UNPUBLISHED SOURCES
Archives
Government Archives
Archives Nationales (Section d 1Outre-Mer)
Paris, Prance
Carton 29, Dossier (formerly Cameroun AP11/27, Dossier 8) - for 
material relating to the governorship of Pierre Boisson during 
the 1930s.
There is also a good collection of periodicals concerned with 
overseas affairs and the Journal Officiel du Cameroun, which 
published laws and arr§tes of the Mandate period on the French 
Cameroons. Periodical articles are listed in a subject card 
catalogue.
Archives Nationales du Cameroun 
Yaounde, Cameroon
Domaniale 759 - for land tenure information and land concession 
information about the French Cameroons during the 1930s.
National Archives of Cameroon 
Buea, Cameroon
Archive Reference no. Qd/a (1959 and 1966), no. 630: "Elders and 
Fyffes General Correspondance".
It should be noted that the Buea Archives preferred that 
permission be obtained from the Yaounde Archives before access 
was granted.
Company Files
Fyffes Group
London, United Kingdom
New Trading Agreement ... 14 October 1958 between The Cameroons 
Development Corporation of Nigeria ... and Elders and Fyffes, 
Limited of ... London.
New Service Agreement ... 14 October 1958 between the Cameroons 
Development Corporation of Nigeria ... and Elders and Fyffes 
Limited of ... London.
La Compagnie des Bananes 
Penja, Cameroon
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Syndicat de Defense des Int6r§ts Bananiers - a chronological file 
of meeting minutes, reports, memorandums or circulars distributed 
by the Syndicat. The file contained material from mid-1959 to 
the early 1970s.
FEBACAM/UGECOBAM: Federation Bananiere du Cameroun, later named 
Union Generale des Cooperatives Bananieres du Mungo - a 
chronlogical file of meeting minutes of FEBACAM/UGECOBAM from 
1960 to the mid-1970s.
Personal Files
Alistair McLaurin 
Staines, England
1937 map of Mungo concessions and of the land either planted in 
bananas or to be planted in bananas, as well as indications of 
banana crops contracted to la Compagnie des Bananes.
Dr. Emmanuel Endeley 
Buea, Cameroon
BCUF file - contracts and correspondance pertaining to the 
Bakweri Cooperative-Union of Farmers from the late 1950s to the 
mid-1970s.
BCUF/Bavenga file - correspondance pertaining to the takeover of 
Elders and Fyffes Bavenga Plantations by the Bakweri Cooperative 
Union of Farmers, 1960s to the present.
Endeley, E.M.L.; Burnley, G.E.; and Mukete, D.M. "Memorandum on 
Land Tenure and Problems Resulting from Ruthless Alientation of 
Land in the Fako Division." Buea, Cameroon: mimeographed 
communication to His Excellency the President of the United 
Republic of Cameroon, 17 September 1973.
Co-operative Department of the Southern Cameroons. Annual 
Reports* of the Co-operative Department 1954-56 and 1956-58.
Buea, Southern Cameroons: Government Press, 1957 and 1959.
Much of the material from the personal and company files has been 
placed in the Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
London.
Interviews
Christian d'Ambriere: Manager, Nassif Planatation, Loum-Chantiers, 
Cameroon.
Aloyios Ajab Amin: Department of Economics, University of Yaound€, 
Yaound 6, Cameroon.
Fon Adii Lucas Anyangwe: Chartered Surveyor and Photogrammetrist, 
Ministere de l'Urbanisme et de 1*Habitat, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Edwin Ardener: Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford, England.
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Paul Bardou: Manager, Procurement of Green Bananas, la Compagnie des 
Bananes, Rungis, France.
Samuel Bateki: Directeur du Commerce, Ministere de l ’Economie et du 
Plan, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Benedicta Biaka: formerly of Service de Statistiques, Yaounde, 
Cameroon, Buea, Cameroon.
Warren G. Breck: Executive Vice President, United Brands Company, New 
York, USA.
Monsieur J. Brun: Institut de Recherches sur les Fruits et Agrumes, 
Paris, France.
Jean Champion: Institut de Recherches sur les Fruits et Agrumes, 
Paris, France.
Max Clement: Directeur-adjoint, la Compagnie des Bananes, Penja, 
Cameroon.
Jean-Louis Dongmo: Head, Department of Geography, University of 
Yaounde, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Jacques Eckebil: Director, Institut de Recherche Agronomique, 
Nkolbisson, Cameroon.
Athanacious Eddia: Plantation Manager, Ekona Banana Estate, Cameroons 
Development Corporation, Ekona, Cameroon; formerly Elders and Fyffes 
employee and manager of Bavenga Plantation.
Thomas Kolle Ekaney: Director of Lands, Ministlre de l'Urbanisme et 
Cadastre, Yaounde, Cameroon.
George Eldridge: Vice President, United Brands Company, New York,
USA.
Salomon Elogo: Directeur G§n£ral de 1'Organisation Camerounaise de la 
Banane, Douala, Cameroon.
Hon. Dr. Emmanuel Endeley: Buea, Cameroon; former Prime Minister of 
the Southern Cameroons under British Mandate and President of the 
Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers.
Chief Justice Endeley: Chairman, Cameroons Development Corporation, 
Bota, Cameroon.
Dr. S.J. Epale: Secretary-General, Economic Council, General 
Assembly, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Peter Fonkem: Businessman, Kumba, Cameroon.
Michel Foyet: Chef de Centre de Nyombe, Institut de Recherche 
Agronomique, Nyomb§, Cameroon.
Rene Gacon: President, Agrisol, S.A., Paris, France; former president 
of la Compagnie des Bananes, Paris, France.
Monsieur Gaudin: Manager, CAM and Boubou Plantations, Penja,
Cameroon.
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Reverend Father Guth: Catholic Mission, Nyombe, Cameroon.
Albert Ikoni: BIAO, Douala, Cameroon; son of West Cameroon banana 
farmer.
Didier Jean: CAMATRANS, (forwarding agents for the banana trade), 
Douala, Cameroon.
T.S. Jones: Natural Resources Advisor, Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, London, England; formerly General Manager of the 
Cameroons Development Corporation, Bota, Cameroon.
Happy Louis Kemayou: Mungo banana farmer and former president of the 
East Cameroon Legislative Assembly.
David Fonky Kukah: Surveyor, Service de I’Urbanisme and Cadastre, 
Yaounde, Cameroon.
Kongnso Lafon: Management Assistant, Head Office, Cameroons 
Development Corporation, Bota, Cameroon.
A* Lassoudiere: Technical Advisor, Institut de Recherche Agronomique, 
Nyombe, Cameroon.
Pierre Leobon: Director, Fruitiere Camerounaise, Douala and Penja, 
Cameroon.
Alistair McLaurin: retired, Staines, England; former manager of la 
Compagnie des Bananes, Penja, Cameroon.
Monsieur Mallisard: Manager, OCB plantations, Cameroon, seconded from 
Institut de Recherches sur les Fruit et Agrumes, Paris, France.
John Mallet: Technical Advisor, National Produce Marketing Board, 
Victoria, Cameroon; former Assistant Registrar of Co-operatives.
Jean-Paul Michel: Agrichim, Douala, Cameroon.
Jean Monnet: Technical Advisor, Institut de Recherche Agronomique, 
Nyombe, Cameroon.
Alain Moreau: Manager, SPNP Plantation, Nyombe, Cameroon.
Mr. Motuba: Assistant director, Office of Lands, Buea, Cameroon.
rj ' ' ™ »
Philippe Moumi§: Directeur-adjoint, Organisation Camerounaise de la 
Banane, Douala, Cameroon.
Salomon Mpondo: Douala, Cameroon, former president of the Syndicat de 
Defense des Intirets Bananiers and president of a banana cooperative.
Victor Mukete: Kumba, Cameroon; former Chairman of the Cameroons 
Development Corporation, Bota, Cameroon, Vice President of the 
Cameroon Chamber of Commerce.
Simon Ledoux Ngamondi: Mungo banana farmer; Secretaire departemental 
de I 1Union National du Cameroun du Mungo 2eme.
Monsieur Ngosso: Mungo banana farmer; former secretary of the Union 
Bananiere, smallholders1 cooperative.
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John Ngu: G&ntlral Manager, Cameroons Development Corporation, Bota, 
Cameroon.
Peter M. Ngu: Administrative and Financial Director, Conseil National 
des Chargeurs du Cameroun, Douala, Cameroon.
Michel Essom Njaleu: Mungo banana farmer; President of Syndicat de 
Defense des Intdrets Bananiers.
Rose Njeck: Service de Statistique, Section Cartographique, Yaounde, 
Cameroon.
Martin Oyebog: Chief Production Manager, Cameroons Development 
Corporation, Bota, Cameroon.
Charles Penny: President, la Compagnie des Bananes, Rungis, France; 
Director, Fyffes Group, London, England,
David Philp: Director, Fyffes Group, London, England; former manager 
of the Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers, Southern Cameroons.
Monsieur Picire: Nassif Plantation, Loum-Chantiers, Cameroon.
Martin Pokam: Chef de Service de Climatologie et des Statistiques, 
Direction de la MStSrologie Nationale, Douala, Cameroon.
Bernal Quiros: Vice President, United Brands Company, New York, USA.
Jean Ratillon: Director, la Compagnie des Bananes, Penja, Cameroon.
John Robertson: Technical Advisor, banana plantations, Cameroons 
Development Corporation, Ekona, Cameroon.
Duane E. Sams: Head, Commercial and Economic Section, American 
Embassy, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Ronald Senfftleben: Directeur General, Agrichim, Douala, Cameroon.
Simon S. Shang: Technical Advisor, Ministry of Agriculture, Yaounde, 
Cameroon, President, Conseil dTAdministration, Organisation 
Camerounaise de la Banane; former Registrar of Cooperatives, Bota, 
Cameroon.
Marius Talla: Mungo banana farmer.
Cyrille Tchoumo: Mungo banana farmer.
Monsieur Tsalefac: Centre G6ographique Nationale, Yaounde, Cameroon.
Raymond Waroquier: Sales Manager, la Compagnie des Bananes, Rungis, 
France.
Cam H. Wickham: Economist, Agency for International Development, 
Yaounde, Cameroon.
Dr. Omar Yembe: Cultural Counsellor, Cameroon Embassy, London, England 
son of banana farmer, British Cameroons.
NOTE: All titles and occupations are those held as of May 1982.
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APPENDIX A
1884
1899
1901
1914
1915
1916
1921
1922
1936
1948
1960
1962
1966
ADMINISTRATIVE TIMELINES
United Republic of Cameroon United Brands Company of New York. 
Germany annexes Kamerun.
United Fruit Co. formed in Boston.
Elders and Fyffes Co. set up in 
London.
Kamerun taken by British 
and French allied forces.
United Fruit Co. buys Elders and 
Fyffes.
Occupied territory divided 
between Britain and France.
La Compagnie des Bananes set up by 
Elders and Fyffes to sell bananas 
in France.
Start of administration under 
British and French mandates 
from League of Nations; later 
Trusteeships of United Nations.
La Compagnie des Bananes begins 
business in the French Cameroons.
Elders and Fyffes starts work in 
the British Cameroons1 Southern 
Province.
French Cameroons becomes 
independant Republic of 
Cameroon.
Southern Province of British 
Cameroons votes to join 
Cameroon Republic; creation 
of Federal Republic of 
Cameroon.
Elders and Fyffes leaves Cameroon; 
la Compagnie des Bananes remains,
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1969 Fyffes Group Ltd. formed out of 
new diversified holdings.
1970
1972
United Brands Co. formed from 
United Fruit Co. and AMK 
Corporation.
Federation dissolved;
United Republic of Cameroon 
created.
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APPENDIX A
TIMELINE OF THE BANANA TRADE OF ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON
1922 British Mandate officially begins.
1924 Mount Cameroon plantations bought back by former German
owners.
1928-32 Banana exports to Germany rise from 281 tonnes per year to 
17,404 tonnes.
1940 Banana exports halted by war for lack of shipping.
1946 Cameroons Development Corporation (CDC) created from former
German plantations.
1948 Elders and Fyffes acquires 18-year lease on Likomba
plantation and sign shipping agreement with the CDC.
1952 Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers (BCUF) formed to
negotiate smallholder banana sales with the CDC.
1956 CDC begins reducing banana acreage.
1957 Elders and Fyffes start negotiation for 10,000 acres at
Bavenga for development as banana plantations.
1958 Elders and Fyffes sign agreement with the BCUF to second 
managerial staff to the cooperative.
1960 Peak production; exports approximately 76,000 tonnes.
1961 Southern Province votes to federate with the Republic of 
Cameroon.
1963 Commonwealth preference for Cameroon fruit expires; new
tarrif imposed.
1966 Bavenga plantations turned over to the BCUF.
Likomba Estate returned to the CDC.
Elders and Fyffes withdraws.
CDC agrees to sell fruit to France through la Compagnie des 
Bananas.
1970 Banana exports from the BCUF virtually nil.
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APPENDIX A
TIMELINE OF THE BANANA TRADE OF FRANCOPHONE CAMEROON
1922 French Mandate officially begins.
1928 Douala/Nkongsamba railroad completed.
1931 Europeans introduce export banana cultivation to Mungo.
1932 France closes market to non-franc zone bananas.
1936 La Compagnie des Bananes obtains one-hundred-hectare 
concession at Penja and begins managing Nassif plantation 
in bananas.
mid-1930s Syndicat de Defense des Interets Bananiers formed.
1941 Banana exports halted by war; British subsidy of Mungo 
banana planters begins.
1948-9 Quota agreement between European and Cameroonian planters 
of Mungo; Cameroonian producers allowed sixty percent of 
all banana exports.
1958 Peak banana production in Mungo; exports approximately 
85,000 tonnes.
1959 9 April - first Cameroonian president of the Syndicat is 
elected.
10 April - African Planters’ Motion protesting the high 
cost of the trade.
3 May - smallholders’ strike begins.
1959-60 State of civil war in Mungo; government military reprisal 
decline of Syndicat begins.
1961 Conversion to Poyo/Cavendish varieties begins.
1964 Organisation Camerounaise de la Banana (0CB) formed to 
work on conversion programme.
1967 0CB plantations created on smallholders’ land.
1975 Entrance of la Compagnie Fruitiere; declining importance 
of la Compagnie des Bananes.
1980 Syndicat memorandum to President of Cameroon Republic 
signalling weakness of the trade.
1982 Fall in banana production disrupts regular shipping; 
government issues subsidy to banana trade.
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APPENDIX B
KEY TO MAP 15, "MUNGO BANANA PLANTATIONS OF THE 195QS"
~ Number Name Hectares
1. Jeremy no data
2. Dikoum€ Oho 13
3. Mich. Meimaris Kirakos 128
4. Alexander Sarandis 115
5. Louis Rouger 55
6. la Compagnie des Bananes 124
7. Socilte Charles Homerides et Compagnie 223
8. la Compagnie des Bananes 141
9. la Compagnie des Bananes 101
10. Chtos. M. Rossides 106
11. Gerasimos Mavromatis 327
12. Lucien Pierre and Lucienne Alice Ferrand 178
13. Priso—Belle ■ no data
14. Cotsiomitis 96
15. Ewane Mouanjo no data
16. Cotsiomitis no data
17. SARL Carron at R. Vallee 187
18. George Oger 94
19. Mub. no data
20. Germaine R Robert Oger 122
Madame Aux Jaqueline Andre
21. Louis Rouger 37
22. Mavromatis
23. Socidte Plantations Djoungo-Penja 114
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Number Name Hectares
24. Edouard Misse 10
25. Les Tabacs du Cameroun (now known as SPNP: no data
Societe des Plantations de Nyombe et Penja)
26. Socidte des Produits Exotiques no data
27. Raymond Peroneille 21
28. Societd Charles Homerides et Compagnie 223
29. PRATS Syndicat de Defense des Intdrets Bananiers 55
30. la Compagnie des Bananes 100
31. Jean Leon Thesters 110
32. Caplain 50
33. Societd des Plantations Djoungo-Penja 365
34. Marie Charles Agnes 100
35. Georges Oger 40
36. Compagnie Agricole du Mungo 108
37. Jean Pallier 124
38. Compagnie Agricole du Mungo 100
39. Socidtd Plantations du Haut-Penja 227
40. Paul Sholler 121
41. Socidte Plantations du Haut-Penja no data
42. Beynis 75
43. Louis Ldon Bondan 110
44. Nassif Plantation (upper) 388
(lower) 421
45. Charles Mangou 92
46. Genevieve Marie Renard 35
Jose Jean Martirene
Franqoise Jeanne Martirene
47. Laborie (SPROA) 435
48. CFSO (south) 139
(north) 317
49. Rend Jolly 440
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Number Name Hectares
50. Louis Jean Bondan 77
51. Bouvier no data
52. Vauve Papageorgiades 78
53. Alkminu Homerides 81
54. Laborie no data
55. Maurice Njoke 79
56. Myron Coulaxides 45
57. les Caf ds du Cameroun no data
(en cours d1immatricultation: sections a-h)
58. Ngassa and J . Rend no data
Source: SATET, Douala, Cameroon. "La Bananidre du Mungo" 1955-1958
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APPENDIX G: SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM THE 1959 SMALLHOLDERS’ STRIKE,
MUNGO
MOTION ADOPTEE PAR LES FLANTEURS AFRICAINS DE BANANES 
A L ’EXPORTATION DANS SA REUNION DU 10 AVRIL 1959
Attendu que la baisse constatee H 1’exportation de bananes est 
due aux frais multiples et que de ce fait les planteurs depuis plus de 
six mois travaillent & pert et n ’arrive plus' a couvrir des frais 
Snormes de main-d’oeuvre.
Les planteurs r^unis i. LOUM le 10 Avril 1959 a 8 heures sous le 
hangar de la gare bananiere de LOUM, ont adopts la motion suivante:
1° - La suppression Immediate de la C.A.T.A.
2° - La suppression de l’emballage,
3° - La suppression du marche a terme, en remplacement du
paiement comptant de la banane rendue a Bonaberi avec 
conditions,
4° - Une greve indSterminee d partir du 3 mai 1959 au cas ou 
satisfaction ne nous sera donnee.
Les Planteurs Africains du Mungo
1° - EPAKA Martin
2° - JOHNE Jean
3° - NGANGUE Doolo
4° - LOBE Richard
5° - NSEKEAM Arman
6° - KEUGOU Marcel
7° - NTOYO Maurice
8° - TCHANE Georges
9° - NGANKAM Zacharie
10° - NJOUME Gustave
11° - SOP Tohoula
13° - YOYEME Elie
SOURCE: Syndicat de Defense des Interets Bananiers du Cameroun 
(Penja, Cameroon, Syndicat minutes).
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APPENDIX C: SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM THE 1959 SMALLHOLDERS’ STRIKE,
MUNGO
MOTION PRESENTEE PAR LES PRESIDENTS DE COOPERATIVES
attirent instamment 1'attention du Gouvernement sur le grave 
m&contentement des planteurs africains, du fait que pendant six mois 
non seulement les planteurs n'ont rien pergu pour les bananes 
chargees, mais encore leurs cooperatives se sont endettees.
Constatant que les planteurs et leurs organismes sont au bout de leurs 
forces :
D E M A N D E N T
1° - la suspension immediate de la taxe de 3 francs qui finance la 
C.A.T.A. en attendant sa suppression par I’Assemblee.
2° - Demandent que de meme qu'il y a deux ans un arrStS a realise un 
abattement de 10% sur la taxe de sortie pour alleger les 
charges de plantations tornadees,
Ce degrevement de 10% soit applique a la periode allant du 
PREMIER SEPTEMBRE 1958 au 28 FEVRIER 1959;
3° - Demandent la remboursement de la taxe prelevSe sur la banane 
non emball&e puisque les conditions qui ont justifie la 
creation de cette taxe n 1existent plus;
4° - Demandent au Gouvernement d ’ouvrir une enquSte rapide et de
prendre les mesures pour l’allegement des charges qui pesent 
sur la banane:
TARIF DE FRET, TARIF FERROVIAIRE, etc, etc.
5° - Demandment lfapplication imm€diate du conditionnement en gare
en attendant la creation le plus vite possible de l 1Office des 
Produits;
6° - Les Cooperatives demandent a §tre consultees sur l ’emploi des 
credits et moyens du fonds Routier car il ne sert a rien de 
faire une propagande en faveur de la qualite, si les pistes 
d ? evacuation sont en mauvais §tat*.
WAMBO Louis 
SIDI Gabriel 
WAGNA Sach£e 
MP0ND0 Salomon 
KINGUE Pierre 
NJITCHANG Pierre 
KWOPNANG Moise 
PENDA Paul
COPLABAM
SCOARM
SCAPBB
C0F0UR
UNION BANANIERE 
C .P.M.
C0F0UBAM
C.A.M.
SOURCE: Syndicat de Defense des Intirets Bananiers du Cameroun 
(Penja, Cameroon, Syndicat minutes).
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APPENDIX C: SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM THE 1959 SMALLHOLDERS' STRIKE,
MUNGO
COMMUNIQUE DU MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ECONOMIQUES
LE GOUVERNEMENT PREND D 1IMPORTANTES MESURES 
POUR ASSA1NIR LE MARCHE BANANIER 
CREATION PROCHAINE D'UNE CAISSE DE STABILISATION DES COURS
YAOUNDE, 25 MAI - Le Ministere des Affaires Economiques communique :
"La chute des cours de la banane sur le Marche frangais ayant mis 
les planteurs dans une position difficile, les prix de realisation 
depassant le montant des frais d'Evacuation, le Gouvernement 
camerounais s'est imm^diatement consacre a la recherche des mesures 
propres a remedier d une telle situation. II convient de souligner 
tout d'abord que 1'element essentiel de cette conjoncture a savoir les 
prix de vente a l'exterieur lui Schappaient totalement. La seule 
possibilite qui lui restait etait d'etudier avec les producteurs et 
les divers intermediates les mesures propres a alleger les frais 
inclus entre le stade plantation et le stade vente en France -
Apres une reunion pr^liminaire tenue a Yaounde au Ministere des 
Affaires Economiques et groupant les ministres et techniciens 
interesses a la question, M. Fouda, ministre des Affaires Economiques, 
recevait du premier ministre mission de se rendre en zone bananiere 
afin de prendre un contact direct avec les planteurs. Trois reunions 
furent tenues le 2 Mai d Mbanga, Loum et Nlohe auxquelles les 
planteurs assistSrent en foule -
Le ministre recueillit les desiderata des planteurs et leur donna 
1'assurance que le Gouvernement s'emploirait dans le plus bref delai d 
trouver des solutions aux problemes poses -
Les 8, 12 et 14 mai etaient convoqu§s successivement a Yaounde 
les representants des transitaires, les Compagnies de Navigation, le 
Conseil d'Administration de la Regie des Chemins de Fer, et le Conseil 
d 1Administration de la CATA -
A la suite de ces reunions et entrevues, le Gouvernement a decide 
de prendre et de faire appliquer immediatement les mesures suivantes :
1/- suspension immediate de la taxe de 3 firs perque au profit de la
CATA en attendant sa suppression definitive -
2/- tarif des Chemins de Fer ramene de 14, 50 a 14 frs la tonne
kilometrique et minimum de perception ramene de 12 a 10 tonnes du 
15 septembre au 14 mars et de 10 S 8 tonnes du 15 mars au 14 
septembre -
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3/- commission des exportateurs ramenee de 5 a 4% -
4/- assurance ramenee au taux le plus bas actuellement applique par 
la Compagnie des Bananes -
5/- suppression de 1'assurance sur les risques de guerre, de la 
cotisation propagande, de la cotisation importateurs -
6/- reduction des honoraires d'agrees en douane de 156,25 la tonne a 
125 frs -
7/- commission sur debours ramenee de 1,50 d 0,50% -
8/- suppression de la cotisation de 180 frs la tonne perque au profit 
de la Caisse de compensation privee.
L ’ensemble de ces mesures aura pour effet d’augmenter la 
remuneration du planteur de 280 a 300 millions par an sur la base d ’un 
tonnage normal d’exportation.
En outre, les Compagnies de Navigation ont accept^ d’etudier un 
systeme de tarif de fret avec ristournes applicables dans le cas ou la 
situation des chargements redeviendrait normale.
Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement a d€cide de mettre en place aussi 
rapidement que possible le conditionnement dans les gares bananieres. 
Cette mesure doit rdduire tres substantiellement les frais 
d ’evacuation du produit. En effet, les planteurs ne supporteront plus 
les frais de transport fer pour des regimes ultSrieurement refuses d 
Bonaberi.
Enfin, il sera proc^de dans le plus bref dglai possible au 
renouvellement des Conseils dfAdministration des Cooperatives.
II convient de noter que nombre des dispositions prises vont au- 
deld des d&sirs exprim§s par les planteurs.
Le Gouvernement a fair le maximum dans le minimum de temps pour 
assainir une situation dont, nous le repStons, la cause essentielle 
reside dans la chute des prix sur le Marchd exterieur. A cet egard, 
le Gouvernement a mis a l’&tude la creation d’une Caisse de 
Stabilisation des cours de la Banane. Cette Caisse permettra 
d ’absorber les fluctuations des prix et d1assurer une remuneration 
normale du planteur en toute conjoncture.
II appartient maintenant aux planteurs de reprendre et meme de 
d&velopper leurs activitis afin de profiter des gains que leur 
vaudront les mesures dvoquees ci-dessus. Leur attention dt€ par 
ailleurs attir€e sur la nicessitd qui s’impose a eux d’effectuer les 
traitements phytosanitaires par leurs propres moyens, ces traitements
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seront dfailleurs rendus obligatoires. Ils devront egalement 
ameliorer la qualitd de leur produit afin d ’en assurer le placement 
sur les marches exterieurs m§me en pdriode de surproduction 
mondiale".
PENJA, le 27 Mai 1959.
Pour copie certifiee conforme, 
Le Directeur du S.D.I.B.C.
P. LEOBON
SOURCE: Syndicat de Defense des Interdts Bananiers du Cameroun 
(Penja, Cameroon, Syndicat minutes).
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APPENDIX D
LABOUR RECRUITMENT IN THE FRENCH CAMEROONS AS DESCRIBED 
BY IRENE DUGAST, 1942
Ayons done le courage de notre honte et transportons-nous dans les 
villages pour prendre part au recrutement. L 1Office du Travail a dit 
au chef supdrieur: "Tu dois me donner 40 homines". Les yeux
brillants, il appelle ses chefs de village et leur transmet la 
consigne: "On me demande 60 horames, donnez-les moi vite". Les chefs
de village decident entre eux du nombre que chacun donnera pour 
fournir les 60 hommes. "Mois, je peux en donner dix". II appelle ses 
messagers et leur dit en secret: "Donnez-moi quinze hommes". Les
messagers, munis de leur redoutable chicote s’abattent alors sur les 
villages et se saisissent de qui ils rencontrent, de jour ou de nuit. 
Certes, le chef du village leur a indiqud ses ennemis, eux-mdmes ont 
les leurs, et ils savent les trouver. Dans les cases, dans les 
champs, ils font la chasse a l’homme. Sans pitid ils frappent et 
blessent, mais tant mieux. "Tu veux dtre liberd? donne-moi une poule, 
donne-moi 5 F. Tu n'en as pas? tant pis pour toi". Ils en prennent le 
plus grand nombre possible pour pouvoir en libdrer le plus possible 
contre des cadeaux rdmundrateurs. Quelle joie pour eux que les 
pdriodes de recrutement! Vite on ramene chez le. chef de village ceux 
qui n ’ont pas pu se racheter, et souvent sans leur avoir d’abord 
permis de retourner jusqu'a leur case ou de prendre congd de leurs 
femmes. Ils-sont enfermds & cld pour etre livrds a l’echelon 
superieur le lendemaln. Le chef a requ les 20 hommes demandes. Mais 
alors il intervient a son tour: "Que ceux qui veulent dtre libdres me
fasse un cadeau; qui veut se racheter?" L ’un promet 2 poulets, deux 
autres se cotisent pour donner une chdvre, un 4e apportera 10 mesures 
de mais, le 5e une grosse calebasse d’huile. Comme il est facile de 
s'entendre! Cinq seront libdres. Les 15 demandds seront envoyds au 
chef supdrieur. Mais ces 5 libdrds peuvent-ils rentrer chez eux? Ce 
serait trop simple. "SI vraiment tu veux dtre libdre, que ta femme 
m'apporte le cadeau promis mais tu travailleras d'abord pour moi 
pendant une semaine". II n ’y a qu'a accepter sans discuter, et 
nourris a peine, ces 5 hommes serviront & tous les travaux avant de 
regagner leurs foyers.
Pendant ce temps, leurs 15 camarades sont amends chez le chef 
supdrieur. Dans l’espace de quelques jours les 60 hommes sont trouves 
et reunis devant lui. Maintenant commence la meme comddie de rachat: 
"Qui veut me faire un cadeau? Celui qui me donnera une chdvre sera 
libre de rentrer chez lui". Que le sacrifice soit dnorme, on 
l’accepte plutot que d ’aller se ruiner plus encore dans une 
plantation. "Moi, je donne la cheve", dit l'un. "Je ne veux pas de 
ta chevre", rdpond le chef qui depuis longtemps ddsire prendre la 
femme du malheureux. II sait d’avance lesquels partiront coute que 
coute, et il faut bien qu’ils partent, ils n ’ont de recours aupres de 
personne si le chef supdrieur le.veut ainsi. L ’un ou l'autre voudrait
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meme, lors de son passage d la subdivision, plaider sa cause pour etre 
libdrd, il ne le peut pas car a quelles persecutions ultdrieures ne 
s 'expose-t-il pas de la part du chef supdrieur, de son chef de 
village, de tous les messagers?
Pendant que les recrutds passent par tous les services administratifs, 
les 20 libdres du chef supdrieur partent pour le travail du potentat. 
Ils passent 15 jours a un mois dans ses propres plantations de cafd, 
travaillant en recevant la ration de 0,30 F. par jour, seront sous les 
verroux la nuit et affamds, ne seront libdres qu'aprds le versement de 
leur prix de rachat.
Voild done nos recrutds amends d la subdivision. Ils passent la 
visite mddicale. Le medecin, s'il n'est pas consciencieux, voit 
arriver avec terreur tous ces hommes et se dit: "Les infirmiers
peuvent bien faire ce travail". Quelle chance pour les infirmiers!
Car eux aussi peuvent dire: "Tu es inapte si je regois un poulet".
Un autre recevra la visite de sa concubine: "Celui-ci ion frere,
laisse-le, tu le remplaceras par un malade que tu avals renvoyd.
Dans tous les contingents qui passent la visite mddicale il y a des 
inaptes. L'un est rachitique, 1'autre a une hernie: un troisieme est
trop vieux. Plus il y aura d'Inaptes, plus le chef superieur s'en 
rejouira car ils seront "cueillis" apres la visite, et au lieu de 
rentrer chez eux, le vieux, le rachitique, le hernissieux vont 
rejoindre au travail les rachetes. Le chef superieur a done su 
recruter comme la plantation europdenne.
Enfin le contingent etant au complet, ils peuvent partir dans les 
plantations, sour l'oeil vigilant des policiers* Et nous, serions 
nous assez sots pour ne pas avoir notre petit profit? Si tu me donnes 
2 F je te remplacerai ce soir par un autre".
SOURCE: Jean-Louis Dongmo, Le Dynamise bami1eke (Cameroun) Volume I:
La maitrise de l'espace agraire (Yaoundd, Cameroon: University 
de Yaoundd, Ministere de 1'Education Nationale, Ddlegation 
gdnerale a la Recherche Scientifique et Technique, 1981) , 
pp. 122-30.
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